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Abstract
Preparation for the twenty-first century presents Taiwan's education
with a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to reflect upon
the existing value system; the opportunity is to innovate.
The thesis has seven chapters. The first chapter deals with educational
provision in Taiwan. The difficulties of teaching critical thinking in
Taiwan are located in distortions of the educational function, the
instrumental role of teachers and the traditional type of teaching and
learning.
The second chapter looks at how education is framed by culture and
society. A lack of autonomy is identified as the major crisis of
education in Taiwan.
In the third chapter, the characteristics of critical thinking are shown in
its four modes: the supernatural mode, the empirical mode, the
subject-dialectical mode and the communicative mode.
In chapter four, a definition of critical thinking is given. It is suggested
that the commonalities of critical thinking are autonomy, dialectical
development, multi-dimensional cognition, emancipation from
alienation, and reconstruction.
In chapter five, a good life based on critical thinking is sketched out,
which is made up of autonomy, harmony and reconstruction.
The task of chapter six is clarifying the distinction between education
and indoctrination; and arguing that autonomy is an adequate criterion
for distinguishing education from indoctrination.
Chapter seven is devoted to working out the principles for the teaching
of critical thinking. It is suggested that these principles are those of
emancipation, autonomy and reconstruction.
Overall, this thesis is aimed at developing a theoretical foundation for
specifying what critical thinking is; assessing the specific cultural and
educational obstacles to its introduction in Taiwan; and the thesis
concludes with suggestions about how to put critical thinking into
educational practice through evolutionary innovation.
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Introduction
This thesis arises, initially, out of the personal experience of the author (as
a teacher in the primary school), out of the professional experience of the
author (as a trainer of teachers in Taiwan), and out of the civic experience
of the author, as a citizen of Taiwan in the present, rather interesting,
times.
The author's concern with this topic arises, then, existentially. But as an
academic, the author's concern with this topic is as a philosopher. What
are the constituents and the process of a good life? What are the
constituents and the process of a good education? What are the obstacles to
both? What might be changed - at the level of philosophic principle - to
secure either or both?
Thus, in reality, the author's interpretation begins with the details of
primary school education in the socio-economic and sociopolitical contexts
of Taiwan. In philosophic analysis, however, the author's interpretation
begins in an anxiety to define the good life, a good education and the
dimensions of critical thinking which are probably essential to both.
The author takes the concept of critical thinking from Habermas, who is a
philosopher with a strong sociological vision of the good society. The
thesis is not an application of Habermas (applied Habermas, as it were), but
the thesis is suffused with Habermas' concepts and categories, and with the
value system which Habermas himself espouses.
Although, educational activities will be examined, and the concept of
critical thinking will be explicated in educational activities and life, this
thesis is concerned more with theoretical research than with practical
research. This is for two reasons:
a) in Taiwan the theoretical foundation for education is underdeveloped
compared with practical strategies: educational researches in Taiwan are
always colonial, especially via the colonialism of the United States of
America. For example, Dewey's educational theory was pervasive in
Taiwan before 1960s. Then, the theory of accountability in teacher
education has been enforced in Taiwan since 1 960s. Educational theory
grounded in Taiwan's educational practice has hardly been invented so
far, and
b) educational practice needs to be guided by educational theory:
educational theory must be based on educational practice, while
educational practice must be guided by educational theories. However,
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educational theory must be taken as a priority, when such a theory
needs to be clarified, or when educational practice needs to be reflected.
In this sense, developing strong arguments as the theoretical foundation
for critical thinking teaching must be appreciated in Taiwan, because the
theory of critical thinking has not yet been established in Taiwan.
In Taiwan, pupils are more courageous than students or teachers in
universities to appeal for their autonomy to the Ministry of Education
(Lin, 1987, 101-103). This phenomenon makes the teaching of critical
thinking starting from primary school education significant. This is also
the reason why primary school education is the focus of my attention in
this thesis.
In general, this thesis can be divided into three parts: a) reflecting critically
upon education; b) investigating rationally the nature of critical thinking;
and c) the concept of critical thinking is thoughtfully applied to education
and life. However, practical strategies in education and life will not be
mapped out, because it is assumed in this thesis that everyone is an
autonomous person, so as to be able to exercise critical thinking in his own
life.
3
Chapter 1
CONTROL AND CRITICAL THINKING IN PRIMARY
SCHOOL EDUCATION IN TAIWAN
I. Control by the Ministry of Education
A. Educational Aims
B. Administration
C. Textbooks
D. Objectives in teaching
II. The difficulties of teaching critical thinking
A. The distorted educational function
B. The instrumental role of teachers
C. Teaching and learning of the traditional type
Conclusion
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Chapter 1
CONTROL AND CRITICAL THINKING IN PRIMARY
SCHOOL EDUCATION IN TAIWAN
Education is a complex consequence of the relation between culture, society
person, and the institutionalisation of instruction. Primary school
education is the foundation of all levels of education; and a good primary
school education is the necessary foundation for a successful education in
terms of human development.
Ideally, in order to comprehend educational activity, we must not only
understand education in the school, but also reflect on its framings by
culture and society. This task will be dealt with in chapter two.
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In this chapter the emphasis is on an analysis of education in schools, along
two dimensions, both of which affect critical thinking and the ability to
develop it in a school system. Two dimensions are a) the control of the
Ministry of Education; and b) obstacles to teaching critical thinking in
Taiwan. The first dimension includes an analysis of educational aims, the
pattern of administrative relations between schools, textbooks and
objectives in teaching. The second dimension concentrates on the formal
curriculum and blockages in the teaching of critical thinking.
I. Control by the Ministry of Education
The reason why the four elements (of educational aims, the administrative
pattern, textbooks, and teaching objectives) are picked out is that they
illuminate the question of who controls school education in Taiwan. In
other words, examining these selected educational elements paves the way
to reflecting upon the deep authority structures of education, which come
from the framings of culture and society.
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A. Aims of Education
The Manchu Government published the Regulations Governing the
Establishment of Schools in 1902 (The Ministry of Education, 1988a). A
number of things in these Regulations, and the pattern of the educational
system, have been changed during the past ninety years (Yang, in Chinese
Education Association (ed.), 1988, 280). These changes have come about
because of the impact of scientific achievements in Western countries. In
reflecting upon Chinese society, J. D. Chung, one of officers of the Manchu
Government, suggested to the Government that Chinese education must be
changed from the pure Chinese style, based in Chinese thought, toward the
integration of Chinese culture with Western scientific knowledge and
methods (Lai and Chi, 1977, vol. 2). The scientific achievement in
Western countries seemed to offer the chance to develop the economy and
industry; but to catch up in economic and industrial development,
educational policy (including aims, the structure of the system and
curriculum contents) needed to change.
All changes to this regulation since the end of the Ching dynasty have been
intended to combine the Chinese systems of thought with Western (Yang, in
Chinese Education Association (ed.), 1988, 276 - 280). Sun Yat Sen
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finally made a synthesis of Western and Chinese thoughts to establish the
theory of The Three Principles of the People. For the Chinese, this is a
theory to improve the progress of Chinese nation and society. In his
theory, Sun pointed out the principles of nationalism, democracy, and
livelihood as guides for the reconstruction of China (Sun, 1923).
Chinese education has been directed by The Three Principles of the People
since 1929 (The Aim of Chinese Education, 1929). In the contemporary
period, Chiang Kai-shek claimed that "the theory of the Three Principles of
the People is the model of education for the Chinese" (Chiang, 1 974a, 65).
Since 1949, all levels of education in Taiwan must follow this Aim: the
educational aim of the Three Principles of the People, under the guidance
of the Central Government.
These aims claim that:
the purpose of Chinese education is to improve national living, to achieve
mutual assistance, to develop national economic life and to prolong the life
of the nation, so that we can attain, by all means, independence of the
nation, democracy and a higher standard of living, and in the end, advance
to an ideal world where harmony and equality prevail (The Ministry of
Education, 1988a, 4).
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These Aims of Education are clothed with political interest and cultural
authority. The political interest pushes education to contribute to its
economic policy, while the cultural authority yields ideas such as education
for nationalism or collectivism.
Two notions which imply political interest, cultural and social authority are
manifested in this aim. First, the foundation of these educational aims is
based on the ideas of Sun Yat Sen. His ideas, grounded in principles of
nationalism, democracy, and livelihood, are taken as the highest guiding
principles for democratic society and human development in Chinese
society (Sun, 1923).
Second, nationalism and collectivism are explicitly emphasised in the Aims
of Education (The Ministry of Education, 1988a, 4). In contrast,
individual development seems to be neglected. Under these Aims, education
is assumed to help the individual to full development o that the individual
can be used for improving the national standard of living.
Taiwan's Government has followed these principles since 1949. There has
been a great economic progress in Taiwan, as shown by the improvement
9
in living standards. For example, general economic growth has continued
since the 1960s, and the average rate of growth reached 9.6% during the
1960s, 9.7% during the 1970s and 7.8% during the 1980s (TAHR, 1989,
9); GNP per capita has reached about $8000 in 1989 (The Executive Yuan,
1989).
However, the progress of aesthetic life and moral life in Taiwanese society
is not necessarily identical to economic progress. Improvements of
aesthetic life and moral life also need education to promote them. Yet, the
Government is keen on economic development rather than improvements
of the aesthetic life and moral life. In fact, the Government spent less on
educational and cultural activities than on military defence. The
proportion of GNP spent on military defence was 8.8% in 1986 (The
Ministry of Finance, 1986; The Execute Yuan, 1987), while the proportion
spent on education was merely 4% in 1987 (UNESCO, Statistical
Yearbook, 1988).
The difficulty for educational reform in Taiwan is also caused by the
political interest and cultural authority. The Government connects the
political interest with cultural authority through practising the Three
Principles of the People. That is, the Three Principles of the People is
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taken as not only the unique but also the perfect theory (Chiang, 1974a).
The Government of Chiang Kai-shek claimed that "the Three Principles of
the People is the principle for saving our nation from destruction,
therefore, education must not only be based on it but also contribute to
reaching its purpose." (Chiang, 1974b, 956) In this sense, the Three
Principles of the People is viewed as the highest guide no matter whether
on political, economic, social or educational policies. Under such an
ideology, the unique authority of the Three Principles of the people cannot
be allowed to be questioned.
The notion of a unique authority can be accepted by the Taiwanese, partly
because the Government spreads its political propaganda through
legitimation, the mass media and education; partly because it is an
ingrained ideology in Chinese thought. The Chinese believe that leadership
is dispatched from Heaven, and to achieve harmony is the Way of Heaven
(Confucius, The Four Books; 1-Ching). Under this cultural ideology, the
authority of the Government is protected and its orders are followed
without question. Accordingly, education is taken as the tool for political
propaganda, which has been shown in the educational aims.
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B. Administration
In this section, the shape of the administrative system in Taiwan will be
analysed in order to reveal the authority of the Ministry of Education. The
current administrative system, according to the Bureau of Statistics of the
Ministry of Education, is as follows, in Chart 1.1.
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Chart 1.1 The system of education administration
source: The Ministry of Education, 1991, Education in the Republic of China, 8
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DIAGRAM REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
The Ministry of Education controls all education in Taiwan. The control
of administration over education in Taiwan is centralised. The Ministry of
Education plays the decisive role in the development of the school. For
example, educational aims, the qualification and numbers of students, the
qualification, numbers and salary of teachers, textbooks etc. are controlled
by the Ministry of Education. The lack of autonomy in schools can also be
shown from the centralisation of the educational administrative system
(Chart: 1.1).
The administrative system is established for educational activity. However,
educational activities are dominated by the administrative system through
setting regulations over it. According to the administrative system, the
Ministry of Education in the central Government is the head of all
educational administrations. Under the Ministry of Education is the
Taiwan Provincial Department of Education. A Local Educational Bureau
in each district or city is directed by both the Ministry of Education and the
Taiwan Provincial Department of Education. The special municipalities,
Taipei and Kaohsiung, each has a Bureau of Education, which is not
directed by the Taiwan Provincial Department of Education, but by the
Ministry of Education.
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Take, for example, teacher education in Taiwan. Teacher education in
Taiwan is controlled by the Government, in terms of its training
institutions, curricula and numbers of students in Teacher Colleges or
Normal Universities etc. All initial and in-service teacher training is
carried out in specific institutions, i.e. Teacher Colleges and Normal
Universities. Most primary school and secondary school teachers are
trained by Teacher Colleges and Normal Universities for a four-year
period, plus a one-year probation. Students for the Teacher Colleges and
Normal Universities must be senior high school graduates and pass the
entrance examination.
At present, there are three Normal Universities, and one department of
education in a general university for training secondary school teachers.
Besides, there are eight Teacher Colleges for training primary school
teachers. Apart from this formal and traditional teacher education system,
a PGCE programme, since 1988, has been offered by three Normal
Universities for all graduates from general universities, where no teacher
education courses are offered. PGCE students are prepared for secondary
school or high school teaching, but they are not qualified for teaching in
the primary school.
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All institutions for teacher training are public, and the majority of primary
schools in Taiwan are also public (Ministry of Education, 1989).
Therefore, the financial and administrative affairs in all institutions for
teacher training are controlled by the Ministry of Education.
In this way, the autonomy of Teacher Colleges and Normal Universities, is
curtailed in matters of personnel, budget and even teaching and learning.
Under such circumstances, the autonomy of the institution itself, the nature
and the function of "enlightenment" in education are in question.
The domination over the school administration can also be shown from the
range of the functions and duties of the Ministry of Education and its
subordinate organisations. The Ministry of Education is in charge of all
administrative affairs in education, e.g., the censorship and publication of
academic research and works, matters of culture and education and so on
(The Ministry of Education, 1988a). The Provincial Department of
Education and the Special Municipalities' Bureaux of Education are
separately responsible for educational and cultural affairs in the provinces
and in the special municipalities (The Ministry of Education, 1988a): for
instance, school education, the supervision of educational and academic
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bodies, the planning and the administration of libraries, museums, and
stadia, and other educational administrative affairs, e.g., matters of
Personnel and Accounting. The Local Education Bureau takes charge of
local educational administration (The Ministry of Education, 1988a). In
general, the range of responsibility of Local Education Bureaux is limited
to primary schools and secondary school (junior high school and parts of
senior high schools).
Such a centralisation of educational administration dominates both school
administration and the activity of teaching and learning. The school
administration is controlled by the control of the finance and personnel;
while the activity of teaching and learning is dominated through general
Educational Aims, textbooks, and objectives in teaching.
C. Textbooks
There are two ways for the Ministry of Education to control educational
activity through textbooks. One is that the Ministry of Education takes
charge of compilation and publication of textbooks; the other is that the
Ministry of Education has placed the National Institute of Compilation and
Translation in charge of censorship (The Ministry of Education, 1988a).
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All textbooks for the primary school are compiled, printed, and published
by the Ministry of Education; some for the junior high school, e.g.,
English, Natural Sciences etc. are compiled and sold by book stores, after
censorship by the National Institute of Compilation and Translation of the
Ministry of Education.
The Ministry of Education prescribes the Standards of Curriculum and
Equipment for all levels of schools. All textbooks have been compiled
according to this Standard of Curriculum and Equipment (the Ministry of
Education, 1975). For instance, all textbooks for primary schools, i.e. the
textbooks on Mandarin, Civics & Ethics, Heath Education, Mathematics,
Social Studies, Natural Sciences, and Music are compiled in accordance
with the Standard of Curriculum and Equipment (The Ministry of
Education, 1975).
In addition, every subject has its own textbook for teaching and learning so
that the contents of teaching and learning are also controlled. The ten
subjects taught in the primary school, which are set up by the Ministry of
Education (The Ministry of Education, 1975), are: Civics & Ethics, Health
Education, Mandarin, Mathematics, Social Studies, Natural Science, Music
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(Singing & Playing for the first two years), Physics, Fine Art and Craft
Work or Industrial Arts (In the first two years, Fine Arts , and Craft Work
and Industrial Arts, are integrated together into one subject.) (The Ministry
of Education, 1988a).
Also, even the subjects without a textbook are controlled by the Ministry of
Education. Group Activity, for instance, comprises extra curricular
activities which are arranged on Wednesday afternoons. Pupils are
organised by virtue of both their ages and interests to take part in activities,
e.g., football, calligraphy, extra-mathematics and so on. The range of
courses offered depends upon the availability of teachers in a school. The
timetable is arranged by school's administrators. Yet, it must be also in
accordance with the regulations of the Standards of Curriculum and
Equipment for Primary and Secondary Schools.
The subjects and timetable can be seen in the Table 1.1.
19
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Table 1.1 Teaching subjects and teaching hours
source: The Ministry of Education, 1991, Education in the Republic of China. 30
		
TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
The dilemma of educational control by the Ministry of Education is shown
in its policy on textbooks. Textbooks are compiled and printed either by
the Ministry of Education or the National Institute of Compilation and
Translation, so that they maintain teaching and learning at a certain
standard. On the other hand, this policy curbs the freedom of teaching
and learning by putting constraints on teaching materials and time.
For example, given the system of entrance examinations, the educational
objective is limited to preparing students for the entrance examination; and
given the contents of teaching and learning in textbooks, educational
activities are also narrowed into textbook knowledge. The academic
standard is assumed to be maintained merely by asking teachers and pupils
to teach and learn knowledge from textbooks, because the criterion for the
academic standard is the numbers of students who pass the entrance
examination.
D. Objectives in teaching
Primary school education in Taiwan implies that education is a tool for the
development of society and nation rather than for the development of the
person. The development of nation and society is the Government's
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interest, and is carried out through the control of objectives in teaching.
Again, the authority of the Ministry of Education is revealed from the
control of teaching objectives, in which the instrumental role is revealed.
According to the Aims of Education, teaching in Taiwan must be guided by
the Three Principles of the People. Every subject has its goal, and each
subject has its subject objectives. These goals and objectives are prescribed
by the Ministry of Education (The Ministry of Education, 1975).
According to The Standard of Curriculum in Ethics (The Ministry of
Education, 1975), for example, educational activity contributes to a
common set of values at the expense of the individual goal. They are: eight
national moral virtues : loyalty,fihial piety, kindness, love,faith,
righteousness, harmony, and peace.
According to the general goal of education (The Ministry of Education,
1975), basic knowledge and skills should be taught for earning a living, the
people's productive power should be improved, and the life of the nation
should be prolonged. Children are taught to keep abreast of the current
international situation and to have a patriotic understanding. So, whether
the aim of education is sufficient for a good life needs to be examined.
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According to the above discussion, to seek autonomy for primary school
education in Taiwan becomes significant for education in order to develop
the human ability to plan a good life. The domination over school
education in Taiwan has been seen from the control of the Ministry of
Education over the educational aims, the administrative system, textbooks
and objectives in teaching. Under such a domination, dysfunction,
dehumanisation and depersonalisation become the obstacles for personal
development.
In this thesis, the term 'dysfunction' does not mean that a function is
corrupted, but that a process is distorted or dominated by political or
economic interests, so that the aim itself might be missed. Similarly, the
term 'dehumanisation' implies the domination of the instrumental interest,
in which man might be alienated from himself.
To be precise, school education in Taiwan is dominated under a
pseudo-universal principle or theory, and the administrative system has
little room for schools autonomy; the activity of teaching and learning is
limited to textbook knowledge. Seif-realisation and seif-actualisation are
then narrowed into the instrumental level, while self-reflection is
discouraged. All of these phenomena show that the teaching of critical
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thinking has not been carried out in Taiwan. Apart from that, formally,
there are no educational programme, curriculum or teaching on critical
thinking. However, if the abilities of seif-realisation, self-reflection and
sell-actualisation are important for personal life, then school education in
Taiwan must be reformed to overcome the above controls and obstacles.
II. The difficulties of critical thinking teaching
In order to solve the problems of dysfunction, dehumanisation and
depersonalisation of education in Taiwan, the school, first of all, must
emancipate itself from the control of the Ministry of Education, and school
education for autonomy needs to be struggled for. Then, reconstructing
the school as the place for the enlightenment of mind can be insisted on.
At the moment, there is no teaching of critical thinking in Taiwan.
Further, apart from the problem which emerges from the control of the
Ministry of Education, there are a number of practical difficulties for
teaching critical thinking in Taiwan. These are: a) the distorted educational
function; b) the instrumental role of teachers; and c) teaching and learning
of the traditional type.
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A. The distorted educational function
A dilemma of education in Taiwan is shown from the conflict between the
interest in political control and the function of education as enlightenment.
As in Francis Bacon's motto, "knowledge is power", school education can
be viewed as the reproduction of knowledge, i.e. power. The enlightened
mind, being capable of inquiry and reflection, however, becomes a threat
to political control. In this sense, education is a dilemma for the
Government - on the one hand, the Government must develop people's
learning skills in order to learn political propaganda; on the other hand,
mental activity, unlike skills learning, cannot completely be controlled, but
can lead to enlightenment so that its result is hard to predict.
In noting this dilemma, the Government tries to control educational
activities, through the controls of the educational aims, administrative
policies, textbooks, and teaching objectives, in order to control mental
development. As a result, the functions of school education may either be
distorted or damaged, through political propaganda or power. Education
in Taiwan is an example.
The distorted functions of education in Taiwan can also be analysed from
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the fact that educational activity is defined by the preparation for the
entrance examination. This instrumental rationality can be shown from the
phenomenon that pupils are keen on studying in the private school in order
to enter the public high school or university by passing the entrance
examination.
Private primary schools hold an entrance examination system for children
who would like to study in the private school. Before the high school
level, the private school is taken as a better place than the public school to
prepare for the entrance examination. In order to pass successfully these
entrance examinations, pupils and parents look for a good 'place' to study.
According to the statistics of education in Taiwan (The Ministry of
Education, 1988a), most primary schools are established by district/city or
special municipalities, while most kindergartens are established by
individuals or affiliated with district/city elementary schools. Children of
six years of age or over have to attend a local primary school without
taking any entrance examination, unless they prefer to enter a private
school. After six years of primary school education, children are
encouraged to enter the junior high school without taking any entrance
examination. Private schools however have an entrance examination,
26
because they can accommodate merely limited numbers of pupils. After
the junior high school, students must pass the entrance examination in
order to study in any level of school beyond the junior high school level.
The private school gains more freedom than the public school in preparing
students for the entrance examination, because the control of the Ministry
of Education over the private school is less than over the public school.
That is, the matters of finance and personnel in the private school are more
independent than in the public school. In this way, the private school wins
more autonomy than the public school, in terms of school administration
and the activity of teaching and learning.
However, the private school does not cherish its autonomy as an
opportunity to strive against the instrumental rationality in education. On
the contrary, the autonomy is abused in order to achieve successfully the
purpose of preparing pupils for the entrance examination. The private
school in Taiwan wins a good reputation by showing its successful
achievement in terms of the numbers of pupils who pass the entrance
examination.
The policy of the entrance examination distorts the function of education,
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i.e. from the enlightenment of reason towards preparation for the entrance
examination by limiting the room for individual development. Only pupils
who pass the entrance examination can study in the senior high school,
college or university. Therefore, pupils, teachers and parents are keen on
textbook knowledge. On the other hand, personal developments, e.g., the
establishment of a value system, autonomous capacity and disposition etc.,
are neglected in school education in Taiwan. The system of entrance
examinations depersonalises pupils by imposing textbook knowledge on
pupils' minds, and through examination.
Under such circumstances, it is hard for children to be themselves. They
'realise' that their abilities must be shown from the result of the
examination; their responsibility both for their parents, schools and
themselves lies in passing the examination they need to take. Consequently,
children will be strange to themselves, in terms of 'who I am'.
The difficulty of teaching critical thinking is shown in the instrumental
purpose of education in two ways. One is that school education is limited
to either the political purpose or economic purpose. School education,
therefore, aims at operating effective skills for the instrumental purpose,
which has been shown in the Aims of Education. The other way is that
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both teachers' and pupils' interests are narrowed into the instrumental
dimension rather than the aesthetic and reflective dimensions, which has
been revealed in the boom of entrance examinations. There is no room for
school education to develop pupils' abilities of reflection, e.g., through the
teaching of critical thinking. Being keen on the entrance examination
shows the interest in the merely instrumental purpose rather than in the
purpose of pursuing a rational life. Therefore, the teaching of critical
thinking in Taiwan will be viewed negatively, from the view of pursuing
the instrumental purpose, including the political and economic interests.
B. The instrumental role of teachers
The instrumental roles of education for political, social and personal
interests have been discussed. Here, the instrumental role of teachers in
educational activity in Taiwan will be revealed. It will be assumed that
teaching critical thinking would be hard to carry out if teachers lack
critical thinking.
Apart from teachers' dispositions, three causes for primary school teachers
in Taiwan lacking critical thinking are: a) a negative ideology dominates
teachers' ability of reflection; b) the social value system intensifies their
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instrumental interests; and c) the pressure of survival needs leads them not
to struggle for autonomy. The first cause, as has been discussed, dwells
upon the control of education by the Ministry of Education. The second
cause has been revealed in the administrative pattern, which carries the
political interest and cultural authority. Here, the third will be emphasised.
The pressure of survival occurs to primary school teachers in Taiwan in
two aspects: spiritual and physical aspects. The spiritual aspect of
suppression comes from cultural and social value systems, for example, the
role expectation from society and culture. With the value system of
Confucianism and under the domination of teacher education in Taiwan,
primary school teachers are cast in the role of messenger between the
Government and education. (The value system of Confucianism will be
analysed in chapter two.) They are neither the people who reflect upon
educational activities nor the people who directed the educational policy.
As a result, primary school teachers in Taiwan are not expected to be
critical thinkers.
The physical aspect of pressure results from their burdens of teaching and
extra-teaching jobs. These burdens can be shown concretely in the jobs
they bear in the school. According to the regulations of the Ministry of
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Education and Local educational Bureaux, primary schools teachers have to
stay in the school, at least eight hours each weekday and four hours on
every Saturday. In fact, they always stay in schools for more than eight
hours a day, from 7:00 am to 4:30 pm. There are about 250 school-days in
an academic year.	 In addition to teaching, teachers have to act as
administrators, (for example, every teacher needs to take some
responsibility for the administrative affairs of his school and classroom,
e.g., as treasurer, personnel officer, etc.); as school nurses, e.g., collecting
children's urine samples, and recording children's condition of health; as
traffic wardens to supervise the safety of the children going to school and
going home; as caretakers of their own schools during vacation times and
so forth.
The ratio of teachers to pupils is still too low to remove this over-loading.
According to the Index of Educational Statistic in Taiwan (the Ministry of
Education, 1989, 14), the numbers of teachers were 56,348 in the 1968
academic year, whilst there were 77,892 in 1988. The numbers of
elementary pupils were 2,383,204 in 1968 whereas there were 2,407,166 in
1988. The ratio of pupils to teachers, on average, was 42.29 in 1968,
30.93 in 1988. This ratio includes the numbers of teachers who engage in
administration, and those who teach specialist subjects. In fact, the average
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numbers of pupils in a classroom which a teacher has to take charge of are
about 43. Thus, a primary school teacher, in particular, for the first two
years, has to be in charge of 43 pupils.
In such a situation, all teachers' thinking is caught up in their immediate
tasks, because they are over-loaded with their work. Therefore, it is
difficult in such circumstances for teachers to think about questions such as,
what is the role which teachers should play in school teaching? what is the
nature of educational activity? and so on. It is also difficult for them to
pay attention to pupils' individual development. In other words, teachers
cannot pay much attention to improving either their own seif-realisation or
pupils' seif-realisation. Therefore, the teaching of critical thinking,
understandably does not come to teachers' minds under such circumstances.
C. Teaching and learning of the traditional type
Tradition is an authority, by which enlightenment of mind might be
hampered. For example, during the period of Spring-Autumn and
Warring States (770-221 B.C.), when China was in a state of chaos, there
were hundreds schools of thought, which were different from
Confucianism, e.g., Ying-yung-cha, Farmer-cha (the term 'cha' means a
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school of thought).
From the viewpoint of enlightenment of reason, the period of
Spring-Autunm and Warring States could be a flourishing period for
enlightening human mind. However, psychologically and partly because
people preferred to live in a stable society; partly because the
emperors(Chin-Shi-Hung), and one of the officials of the Han dynasty
(Tung, Chung-shu) intended to unify all thoughts into one, an orthodoxy
was needed. Confucianism has been occupied a dominant position since
then. This is a case that the ideology of 'unification' hampered the
development of diversity.
Traditional authority revealed from the cultural heritage will be examined
in chapter two. Here, the traditional types of teaching and learning in
Taiwan will be criticised, because they cause difficulties for the teaching of
critical thinking in two ways: curricula and the methods of teaching and
learning.
First, it is hard to teach critical thinking via "formal" teaching with a
formal textbook in Taiwan. The subjects and their textbooks are controlled
by the Ministry of Education, and their contents are distorted as an
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instrument for the political interest, economic interest and cultural
authority. Further, the purpose of teaching and learning is constrained to
preparation for entrance examinations, and "memory" becomes the most
important ability to be trained and learned in the school. This kind of
school education assumes that the achievement of learning must be assessed
by the amount of knowledge which children can reproduce or repeat from
what they have memorised.
Second, traditional authority can be explicitly seen in the pattern of
teaching and the format of the classroom. For example, the organisation
of the classroom shows a formal organisation in which desks are arranged
row by row and pupils are asked to keep their desks in order. This format
carries an authority of which everything asked by teachers must be
followed in the school. It implies that pupils' freedom must be limited.
This claim does not mean that pupils' freedom should not be limited to the
range of what can be accepted by the teachers or the school, but is
concerned with the pupils' autonomy. Such a teaching pattern and the
classroom format manifest the dehumanisation and depersonalisation in the
primary school education in Taiwan.
It is hard for the good of the enlightenment of reason to be reached
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through traditional types of teaching and learning. Traditional lectures are
generally used in order to make time for the huge amount of material to be
taught. Pupils' minds cannot be enlightened simply by imposing learning
materials on pupils' heads, but by stimulating their skepticism, by fostering
their abilities of self-reflection, and by encouraging their autonomy. In
this sense, traditional types of teaching and learning in Taiwan are far from
reaching the goal of teaching critical thinking.
Teaching for critical thinking is not teaching the knowledge of the
materials in textbooks, but teaching and learning in and by thinking, viz,
teaching and learning through seif-realisation, self-reflection and
self-actualisation. If teachers acknowledged the significance of teaching
critical thinking, they could use teaching materials relevant to pupils' lives,
rather than ones adapted to the service of examination success; they could
also be keen on enlightening pupils' minds rather than on accumulating
their knowledge. These differences in the kinds of teaching materials and
methods used show the differences between teaching critical thinking and
non-critical thinking teaching. (This difference between these two kinds of
teaching will be discussed a step further later on, where the concept of
indoctrination will be analysed.)
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In sum, the dysfunction, depersonalisation and dehumanisation of education
in primary school education hamper the teaching of critical thinking in
Taiwan. For teachers, over-loading and social pressure push them to teach
without thinking, while for pupils, traditional authorities, including
teachers' authority and the social value system, also push them to learn
without thinking. Given that these problems have not been solved, the
teaching of critical thinking is hard to carry out successfully in Taiwan. In
fact, it is also hard to achieve even these educational aims, which are set up
by the Government, i.e. cultivating in all pupils capacities in ethics,
democracy, and scientific knowledge, so as to celebrate the Chinese culture
and heritage; and developing their potentials as the resources for the
reconstruction of Taiwan as a bastion of national recovery (The Ministry
of Education, 1988a, 15).
However, the subjects of education are teachers and pupils. If education
functions merely as an instrument for politics, society and the state, then
any educational reform would merely transfer education from one
straitjacket to another. Nevertheless, while pursuing the overall aim,
education can create its own objectives, especially for personal
development and growth.
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There are three possible results of teaching and learning: a) pupils learn
merely textbook knowledge or political propaganda, for example; b) pupils
not only learn textbook knowledge or political propaganda, but also
develop their reason; and c) pupils reflect upon textbook knowledge or
political propaganda through their enlightened reason.
'Reflection' here does not mean necessarily rejecting, but examining
knowledge via thinking critically before accepting it. In this sense, the
significance and the importance of critical thinking are revealed from the
third possibility. (The teaching of critical thinking will be dealt with in
chapter VII.) Given human power of reflection (enlightened
consciousness), education itself can win its autonomy through reflection
upon itself. This is the starting point of education reform.
Conclusion
In shedding light on the domination of primary school education by the
instrumental rationality and negative ideology, resulting from the political
and economic interests, and cultural authority in Taiwan, critical thinking
should be helpful and necessary for the Taiwanese to develop children's
minds.
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Even though there are difficulties in teaching critical thinking in Taiwan,
teaching for critical thinking is still possible, if the domination of education
can be emancipated from the yokes of political and economic interests, and
of cultural authority, and if the obstacles to teaching critical thinking can
be dismissed.
In order to solve the difficulties for teaching critical thinking in Taiwan, a
number of things need to be undertaken. All educational activities which
are dominated under the political power and limited to the instrumental
interest must be reflected upon. For example, The Aims of Chinese
Education, which is the unique principle for teaching but is coloured with
political interest and cultural authority, must be reflected upon critically.
Also, the rationality of the control of education from the Ministry of
Education needs to be examined. The criterion for the academic
achievement of education needs to be analysed.
In other words, the criteria of quantity, e.g., the ratio of students who pass
through examination, and the instrumental goal of education and so on
must be reflected upon. For instance, the quantity of schools has been
expanded since 1951: the number of schools has increased from 1,504 in
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1951 to 6,628 in 1988, and the number of students from 1,054,927 in 1951
to 5,123,742 in 1988 (Ministry of Education, 1988a, 1). Yet, whether such
an achievement can be sufficiently taken as the criterion for the
progression of education in terms of human development is in need of
further analysis.
Further, if teachers and pupils were to think with their own minds, instead
of swallowing all the materials they are given like a sponge, then there
would be no necessity for a person to isolate individual development from
social or national development within educational activity. In this sense,
teaching critical thinking can be carried out in Taiwan to awaken teachers'
and students' minds without causing conflict between personal development
and the social and cultural value systems.
In addition to reflection upon the aims of education, the administrative
pattern, textbooks and teaching, the deep structures of education, viz.,
cultural and social framings, will be examined in order to understand
educational activity, and then to offer adequate recommendations for
educational innovation in Taiwan. This will be the focus of the next
chapter.
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Chapter II
THE ISSUES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EDUCATION
IN TAIWAN
I. The educational framing of non-critical thinking
II. The cultural and social framings of non-critical thinking
A. The mysterious power of Heaven
B. The legitimate authority
Conclusion
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Chapter II
THE ISSUES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EDUCATION
IN TAIWAN
With the development of industry, and with changes in the social structure,
education must meet the demands of innovation, within the particular
cultural and social contexts of Taiwan which have undergone a very rapid
growth of the economy, and tremendous changes in social structures.
As was mentioned in chapter one, two aspects need to be studied to
investigate educational activity: surveying educational activity itself; and
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penetrating into the deep structure of the educational activity by the use of
hermeneutical methodology. The first aspect has been dealt with in chapter
one. Here, two tasks will be dealt with in this chapter: first, pinning down
the instrumentality of education and its consequences; second, examining
the framings which culture and society give to non-critical thinking. I use
the tenn non-critical thinking for the predicaments of education which
come from the yoke of authority or an unemancipated instrumental
rationality.
I. The educational framing of non-critical thinking
After analysing the control of education and the difficulties of teaching
critical thinking in the first chapter, the educational framing of non-critical
thinking in Taiwan needs to be tackled, so as to cope with the demands of
society by achieving two tasks of education: enlightening people and
strengthening their ability for reflection.
The intention of this section is to reveal patterns of non-critical thinking in
Taiwan by analysing the aims and goals of education, and the roles of
teachers and pupils in schooling.
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The roots of non-critical thinking in Taiwan lie in Confucianism.
Confucianism has occupied a position in the mainstream of chinese thought
since the Han Dynasty, when Tung Chung-Shu set up Confuicianism as the
main philosophy and abolished others (Yu, 1960). 	 Since then,
Confucianism has become an orthodoxy in Chinese culture and society, and
its thought and works have affected the teaching materials in school
education. This influence can be seen in textbooks for primary school
education, especially, Social Sciences, Chinese and Civics (The National
Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990a; 1990b; 1990d).
Traditional authority and social legitimation have penetrated into
educational activity in Taiwan. The general aims of education have been
affected by political and economic interests and cultural authority, as
indicated in chapter one. Also, they can be shown in subject objectives
(The National Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990a; l990b;
1990d), because subject objectives must be in accordance with the Aims of
Education (The Ministry of Education, 1975).
The phenomena of non-critical thinking, in terms of instrumentality - and
dysfunction, dehumanisation and depersonalisation - can be revealed from
the objectives and contents of textbooks:
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According to The Standard of The Curriculum For The Primary School,
each subject has three general goals: knowledge, morality and politics. (The
Ministry of Education, 1975) The political interest, the cultural authority
and the instrumentality of primary school education in Taiwan are shown
in the goals and contents of subjects which are required for pupils.
For instance, main subject goals for Chinese are:
a) imposing on children the concepts of morality, democratic attitudes and
scientific spirit;
b) inspiring their patriotism;
c) spreading Chinese culture;
d) cultivating their abilities of logic and correct thinking; and
e) cultivating their abilities of listening, speaking, reading and writing (The
Ministry of Education, 1975, 1 - 2).
Goals for Civics are:
guiding children to learn the rules of family life and social life in order
a) to establish the foundations of their behaviour;
b) to revere the aged and show filial piety to their parents;
c) to propagate traditional Chinese virtues;
d) to develop morality;
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e) to inspire patriotism, particularly anti-communism, especially
anti-Maoism;
f) to cultivate good manners, to establish the correct value system, and to
improve their knowledge and abilities, so as to train them as good
citizens (The Ministry of Education, 1975, 1).
Subject goals for Social Sciences are:
training good manners, behaviour and habits in daily life; and teaching
pupils the knowledge and abilities about the personal relationships of social
life which are necessary if their behaviour is to be adapted to modern
society, and they are to carry on Chinese morality; training children to
become good pupils and patriotic citizens. (The National Institute of
Compilation and Translation, 1990b, 2)
Goals for Music for the first two years of primary school pupils are:
a) developing children's physical and mental aspects;
b) inspiring children's interests and abilities in Music;
c) developing children's interests and abilities in sports (In the first two
years physical training and music are combined.);
d) cultivating children's habits; and
e) establishing children's social habits, including Confucian morality and
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patriotism (The National Institute of Compilation and Translation,
1990c, 3).
Subject goals for Art and Craft are:
a) guiding children to use both their hands and minds;
b) cultivating children's creativity;
c) inspiring children's abilities and interests in art;
d) increasing children's abilities of imagination, thinking, planning and
problem-solving;
e) cultivating children's social manners and habits, including cooperation,
industry, autonomy in order to provide services for social products; and
f) teaching children to acknowledge Chinese traditional arts, in order to
dignify their high aspiration to publicise Chinese culture (The National
Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990b, 6).
According to the above subject goals, primary school education in Taiwan
has been taken as a tool for preserving traditional Chinese culture; for
preparing labour power for Government and society; and for maintaining
the social status quo. Each subject has objectives for cultural, social,
political and economic interests:
a) cultural and social interests: namely, collectivism, Confucian morality,
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e.g.,cooperation, filial piety, obedience and harmony with society etc;
b) political interest: namely, patriotism, anti-communism, 'good'
citizenship etc.
c) economic interest: namely, contributing to future labour power,
adapting to modem society and handling personal relationships etc.
These objectives might improve children's knowledge and abilities for their
social life, but the problem is that children's individual lives might be
isolated from these objectives. This problem results from two strategies.
One is that these goals are set up by scholars, teachers and administrators
without the participation of children; the other is that the goals for
education emphasise instrumental rationality, in particular, the cultural and
social aspects rather than the individual aspect.
For example, parts of subject goals for Music and Art & Craft seem to be
to inspire children's interests, and to cultivate and improve their abilities of
creativity, imagination, thinking, planning and problem-solving etc.;
however, the aim for these objectives lies in adapting to social codes or in
propagating Confucianism instead of building up children's abilities for
self-knowledge, self-reflection and self-actualisation. Further, the so-called
'good citizenship' is measured in terms of cultural, social, political and
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economic interests, without taking children's judgments into account.
The contents of textbooks also contribute to instrumental rationality. For
example, more than half of the textbooks of Social Sciences are aimed at
cultivating collectivism, patriotism, Confucianism and economic interest
(The National Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990a, vol. 3-6).
Moreover, the individual life is weakened in Civics, while collectivism is
over-emphasised in eighteen units of Confucian morality. The eighteen
units as contents for Civics are: industry, social manners, patriotism,
forgiveness, social morality, faithfulness, cooperation, obeying laws,
justice, friendship, bravery, filial piety, neighbourliness, frugality, being
shamed, responsibility, perseverance, and peace and harmony (The
National Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990a, vol. 3-6).
Self-realisation is distorted by the monological form of educational
activity. According to the above analyses, primary school education in
Taiwan is far from the nature of autonomy, in particular, personal
autonomy. (The nature of autonomy will be analysed in chapter five.)
Such an education seems to persuade people to believe that all tradition is
good for both the individual and society, and the significance of the
individual is subordinated to the development of society rather than the
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individual himself. The monological form of educational activity can be
shown in teaching methods and materials, by which education is separated
from pupil's life.
Children struggle when they enter society, because they cope with conflicts
between tradition and modernisation, and between the individual and
society. Children have few experiences to make a dialogue between their
own lives and the knowledge they learn from the school. It is in this sense
that the knowledge they learn from schooling is merely monological
knowledge, while dialogical knowledge must be acquired through
self-reflection, and must be integrated with children's cognitive styles into
their own value systems.
In this way, children merely learn from textbooks and teachers, instead of
learning from the interaction between the knowledge they are presented
with at the school, and the knowledge they have of their own lives via
self-reflection. This increases children's inability to establish their own
value system and to make proper choices for their lives.
Further, both in the family and in the school, children are merely viewed
as immature people. Therefore, they are asked to follow whatever parents
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and teachers say. In other words, children are merely asked to memorise
rather than to think. The contents of textbooks are then designed around
description rather than hypothetical problems or argumentation (Tran, in
Chang (ed.), 1988, 90).
Learning without application is the major dissatisfaction with education in
primary school education (The Central Daily News, Jan., 30, 1991). After
investigating the dissatisfaction with education (Tran & Wen, in Chinese
Education Association (ed.), 1988, 203, 204, 207; Tran, in Chang (ed.),
1988, 83; Yang, in Chinese Education Association (ed.), 1988, 54; Li, in
The Central Daily News, Jan., 30, 1991), the Government and scholars
confirm that the crucial cause for educational dysfunction is that pupils are
unable to apply what they have learnt in their lives. Accordingly, the
director of the Taiwan Provincial Department of Primary Education, L. F.
Lin, demanded that teachers should concentrate their teaching upon
learning to practise (Central Daily News, Jan., 30, 1991).
In principle, it is hard, if not impossible, to ask or help pupils to put what
they have learned from the school into practice under the following modes
of teaching and learning:
a) gathering and recalling data/knowledge without combining it with
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practical life;
b) responding to knowledge without making sense of it;
c) learning and reciting knowledge without reconstructing it into individual
cognitive styles of thinking;
d) being praised, verbally, for saying "um-hmm", "yes", "I understand"
without giving individual reasons for or against;
e) slavishly being required to follow "standard answers", which are
presented in textbooks without empowering individual thinking ability;
and
0 telling, describing and explaining to children without getting back their
analyses, critique and reflection.
These phenomena exist in practice as well (Tran, in Chang (ed.), 1988, 81;
Ou, 1991, 4). For example, learning activities are divided into a number
of concrete categories for teaching and for testing of "what children
'know'; what children perceive; and what children have done" (The
National Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1 990d; Ou, 1991,4).
Emphasising merely school knowledge narrows the range of learning
(Chang, 1988, 231). As a consequence, "children become the consumers of
knowledge, while teachers are the retailers" (Chang, 1988, 234). This
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implies that children are taken as machines to produce already designed
outcomes, rather than being encouraged to establish their own value
system.
Such an abstract learning without application is one problem - and a bad
one. Learning without thinking is a more fundamental problem in primary
school education in Taiwan than learning without application. Learning
without application, might leave children to face their real life in panic,
while learning without thinking can crush the ultimate aim of education -
human development in terms of the enlightenment of reason - by addling
children's minds.
Four educational phenomena of non-critical thinking can be shown through
reflection upon the roles of teachers and pupils, teaching materials, and
administrative systems.
First, most teachers in the primary school have work overloads. They
must commit themselves to prepare their pupils for examination; to check
pupils' homework; to put effort into in-service training courses in order to
be promoted; to be forced to do many jobs auxiliary to teaching, e.g., as a
treasurer or nurse in a class.
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Teachers are expected not to complain about their situation, in order to
maintain a good model for society in terms of the traditional teacher's
pattern. The traditional pattern for good teachers in Taiwan is as Passmore
described. That is,
they (the teachers) teach precisely the subjects named in the curriculum,
guiding themselves by the textbooks in use and attempting to smooth the
path for the children; they obey cheerfully the instructions issued by
superintendent and principal, in so far as they can understand them.
(Passmore, 1980, 172)
Teachers are used to obeying rather than questioning; to hiding individual
queries and puzzles rather than expressing themselves authentically.
Accordingly, they have learned that to conform with, not to question, all
orders of the government or administrative powers will lead to keeping
their position and being promoted, through keeping a harmonious
relationship with the principal or the government. As a result, teachers
alienate their teaching from their life, and in this way, they lack a sense of
commitment to their teaching. For themselves, teaching is then merely
taken as the tool for earning a living rather than an art of human
development.
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Second, learning is alienated from the lives of pupils. Learning by reciting
is the typical type of learning in Taiwan, which can be revealed from the
measurement of the achievements of learning (Chang, 1988, 231; Ou,
1991, 4). Children are discouraged from discussing or inquiring.
However, both teachers and pupils are pleased with such a method of
teaching and learning (Tran, in Chang (ed.), 1988, 81), partly because
reciting materials, for example, can save time when cramming for the
examination; partly because both of them are used to coping with definite
answers, rather than with open-ended forms of enquiry.
Children's potentialities are weakened by asking them to obey rather than
to criticise; to memorise rather than to think; to imitate rather than to
create and so on. These phenomena* can be assumed universally to exist in
nearly every primary school in Taiwan, due to the policy of the entrance
examination, so that the argumentative type of teaching and learning in
* P.C. Chang, an associate professor in Taiwan Normal University, points out that "the
policy of entrance examination in Taiwan lacks cognitive perspective, worthwhileness and
voluntariness, in R. Peters' terms" (Chang, 1988, 217). Earlier than Chang, C. S. Chung,
a professor of Taiwan Normal University, claimed that "students take the entrance
examination as the unique aim of education. ..even though everyone criticises it, however,
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which pupils must work out their own reasons for or against answers is less
popular in Taiwan than lecturing, listening and reciting, which are
traditional types of teaching and learning (Tran, in Chang (ed.), 1988, 80).
Also, the educational alienation of pupils results from the fact that the
traditional virtues, e.g., obedience, forbearance, silence, conformity etc.
are over-emphasised in education. In Taiwan, so-called good boys or girls
are those who do everything they are told and act as directed, and all
so-called good pupils are those who listen to rather than speak to, answer
rather than question, conform rather than argue, obey rather than rebel,
etc. It does not mean that these traditional virtues themselves are
necessarily damaging to people's self-consciousness. Rather, learning these
schools, parents and society are intent on passing through this examination" (Chung, 1982,
21). Actually, the weakness of this policy has been noticed for at least twenty years. The
articles reflecting upon this policy , for example, are:
a) Bou, J. C. (1971), "Reflecting upon the Entrance Examination', in Taiwan Education.
vol. 244.
b) Chun, L. D. (1974), 'The Improvement of the Entrance Examination', in The Collection
of Yat-Sen Academic research, vol. 14;
c) The Ministry of Education (1982), The Research Report on The Improvement of the
Entrance Examination.
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virtues without reflecting upon them is the key cause for weakening
children's ability of self-reflection.
Such 'good' children will become 'good' citizens in a society. They are just
the people with neither mind nor independent thinking, viz., either without
self-consciousness or with false-consciousness. In this sense, education
damages not only the individual but also society and the state.
The Government has tried to improve the quality of education, by adopting
educational theories from western countries. For example, it has accepted
Spencer's idea that "children ought to be educated according to nature"
(Passmore, 1980, 8); appreciated Herbart's notion that "the object of
education is to produce good characters by means of instruction"; and
transplanted Dewey's idea that "education should proceed by practical
instruction in the affairs of life" (Passmore, 1980, 8).
These notions are put into some subject goals for primary school education.
For example, one of the teaching goals for Art and Craft is adapting
teaching to the physical and mental development of children (The National
Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990b, 6). The main teaching
goals for Social Sciences are developing children who have good
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characteristics including attitudes, behaviours and habits...in order to adapt
to modern social life and so on (The National Institute of Compilation and
Translation, 1990b, 2; The Ministry of Education, 1975). Children's
interests and abilities are taken as parts of the teaching objectives of Music:
"developing children's interests and abilities in music (The National
Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990c, 3). However, the ultimate
aim of education is still rooted in instrumentality, which can be shown
from subject goals in which cultural, social, political and economic
interests dominate educational activity.
The idea of child-centred education, the ideas of "problem-solving
teaching" and "inquiry learning" etc. have been in fashion in Taiwan (The
National Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1990b, 6). The
Government asked the Institute of In-service Teacher Training for Primary
and Secondary Schools to design and offer courses for in-service teachers
in order to introduce and develop these educational ideas (The Ministry of
Education, 1980). This programme implies that the educational innovation
is part of Governmental policies on education.
Although this programme has been underway for ten years, its contribution
to ability for reflection seems not to be confirmed yet (Yang, in the
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Chinese Education Association, 1988, 54; Li, 1991, in the Central Daily
News, Jan., 30), because the instrumentality of education has not been
changed so far. The reason for the unchanged predicament is that
education is still fettered by the yoke of political and social interests or
cultural authority.
Children are still dominated by the external value system, e.g., heritage or
social codes. Children might be encouraged to participate in their
community life, to contribute to the reform of their own lives and society,
to improve their social relationships, and to exercise their capacities
efficiently, but they are taught not to reflect upon governmental policies,
social systems and traditional culture from a negative viewpoint.
In contrast, children just think from one dimension. They are encouraged
to exercise critical thinking only in a way which is positive regarding the
merits of culture, society and the state. Children are still doing what they
are told. This sort of thinking is called one-way thinking.
Two issues could be raised from such one-way thinking. They are: a) is
one-way critical thinking possible? and b) why cannot new methods which
have been carried out in Taiwan genuinely promote critical thinking? In
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order to answer the first question, the nature of critical thinking needs to
be clarified. This will be dealt with in the next chapter. It will be claimed
here that a critical thinker should examine not only the rationality of his
own knowledge, but also that of other persons' knowledge; a critical
thinker should question not only his previous value systems, but also his
present value system. Critical thinking should be a continuous process of
reflection. On these accounts, one who thinks over things from merely one
point of view cannot be called a critical thinker. One-way thinking is not
sufficient to meet all these criteria for critical thinking.
The second question is: why do some methods in the educational reform in
Taiwan, designed to stimulate pupils' thinking, have little effect on
promoting critical thinking? The explanation lies in the dominated
situation of education and the lack of autonomy of teachers and pupils. The
enquiry method, for example, is merely taken as a tool for promoting
cultural, social, political and economic interests rather than for establishing
pupils' value systems, as have been analysed where subject goals are
discussed.
Educational reforms of teaching materials and methods are not made for
developing the ability of autonomy with pupils' own resources and their
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own objectives. For example, the contents of Social Sciences have been
concerned not only with children's interests and their lives, but also with
knowledge about economy, politics, society and culture. Also, teaching
'how-to-think' has been emphasised (The Ministry of Education, 1991, 1).
However, all contents and methods aim at reaching the subject goals of
"...practising Chinese traditional morality, behaving as good children and
patriotic citizens" (The Ministry of Education, 1991, 2).
From the above analysis, the Government has not abandoned taking
education as a means for political and economic interests. Instead of
promoting human ability for reflection, educational activity will serve as
the tool for politics and the economy. Accordingly, school falls short of
autonomy when it becomes an instrument and when its aim is full of
instrumentality. The function of education will be distorted or reduced,
once educational activities are controlled by instrumentality.
This distortion of education will damage children's potentialities, especially
the abilities of creation and reflection. For example, if the entrance
examination is taken as the most delicate sifter of the elite of schools and
society, and children's abilities are measured by how much they remember,
then individual development will be measured by ability to pass the
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examination by virtue of memory. In this sense, individuals are forced to
meet external criteria rather than their own criteria.
Wilson confirms this interpretation of educational phenomena in Taiwan.
He argues,
in Taiwan considerable effort has successfully been expended through the
educational system to reinforce a congruence between styles of authority in
primary groups and those that exist between citizens and political leaders.
Knowingly, or unknowingly, the patterns of authority that have been taught
have been conducive to political stability.... Educational development has
been characterised by a great mass of teachers cooperating effectively in
inculcating in children support of the government. (Wilson, 1974, 146)
More general than Wilson, Habermas analyses the processes of alienation,
and why education alienates teaching and learning from lifeworids.
According to his analyses, a judicalization and bureaucratisation have
penetrated deep into the process of teaching and learning, and individual
responsibility and freedom can be broken down by them (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 371). His analyses are as follows:
...the medium of the law comes into collision with the form of educational
activity.... Subsuming education under the medium of law produces an
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"abstract grouping" together of those involved in the educational process
and individualised legal subjects in the fact that the norms of school law
apply without consideration of the persons concerned, of their needs and
interests, cutting off their experiences, splitting up their life relationships.
This has to endanger the pedagogical freedom and initiative of the
teachers.... The over-regulation of the curriculum lead to such phenomena
as depersonalisation, inhibition of innovation, breakdown of responsibility,
immobility, and so forth. (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 371)
Then he proposes communicative rationality as the solution for alienation
and domination. He explains how communicative rationality functions for
solving educational depersonalisation and dysfunction. Communicative
rationality will be reached "through decision-making procedures that treat
those involved in the pedagogical process as having the capacity to
represent their own interests and to regulate their affairs themselves."
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 372) In this way, pedagogical
freedom can be kept from dysfunction, and the relationships between
pupil's experiences and life can be prevented from being cutting off. He
points out,
the point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent on social
integration through values, norms, and consensus formation, to preserve them
from falling prey to the systematic imperatives of economic and administrative
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subsystems growing with dynamics of their own, and to defend them from
becoming converted over, through the steering medium of the law, to a
principle of socialisation, that is, for them, dysfunctional. (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 372-3)
The predicaments of dysfunction, depersonalisation and dehumanisation can
be avoided through autonomous decision-making, by which communicative
rationality is established, instead of dominated or distorted rationality.
The above four educational phenomena of non-critical thinking in primary
school education can be summarised as follows:
a) teachers are taken as tools of teaching - as servants and robots;
b) education alienates teaching and learning from both teachers' and pupils'
lifeworids *;
c) teaching materials are depersonalised; and
* lifeworid (Lebenswelt): According to Husserl, the lifeworid, "for every historical period
and civilisation, has its particular features and is precisely the tradition" (Husserl;
Derrida (trans.), 1978, 172). In a word, the lifeworid is the cultural world, in which it
has "a universal, unconditioned structure" (Husserl; Derrida (trans.), 1978, 119).
Therefore, the lifeworid can be viewed as the world of pure experience. Further,
Habermas introduces the concept of lifeworld to begin with "as the correlate of
processes of reaching understanding" (Habermas, 1984, 70). In this thesis, it is used
not only to imply cultural experiences, but also to indicate the subjective-relative world.
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d) educational administrations are dysfunctional.
II. The cultural and social framings of non-critical thinking
In the following two sections, Chinese culture and society will be reflected
upon by hermeneutic and phenomenological methodologies, for cultural
and social contexts are assumed in this thesis to be entangled in educational
activity, and the concepts of culture and society are thought of
hermeneutically and phenomenologically in this thesis, which will be
explained as follows.
The fundamental concepts of culture and society need to be clarified,
because both culture and society are comprehensive notions. T. Ready
synthesised the definition of the concept of culture through a survey of
anthropologists, ecologists and phenomenological perspectives (Ready, in
Kromkowski & McLean (ed.), 1990, 279-81). He "prefers to view culture
from a phenomenological perspective" (Ready, in Kromkowski & McLean
(eds), 1990, 280).
According to the phenomenological perspective, culture can be viewed as
the result of a dialectical process which involves three phases (Ready, in
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Kromkowski & McLean (eds.), 1990, 280). These three phases identified
by Ready are:
1) the exteriorisation of (unstated) human strivings and needs through action
and symbolic expression; 2) the objectification of those symbolic forms into
a cultural reality; and 3) the selective intemalisation of that cultural reality by
members of a society according to their position in that society. (Ready, in
Kromkowski & McLean (eds.), 1990, 280)
From the above perspectives, culture can be seen as a developed and still
developing knowledge and value, in which all knowledge and values are
available to members of society, and society and the person are influenced
by culture through "cultural learning", viz, socialisation. The creativity of
the person, however, seems to be neglected in Ready's viewpoint. In other
words, the passive effect of culture and society on the person is noticed by
Ready, but the active aspect of the person is omitted from the above
functions.
In contrast, for Habermas a central characteristic of the person is "the
competence that makes a subject capable of speaking and acting, that puts
him in a position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and
thereby to assert his own identity" (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987,
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138; see also in ch. iv).
For Habermas, culture is viewed as the stock of knowledge, whereas
society bears the legitimate order, and culture and society are formed with
the participation of the person in the culture and society (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 138). In other words, culture provides value
systems for society and person, while a person forms part of the contents
of culture and society.
The relationship among culture, society and person can be outlined in
Figure 2.1. In this Figure, the person participates in the formation of the
value system and legitimation, while culture is the source of the value
system, and society is the source of legitimation. Habermas' clarification
confirms the hermeneutical viewpoint that cultural and social contexts are
important for education, in terms of personal development in both social
life and individual life.
The cultural and social framings are analysed on the basis of the
hermeneutic viewpoint in this thesis. Therefore, in this chapter, only
cultural and social contexts which are penetrated by instrumental
rationality, or dominated by authority are picked out, when educational
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activities are reflected upon. The concepts of culture, society and
education are acknowledged in terms of hermeneutics, therefore,
Habermas' idea about the relationship among culture, society and person is
borrowed. The relationship among culture, society and education is
viewed as the way of reciprocation as in Figure 2.2.
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culture society
culture o c ie ty
Figure 2.1 The relationship between culture, society and person
Figure 2.2 The relationship between culture, society and education
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A. The mysterious power of Heaven
The concept of human nature could be reflected upon, when Chinese
thought is examined, but in this thesis, the metaphysical level is not the
focus, so I shall emphasise the reflection upon the transformation of
ideology, the weak ability of self-reflection and the neglect of individual
autonomy.
A paradoxical relationship among culture, society and education can be
seen from the Confucian influence on the Chinese. From Confucianism,
the Chinese learned: forbearance instead of resistance; loyalty to the state
and leadership; respect for and obedience to aged people; and so on
(Confucius, The Analects). These virtues do maintain community, society
and the state in a stable condition, and therefore are thought to be the
foundation of community, society and the state (Yang, in Chinese
Education Association (ed.), 1988, 267 - 276). The economic progress in
Taiwan is one such a case, and these virtues are seen to be incorporated
into textbooks of moral education, for example (Tran, in Chinese
Education Association (ed.), 1988, 203).
In contrast, harmony, initially, is a good 'thing' in Chinese culture, yet, it
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can come to have a negative function (Tran, in Chang (ed.), 1988, 92-3).
Although the concept of harmony has been rooted in Chinese tradition
since Hsia, Shang and C/iou (Yang, in Chinese Education Association (ed.),
1988, 268, 273), and it in Chinese culture brings out its negative aspect, it
is nevertheless true that harmony - interpreted in a way that is not bound to
Chinese culture - is a necessary element of a good life. This will be
explored in chapter V.
The negative aspect of tradition rather than its positive function is the focus
in this chapter, because examining whether a value system, e.g., harmony,
has come to have a negative effect is more significant for a critical thinker
than justifying its positive function. The processes of the transfer of the
ideology from the positive function into the negative effect are: "by virtue
of its efficacy; by virtue of the needs of society; and by virtue of the
interest of politics" (Tran, in Chang (ed.), 1988, 93). For the Chinese, the
positive function is as a signpost of the value system, however the negative
effect is as a dominator of the value system. For instance, harmonious
mind and society provide a good life for people. Nevertheless, if harmony
is reached through traditional power and authority rather than by reason,
or if it cannot be reflected upon continuously, then its nature might be
either distorted or misunderstood. In this way, the Chinese might be
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alienated from true understanding of themselves when they hold the belief
that harmony is the best policy and the highest virtue in society or in life.
Three tasks will be tackled in this section. They are: a) hermeneutically
grasping the context of Chinese culture; b) disclosing its core structure, i.e.
its inner movement of thought - the cultural power; and c) critically
looking for the key source of its value system which influences educational
activity in Taiwan.
Ho (harmony) is the essential characteristic in Chinese culture (Confucius,
The Four Books; 1-Ching). Ho is defined in The Doctrine of the Mean as
"when feelings or emotions, i.e. pleasure, anger, sorrow or joy, are stirred
but act in their due degree, this state is called a state of harmony...
Harmony is the universal path which all people should pursue" (The
Doctrine of the Mean). In this sense, the nature of ho illustrated in Chinese
thought is equivalent to virtue in Aristotle's theory; that is, ho is morally to
express or behave oneself properly in a state of balance between reason and
emotion.
Three characteristics of harmony in Chinese culture are:
a) harmony is a natural outcome from Heaven: as The Doctrine of the
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Mean indicates, "the requirement from Heaven is called human nature,
whilst following human nature is called the Way of Heaven" (The
Doctrine of the Mean);
b) harmony is originally rooted in human nature; and
c) harmony can be reached and must be followed, because of its
universality, in terms of transcendental experience.
The Great Learning indicates eight steps to reach harmony. These eight
steps are developed step by step from grasping the external world to
sincere internal emotion and reason. These eight steps are:
things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge
being complete, their thought were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere,
their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons
were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were
regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly
governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole empire was made
tranquil and happy. (The Great Learning)
According to the above quotation, the Chinese focus the concept of ho
(harmony) on the social and moral aspects rather than on the individual
aspect. In other words, personal aspect of harmony, for the Chinese, is
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merely taken as the tool for reaching social harmony. That is the reason
why the goal for moral education in Taiwan is aimed neither at improving
one's self-realisation, nor at developing ability for self-reflection, but at
maintaining social stability.
The nature of ho (harmony) is transferred from transcendental nature, in
which individual reason and emotions is rooted, into an internalised and
unconscious experienced authority for maintaining the social status quo.
Accordingly, individual development for the Chinese is merely
self-control, so as to be in accordance with the value system of
collectivism.
Ho (harmony) maintains its unique authority for both individual virtue and
social morality in Chinese thought (Yang, in Chinese Education Association
(ed.), 1988, 270). Ho (harmony) is not only developed for a harmonious
or stable society (Tran, in Chinese Education Association (ed.), 1988, 112),
but also serves as the crucial criterion for moral life. "The moral person
must be a person who does whatever in the way of Chung and Yung, i.e.
the Way of Heaven" (The Doctrine of the Mean).
Although harmony (ho) is the dialectical crystallisation from Heaven and
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the Earth via the person (Mencius, The Works of Mencius), it goes beyond
the function of Nature and serves as the universality for the Nature.
Mencius justified the power of harmony in Chinese culture by showing that
"neither do opportunities realised by choosing the right time go beyond the
advantages afforded by choosing the right place, nor advantages afforded
by choosing the right place go beyond the benefits arising from an
harmonious relationship among people" (Mencius, The Works of Mencius).
Also, he takes an example to argue this. He argues,
a small town had not been attacked by a strong state, because the small town
acquired its advantages from its location, though the strong state chose the
best opportunity to attack it. On the other hand, a strong state could not
occupy the small town, because it lost the support from its people, though it
was abundant with foodstuffs. In a word, it was as a result of lack of
harmony in the state that the strong and large state did not occupy the small
country. (Mencius, The Works of Mencius)
From Mencius' arguments, harmony bears the primacy of all things by the
authority of an arbitrator in the universe, and it is by harmony that the
criterion for a good life is defined. In the belief that harmony is the
ultimate good, the Chinese family and society transmit the mottoes about
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harmony from generation to generation. The mottoes say that 'a
harmonious relationship among members in a family makes everything
prosperous,' and 'nothing valuable can beat a harmonious relationship.'
From these mottoes, harmony shows its mysterious power in constituting
the essence of Chinese culture, including politics, morality and personal
life.
However, this value system will hamper human development, once its
operation functions negatively rather than positively. The transformation
of this value system is equivalent to the transfer of ideology. The process
of the transfer of ideology has been analysed in Habermas' Legitimation
Crisis (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1975).
According to Habermas, the term 'crisis' implies that positive ideology is
transferred into negative ideology, which is dominated by a certain
interest, therefore it becomes the conflict between different interests
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1975). He analysed four crises in society:
a) economic crisis: covering political crisis, which gives rise to the conflict
between the individual interest and the community interest (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans), 1975, 45-6);
b) rationality crisis: resulting from the conflict between the idea that
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rationality is established through hegemony or through enlightenment
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1975, 45-6; 70-3);
c) legitimation crisis: indicating the conflict between the privileged class
and other members (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1975, 70-5);
d) motivation crisis: emerging from the lack of materials and the lack of
confidence in social, political and economic systems. In a word, this is a
crisis of identification (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1975, 45-6; 70-3).
For the Chinese, the mysterious authority in Chinese culture does not
display the above crises, although it has transferred its positive function
into the negative effect (Tran, in Chang (ed.), 1988, 93). This does not
mean that there is no crisis in Chinese culture. On the contrary, the sense
of non-crisis is a crisis, which may emerge from culture distortion.
There is a more severe crisis than the above four crises in Chinese society.
That is, they might not perceive any crisis in their society. This crisis
results from the fact that the Chinese were taught and encouraged by
education, in its broadest way, to hold the belief that in the interest of
collectivism, leadership must be completely respected without question,
because any thing is not dominated by the person but by Heaven. Harmony
is viewed as the will and order of Heaven. Therefore, the conflicts
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between the individual and the community, and between the privileged class
and other members, were severely discouraged. They might hide behind
harmony.
In this way, the rationality crisis and the motivation crisis can hardly be
recognised in Chinese culture. The Chinese accepted the fact of the lack of
materials and distortions of society, because they took all 'disasters' as
symbols from Heaven to warn people not to rebel against the Way of
Heaven (Confucius, The Analects). In this sense, the Chinese hold that
everybody must follow this rule without question. Ho (harmony) acted as
such a universal criterion for self-identity, self-reflection, social
legitimation, and economic interest in Chinese thought. It is the hope for
Heaven that all crises are covered against being exposed.
As Confucius pointed out, the rule of ho (harmony) between the prince and
his ministers is that "a prince should employ his ministers according to the
rules of propriety; ministers should serve their prince with faithfulness"
(Confucius, The Analects). A harmonious personal relationship can be
maintained by moral rules such as "he who is not in any particular office,
has nothing to do with plans for the administration of its duties'1
(Confucius, The Analects).
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Such an a priori principle will constrain individual development, while it
maintains the social status quo. Confucius teaches his students that the
individual has been located so that nobody should destroy this location, and
each location has its own duty so that nobody should be involved in others'
location, otherwise society and the state will be in a mess (Confucius, The
Four Books). This principle seems sound: to place everyone in a position
and to keep society in order. Similarly, Confucius claims that Heaven
determined the order of succession from Yoau to Shun (Confucius, The
Analects). However, it is a product of determinism that nobody can be
changed, once he has been placed in a position.
Two crucial elements in Chinese culture for reaching or maintaining
harmony involved in the above a priori principle are Li and Jen. Both of
them are viewed as effective approaches for harmonious personal
relationships, in family, society and the state. Li means the rules of
propriety, while Jen (benevolence) "is the characteristic element of
humanity" (The Doctrine of the Mean). Confucius argues that Li must be
the foundation of virtue, because it provides the stable foundation for
society and the state by regulating individual behaviours (Confucius, The
Analects). Also, he says that "respectfulness without Li becomes laborious
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bustle; carefulness without Li becomes timidity; courage without Li
becomes boldness; straightforwardness without Li becomes rudeness"
(Confucius, The Analects). Further, he points out the function of Li by
showing that "if a superior loves Li, the people would be reverent"
(Confucius, The Analects).
Mencius goes a step further to claim that Li and benevolence (Jen) are two
constituents of harmony. He argues that "if everyone would love his
parents and show due respect to his elders, the whole state would enjoy
tranquillity" (Mencius, The Works of Mencius).
He takes Yaou and Shun, two sages in ancient Chinese society, and their
prosperous periods of government as an example to show the vital
functions of Li and Jen for the state. He explains that "Yaou and Shun,
two emperors in ancient China, governed a prosperous state by the
principles of Li and Jen. Without a benevolent government, even a sage,
like Yaou or Shun, could not secure the tranquil order of the state"
(Mencius, The Works of Mencius). Also, he emphasises the efficacy of
Jen that "it was by Jen (benevolence) that the three dynasties, Hsia, S hang
and Chou, gained the empire; and that they lost their empire, by not being
Jen (benevolent)" (Mencius, The Works of Mencius).
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Since then both Li and Jen have been thought by the Chinese to be
effective elements for regulating one's behaviour when a harmonious
society would be maintained or reached. That these two elements have
been constituted the contents of education is a case in point.
It seems to me that the reason why Li and Jen are praised by the Chinese is
that they are effective for a stable society or the state rather than for
personal well-being. Li and Jen are taken as tools for political and social
interests rather than individual interest in Chinese thought. In Chinese
culture, while Li and Jen maintain a harmonious relationship between
individual and society, there is no room for personal well-being, but
merely for collectivism.
The power of Heaven in Chinese thought shows its unchallengeable and
irresistible authority in three ways. First, Heaven plays a transcendental
role in Chinese culture, especially morality. This transcendental role can
be seen from the works of Confucianism. Chuen-Chion-farn-low, one of
the important books of Chinese history, illustrates that "Heaven is claimed
as the emperor of all things" (Chuen-Chion-farn-low). Also, Confucius
instructs people to follow the rule of Heaven. He reminds people that
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"without recognising the ordinances of Heaven, it is impossible to be a
superior man (ChunTzu)" (Confucius, The Analects). In this sense, Heaven
plays a transcendental role in Chinese morality. A superior man (Chun
Tzu) is the very person who is dispatched by Heaven, and he knows the
Way of Heaven and follows it.
Tzu-kung, one of Confucius's students, explicitly emphasised the
all-embracing power of Heaven. He says that "our master (Confucius) is
a person of virtue and nobody can surpass him. His virtue is as high as the
Heaven, which cannot be reached" (Confucius, The Analects). This reveals
the characteristic of the transcendental role of Heaven in Chinese thought.
Nobody except the sage, like Confucius, can grasp the Way of Heaven,
therefore, people should defer to the way of the sage in order not to be
against the Way of Heaven. Confucius claims that "there are three things
of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the
ordinances of Heaven. He stands in awe of the great men. He stands in awe
of the words of sages" (Confucius, The Analects).
Second, Heaven is viewed as the justice of all things in Chinese society.
Heaven is viewed as an arbitrator in personal life and social life. Confucius
claims that Heaven is the only one who knows what people have done. He
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exclaims,
Alas! no one knows me well ... All my life has been arranged by Heaven.
So I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against men. I try to
grasp the Way of Heaven via learning from my experiences. The only one
who knows very well about who I am and what I have done is Heaven.
(Confucius, The Analects)
Following Confucius, the Chinese put their hope on Heaven when they are
unjustly treated and are unable to defend themselves. A Chinese motto
offers a consolation to people that "Heaven will know everything very well,
reveal the truth and return you justice, even though nobody knows what
happened." A just and judicious judgment in ancient Chinese society, for
example, was called the Heaven Pau. (Pau is the surname of this justice
judgment in the Legend of Twelve Heroes.)
The third way to show the power of Heaven in Chinese thought lies in
taking Heaven as the ultimate concern of morality in order to maintain
society in order. Tsze-sze tries to link the unsurpassed Heaven with
morality by the connection between Heaven and men. He points out that
"be sincere" is the crucial principle by which people may reach the Way of
Heaven. Further, he explains why sincerity is the main road towards the
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Way of Heaven. He says,
only the most sincere man can fully fulfil his potential, which is in
accordance with the nature of Heaven. Then, the man will understand the
nature of human beings. He can contribute to the development of all things
via his understanding about human nature. Then the man will stand with
Heaven and the Earth, and form a triad. (The Doctrine of the Mean)
For Tsze-sze, "to sincerely follow the Way of Heaven is the right way for
men" (The Doctrine of the Mean). A moral man should figure out the
Way of Heaven and obey it. In this sense, Heaven governs not only the
natural lifeworld, e.g. scientific knowledge or truth, but also the social
lifeworld, e.g., morality, and the internal lifeworld of self, i.e
self-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation.
For the Chinese, morality is the Way of Heaven. To act morally is the
road towards the Way of Heaven. This is the ideal type of Chinese
morality, and it is too perfect to be reached. If this is the case, then
Chinese morality is too transcendental to be put into practice. However,
for the Chinese, Heaven will enlighten people, i.e. wise people, and show
them His Way. In order to be accordance with the Way of Heaven,
education in Chinese traditional society was assumed to help people to
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recognise the Way of Heaven, at least, to recognise the way of the sage
(Confucius, the Great Learning).
Confucius is taken as this sage in Chinese culture. This is the reason why
the dogma of Confucianism, e.g., loyalty, filial piety etc. become the main
contents of moral education in Taiwan (Tran, in Chang (ed.), 1988, 73-4;
The National Institute of Compilation and Translation, 1 990a; Yang, in The
Chinese Education Association (ed.), 1988, 268).
Six learning steps, in terms of education, to reach the Way of Heaven
Confucius pointed out are:
At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At
forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I know the decrees of Heaven. At sixty,
my ears were obedient organs for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could
follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right
(because my heart is nearly identical to the way of Heaven). (Confucius,
The Analects)
From the above quotation, Confucius takes himself as a model to show that
a moral person must be a person whose desire is identical to the Way of
Heaven. This idea of morality seems to have a developmental basis, in
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terms of age. Only at seventy is the final and ideal stage at morality fully
achieved. At that age, a person' behaviour is identical to the Way of
Heaven, so he can act and express himself freely but properly.
According to Confucian theory of moral development, a moral person is
equivalent to an autonomous person. For the Chinese, the moral person,
however, is just the messenger of Heaven rather than himself. However, a
moral person on this conception is not truly to be counted autonomous, if
an autonomous person is assumed to be able to reflect upon his own value
system or ideology.
Here, in brief, I shall claim that an autonomous person must be free but
rational enough to be himself, and therefore, he reflects upon not only
external rationality but also inner rationality. Inner rationality indicates
the individual value system, while external rationality is based in others'
value systems.
In Confucian theory, an autonomous person is viewed as a moral person,
who can defer to the Way of Heaven (external rationality) to maintain a
harmonious society, but can hardly be himself (inner rationality).
Whatever he reflects upon is within the framework of the authority of
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Heaven, i.e. within the idea of harmony.
Nevertheless, whether harmony is compatible with self-reflection, and
whether the nature of harmony is misunderstood by the Chinese so that it
becomes the hindrance of autonomy need to be examined. V. D. Tran has
discussed these questions to show the changes in the meaning and nature of
harmony, but he did not discuss the relationship between autonomy and
harmony (Tran, in Tran & Shen (ed,), 1987, 101-130). Thus, this task will
be dealt with in this thesis.
Harmony originally emerged from the human demand for an orderly
society in Chinese culture. However, it becomes the dominator over
personal life and social life by its transcendental authority, by its
arbitrative power and by its moral legitimation. In shedding light on the
key source of the inner logic of Chinese thought, viz., the concept of
Heaven and the authority of harmony, the arbitrative power and moral
legitimation of culture manifested in Chinese society can be found. The
autonomy of the Chinese, constrained under the authority of Heaven, is
revealed from the fact that the Chinese are confined to this unchallengeable
authority, and that the concept of Heaven is transferred from the role of
helper of human development into a constraint in Chinese culture.
86
In order to emancipate men from its power, the mysterious authority of
Heaven in Chinese culture needs to be examined by looking critically at the
relationship between this power and human life. The process of the
transfer of ideology confirms that critical thinking is needed for human
development in two ways - negatively for showing the constraint of
ideology; positively for searching for rationality in the value system.
Otherwise, the Chinese will be dominated by the cultural authority due to
the lack of critical thinking, as Habermas claimed,
the more cultural traditions predecide which validity claims, when, where,
for what, from whom, and to whom must be accepted and the less the
participants themselves have the possibility of making explicit and
examining the potential grounds on which their yes/no positions are based.
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 70-1)
According to Habermas, if a person is lacking in self-reflection, the role of
culture can be changed from the helper into being a constraint on human
development (Habermas; 1984, McCarthy (trans.), 70-1). Similar to the
relationship between autonomy and harmony, the argument here is that a
cultural authority with non-critical thinking, e.g., Confucianism, grounded
in a mysterious concept of Heaven and not allowed to be questioned but
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dominating human activities, including thought and actions, will hamper
human development, in terms of autonomy.
It can be thought in previous analyses that lack of questioning of the
foundation of assumptions is what crucially leads the value system from a
positive to a negative effect. In Chinese culture, the power of Heaven
dominates not only human thought and actions, but also the whole universe,
including Nature, society and the state (The Great Learning; The Doctrine
of the Mean). Under such a power, nobody can really be oneself.
It is hard for the Chinese to be autonomous. The Chinese are always
encouraged to defer to the Way of Heaven rather than to inquire or rebel
against it, as Mencius claims that "if an emperor is pleased with the Way of
Heaven, his state would be maintained; while if he is in awe to Heaven, his
country could be sustained" (Mencius, The Works of Mencius). In
addition, the Book of Poetry, another work of Confucianism, shows that
the way for men towards happiness is to follow the Way of Heaven, which
is illustrated also by the statement that "men had better be in harmony with
the ordinances of Heaven so that they can maintain themselves in much
happiness" (Mencius, The Works of Mencius). Therefore, those who try
to rebel against this power will themselves suffer from Heaven's
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punishment. A warning for this was given in Tae Kea , one of the works
of Confucianism:
if calamities are sent down from Heaven, it is still possible for men to
escape from them; (because these calamities are just a test for people from
Heaven) however, if the calamities are caused by men themselves, it would
not be possible for men to live any longer. (because men rebel against the
way of Heaven.) (Mencius, The Works of Mencius)
In other words, any action rebelling against the authority of Heaven will be
threatened with the dreadful punishment. Both Confucius and Mencius also
confirm this punishment: that men cannot live again if they rebel against
the way of Heaven, while the state will be destroyed, if the emperor rebels
against the way of Heaven (Confucius, The Analects; Mencius, The Work
of Mencius); and that the person who does not understand the Way of
Heaven and does not defer to it will be viewed as an immoral person
(Confucius, The Analects). Such social pressures also depress human
capacities to reflect upon this mysterious authority. Therefore, it is hard
for the Chinese to deform or destroy the authority of Heaven, which is
rooted in Chinese thought.
Moreover, the omnipotence of the authority of Heaven prevents the
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Chinese from developing enlightened scientific knowledge and themselves.
As in Thome Fang's description about the role of harmony in the universe,
harmony is an unchallenged, transcendental principle, in which all things
are rooted, including the natural and the social worlds. As Fang describes
it
for several thousands of years, we Chinese have been thinking of these vital
problems in terms of comprehensive harmony which permeates anything
and everything. It sounds like an eternal symphony swaying and swinging
all the sky, all the earth, all the air, all the water, merging all forms of
existence in one supreme bliss of unity. The Chinese speculation has been
centring on the three chief problems of Nature, Man and Men's cultural
achievement. (Fang, 1980, 11)
From the above descriptions about harmony, no enlightened scientific
thought could exist in Chinese thought. Enlightened scientific thought leads
men to be the masters of the natural world and to establish a universality
for the natural world, while for the Chinese, there is no way to transcend
the power of Heaven, if they have not been emancipated from the
traditional authority. Even though the nature of harmony is revealed in
various forms, all forms share transcendentally their principles with the
Way of Heaven. As The Doctrine of the Mean indicates, all things attain
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their full growth and development within the Way of Heaven.
The Chinese originally understand the universe through the concepts of
ritual terms rather than through empirical terms. The concept of ritual is
constituted by a set of abstract ideas which are expressed through
imagination with reason. The concept of ritual can be understood via
human experiences but cannot be empirically justified, and its justification
is concerned with the amount of human knowledge about its contents.
Thus, it should be reasonable but not necessarily universal.
If rules established by empirical terms are called established principles,
then those established by ritual terms, e.g., the description of harmony and
Heaven, are called natural principles here. In this sense, generally
speaking, Chinese culture can be expressed by the natural principle while
the Western enlightened science is created via established principles.
Traditional value system which is acceptable in Chinese society should be
established by natural principles rather than established principles. For
example, the leadership in a state, a community, or in a family is granted
the sub-power from Heaven in traditional Chinese society, rather than from
democratic legitimations. The leadership's orders, being fundamentally
viewed as the second order of Heaven, are not to be rebelled against. A
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person, as a good citizen or a good member of a community or a family, is
required to obey the rule established by their leadership in order to
maintain the harmonious state.
Chinese children should obey their teachers and accept knowledge from
textbooks without question. Analogously, as being analysed in the first
section, both principals and teachers in the school are clothed in the
sub-authority of Heaven, and function as authorities in the school. As a
result, the Chinese lose themselves by confining themselves to authority.
It is because the deep structure of thought is grounded in natural principles
rather than established principles that the pace towards autonomy is slowed
down.
If this is the case, the Chinese should enlighten themselves by reflecting
upon these authorities, in order to be authentically themselves; and they
should emancipate themselves from this traditional yoke to reconstruct a
rational life.
B. The legitimate authority
The phenomenon of domination by natural principles, shown in Chinese
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culture, is also shown in Chinese society. In tradittional society, social
codes and moral perspectives are based on the mysterious authority of
Heaven in Chinese thought. This authority did contribute stability and
security to a chaotic society - stability, to tranquialise the enlightened
consciousness; security, to secure acquired authority against undermining.
This strengthened the legitimacy of "the Way of Heaven".
Like the transfer of ideology, the positive legitimation might work its
negative effect on limiting individual autonomy, once the legitimation is
taken as an unchallenged universality. In this sense, individual autonomy
will have to be exercised within the range of the legitimate. As discussed,
the mysterious authority of Heaven and legitimation have their positive
functions. It is in the lack of critical thinking that the Chinese are confined
to its negative function. This will be discussed further.
The terms Chung and Yung in Chinese mean the Way of Mean. They
imply commonality, equality and sincerity (Confucius, The Doctrine of the
Mean). Commonality, equality and sincerity constitute a democratic
society. A sound democratic society is possible only if these three
constituents are realised and carried on. (Here, the sound democratic
society means a society in which the relationship between individual and
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community is harmonious both in appearance and in its hidden value
system.) In this sense, either harmony without being sincere to oneself or
harmony under political or economic power, is not such democracy.
Confucianism shows its deficiencies as sound democracy in two ways.
First, not diversity but commonality is emphasised. Confucius says, "what
you do not wish others to do to you, do not do to others" (Confucius, The
Analects). Similarly, The Doctrine of the Mean indicates that "..to serve
my father as I would expect my son to serve me, ... to treat friends as I
would expect them to treat me..." (The Doctrine of the Mean).
Second, equality and sincerity are limited to either the ruler or
collectivism. The ideology of class is grasped tightly in Chinese society in
order to maintain society in order. The Works of Men cius indicates that
"the highest personal relationships are the relationship between father and
son in a family, and the relationship between the ruler and the ministers in
a state.. .Children cannot delay to respond to father's summons, whereas the
ministers cannot delay to respond to the ruler's summons" (Mencius, The
Works of Mencius). An unchallenged power is manifested from the above
relationship which is taken as the highest morality in Chinese society. The
meaning of 'highest' implies the strongest authority. Sincerity is the
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crucial element in reaching harmony (The Great Learning; The Doctrine
of the Mean). However, under a certain coercion which comes from
culture or society, sincerely to be oneself is difficuilt, if it is not impossible.
This legitimation is not only furnished with the authority of Heaven, but
also involved in political and economic dominations. The legitimate
structure, like the cultural framing, embodies its irresistible power in
Chinese society.
Therefore, two tasks, focused on the authority of legitimation in society,
will be undertaken in this section. First, why and how cultural authority
clings to society; and second, how far the legitimation influences Taiwanese
society. The first task is a historical understanding of the relationship
between culture and society, while the second task is the reflection upon the
current situation of Taiwanese society. (Yet, both these two put emphasis
on philosophical reflection rather than historical or sociological researches,
therefore, the social context will not be described n detail.)
Confucianism is appreciated by the leadership in Chinese society because it
offers a condition of moral "quiet", which men are expected to obey
quietly rather than reflect upon dynamically. One of outstanding examples
for showing that the leadership benefits from adopting the idea of
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Confucianism is Confucius' recommendation to the leadership of the state.
He advises the leadership that "you may have people follow an instruction,
but they should not be informed to understand its reason" (Confucius, The
Analects). Apart from the political aspect, legitimation is located in the
community and family by the form of collectivism and by the superior
virtue of senior persons (Confucius, The Analects).
In Taiwan, since Confucianism is taken as a unique orthodoxy, people are
merely required to be loyal to the state or their leadership; to devote
themselves to their parents; to make sacrifices to the collectivity; to obey
the law of society; and then legitimation, which regulates human
behaviours legally, becomes the criterion for a good citizen in Taiwanese
society.
Cultural orthodoxy functions as social legitimation, becoming the criterion
of qualification as a good citizen for the Taiwanese. There is an Institute
which is established by the Government to take charge of propagating
Confucianism, and the doctrines of Confucianism constitute parts of
required courses in school education, even in university. In other words,
for the Chinese, cultural authority locates morally the criterion for
harmonious society, while human ability of reflection is stifled by
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legitimation (Chang (ed.), 1988, 154).
In Chinese society, legitimation is established for maintaining the social
status quo and for protecting the Governmental political interest. Thus,
either evolutionary or revolutionary reformation of society can hardly
earn any support from the Government. For example, an opposition
political party has difficulty in being recognised and organised (Chung, in
TAHR, 1989, 248). The incident of Tianamen Square in Mainland China is
a similar case.
Being authentically oneself would be hard to reach, if self-reflection is
limited to an external framework. Legitimation guarantees the interests of
its establishers, e.g., the Government, by rationalising the emancipatory
power (TAHR, 1989). Therefore, legitimation which is established by
power holders must not be in conflict with their own interests. In this way,
human reason is limited by legitimation to the extent that it is directed by
an external framework of reference rather than through internal reflection.
The influences of legitimatisation on the Chinese can be shown in two
ways. First, cultural authority normalises a person into adjusting
harmoniously to the social codes instead of reflecting upon them. Under
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the yoke of the traditional value system, the person is legitimately and
morally asked to think and to act according to the same model, which is
viewed as the orthodox legitimation. Consequently, individual ability of
reflection will be gradually paralysed. This is a negative function of
socialisation.
Second, as analysed in chapter I, educational aims are distorted by
instrumental reason. Education loses capacity for reflection, and becomes
a tool for the reproduction of human-labour, when facing economic and
political manipulation. Meanwhile, political propaganda is imposed on
people via teaching and learning. With teaching and learning which lack
critical thinking, traditional authority is taken for granted as orthodoxy
from generation to generation. It is by this route that legitimation
accompanied by cultural authority is, therefore, taken for granted as the
criterion for the rationality of the lifeworid. As Habermas criticises, "the
legitimation load of ideologically effective worldviews was immunised
against objections already within the cognitive reach of everyday
communication" (Habermas, McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 189).
Within such situations, seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation
are exercised dysfunctionally, because self-reflection is tied to collectivism,
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orthodox social codes, and instrumental interest.
The dysfunctions of seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation
can be shown in Taiwanese society by the fact that people become
interested in gambling on the stock market, on the lottery and on the
competition for political power (Lee, in Central Daily News, Jan. 30,
1991). Habermas confirms the critique of Horkheimer, Marcuse and
Adomo, and explains the reason for the cultural and social dysfunctions.
He says,
the critiques of ideology carried out by Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adomo
confirmed them in the belief that culture was losing its autonomy in
postliberal societies and was being incorporated into the machinery of the
economic-administrative system. (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.),1987, 382)
According to the above analyses about the orthodox social legitimation in
Taiwan, the crises of dehumanisation and depersonalisation, in Habermas'
terms, are revealed in Taiwanese society. "Dehumanisation means any
splitting off from the lifeworld of formally organised domains of action
which is made possible by steering media"(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.),
1987,308). Depersonalisation means "the separation of organised action
systems from personality structures' t(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.),1987, 308).
99
Under the effects of dehumanisation and depersonalisation, two
characteristics may result: the individual loses his ability of reflection; and
personal autonomy is limited or neglected. According to Marx' and
Habermas' analyses of European feudalism, dehumanisation and
depersonalisation under the capitalist pattern of modernisation are "marked
by a deformation, a reification of the symbolic structures of the lifeworid
under the imperatives of subsystems differentiated out via money and
power and rendered self-sufficient" (Habermas, McCarthy (trans.), 1987,
283). Similar to European society, dehumanisation and depersonalisation,
shown in Taiwanese society, not only result from the individual alienation
from his lifeworld, but also result from the yoke of the traditional power,
which is deeply rooted in Chinese thought.
In general, dehumanisation and depersonalisation are shown in Taiwanese
society in two ways: a) in political and economic aspects; and b) in cultural,
moral and educational aspects. In Taiwan, there was no opposition political
party, which could balance the Government, until five years ago; most
major industries, e.g., alcohol, cigarettes, electricity, water, postal and
cable services, traffic, petrol, the steel industry and so on, are monopolised
under the control of the Government. Such control of the economy,
100
surprisingly, has brought about great economic development in Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the control of the economy implies the control of necessity,
while the control of necessity indicates the control of self-survival.
Consequently, freedom of thought will be controlled through the control of
self-survival, because self-survival is a physical but fundamental need for
human beings.
The control of freedom of thought is aimed at consolidating the position of
the ruling class, because their interests are legitimately guaranteed not to be
reflected upon by limiting the extent of people's thought to a specific
framework. For example, according to the Three Principles of the People,
the Government should possess the power of governing, while people
exercise political rights (Sun, 1923). In principle, this distinction is clear
enough to locate governmental power and people's rights. However, in
practice, the relationship between these two forces is complicated and
vague.
Take, for example, the affairs of the National Defence. Some of them are
matters of the highest secrecy for a country in order to maintain its
security and stability, from the viewpoint of the Government. However, if
people are not informed or are not allowed to understand these affairs, the
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process and adequacy of the governmental policy-making on it are called
into question. Similar to this, some legitimisation in Taiwan appears
democratic, yet such a democracy is exercised within a certain political
interest.
Apart from the economic and political influences, such an authority also
influences Taiwanese society in moral and educational aspects (Tran, in
Chang (ed.), 1988, 76-8). According to the analyses in the first section of
this chapter, the government is interested in the reform and renaissance of
Confucianism, and traditional virtues such as filial piety, obedience,
loyalty, trust, and peace constitute the moral contents in society and
schools. These are parts of the reasons why educational reform cannot
reach the aim of creating an autonomous person.
The influence of dehumanisation and depersonalisation can be shown from
the fact that Taiwanese society has been entangled in the conflict between
social destruction and individual freedom. The Taiwanese pursue a free
economic marketing system, while they appeal for individual independence
in a society and in a family. It can be shown from the documents of
Candidates for the people's representatives that the Taiwanese expect to live
in a rich and free society (Central Daily News, 1991, Dec. 12-28).
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This demand shows also that the Taiwanese demand their independence as
individual from the Government, when they are impressed by Western
democracy and freedom. Nevertheless, they are unable to throw off the
traditional yoke, because they finally choose the way of the mean - to make
progress on the basis of stability rather than radical changes (Central Daily
News, 1991, Dec., 25). Making progress in a stable society is not
questionable; what is questionable is sticking to a universal and legitimate
authority both in moral life and school life without thinking critically.
Teaching for critical thinking will be advocated in this thesis. At this very
moment, self-realisation and self-reflection must cope with this change and
face this crisis so that the relationship between society and the individual,
and between freedom and legitimation can be re-harmonised. Otherwise,
either because of the shortage of knowledge and the capacity for
self-reflection, or because of the lack of openness in the value system, it is
hard for the Taiwanese to dismiss such a negative ideology which is deeply
rooted in an unchallengeable authority.
The Taiwanese have been fettered by both cultural authority and social
legitimation so far. Legitimation is still based in cultural authority. Even
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though some scholars, e.g., V. Shen (1987), M. H. Lee (in Tran & Shen
(eds.),1988), K. D. Lee (1991), have noticed the crisis of Chinese culture
and society, they have merely pointed out that there could be something
wrong with Confucianism, or have suggested that Confucianism must be
reexamined, but they have not thought out an effective strategy to
emancipate the Chinese thoroughly from the confines of the concept of
Heaven.
Three reasons might explain their positions. First, they themselves are still
constrained by the authority of Heaven; second, they are not courageous
enough to rebel against tradition, even though they have discovered the
negative effect of the Chinese tradition. Finally, they are not capable of
dealing with it, partly because this issue is too hard to be resolved; partly
because circumstances, e.g., the political situation of conservatism or their
own interests, prevent them from solving this problem efficiently and
critically.
From the above discussion, the Chinese can neither unfetter themselves
from the ultimate power, nor struggle for the autonomy of both the
individual and society. Therefore, to reconstruct a rational value system
will be a tough challenge for the Taiwanese, unless their self-consciousness
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is promptly enlightened and their ability for self-reflection is manifestly
developed. These issues show the tasks of primary school education in
Taiwan.
In other words, education acquires its significance from following two
tasks: a) enlightening people to be brave and rational enough to be
themselves; and b) furnishing people with ability for reflection. Basically,
not only knowledge and ability for self-reflection need to be cultivated, but
also an open-minded system (community, society and the state) needs to be
established as a basis for the reconstruction of a rational value system in
society. In this sense, education raises human hope for a good life.
Reflecting continuously upon educational theory and practice will be
indispensable if education is to escape from the domination of negative
ideology and to undertake its tasks.
Conclusion
The cultural, social and educational framings of non-critical thinking in
Taiwan can be divided into three dimensions: power, alienation and
one-sided rationality. The characteristics of non-critical thinking in
culture, society and education can be shown in Table 2.1.
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Heaven lodges 'His' power in culture, while ho (harmony) imparts its
power to morality in society. Political and economic interests are hidden
in cultural authority and moral codes in Taiwanese society. Knowledge
constitutes its power in school education, whereas teaching and learning
without thinking distorts the function of the enlightenment of reason.
Thereby, the development of culture, society and person is alienated from
lifeworld. Dysfunction, depersonalisation and dehumanisation therefore
occur to the Taiwanese.
Education, in terms of teaching for critical thinking, should show its
achievements in at least three ways: a) one-sided rationality will be
questioned; b) human beings can emancipate themselves from the
dominations of Heaven, moral codes and knowledge; and c) the alienations
of dysfunction, dehumanisation and depersonalisation can be destroyed, if
critical thinking can help people to emancipate themselves from the above
alienations, including culture, society and person. Critical thinkers at least
should be capable of inquiry, reflection and emancipation, so as to
reconstruct autonomously a rationality for their lives and society. This
will be investigated in the following chapters.
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Table 2.1 The characteristics of non-critical thinking
	
Framing	 culture	 society	 education
representation
	
power	 Heaven	 ho (harmony)	 knowledge
moral codes
alienation	 dysfunction,	 dysfunction,	 dysfunction,
dehumanisation,	 dehumanisation, 	 dehumanisation,
depersonalisation	 depersonalisation	 depersonalisation
one-sided	 I universal	 political and/or	 teaching
& learning
rationality	 value system	 economic power	 without thinking
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Chapter III
THE NATURE OF CRITICAL THINKING (I):
FOUR MODES
I. The supernatural mode
II. The empirical mode
III. The subject-dialectical mode
IV. The communicative mode
Conclusion
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Chapter III
THE NATURE OF CRITICAL THINKING (I):
FOUR MODES
He who has imagination without reason has wings but no feet.
Primary school education in Taiwan has been reflected upon, and the
educational dysfunction, dehumanisation and depersonalisation are its
crises. These crises result from teaching and learning without thinking,
because it weakens the abilities of self-knowledge, self-reflection and
seif-actualisation. These abilities must be exercised by an autonomous
person. Therefore, I assume that the teaching of critical thinking will be
able to reduce such crises, if critical thinking includes the abilities of
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inquiry, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction. In order to justify
this assumption, the nature of critical thinking will be clarified.
The nature of critical thinking will be clarified in two ways: investigating
its general characteristics, and examining its noesis*.
 The first task will be
undertaken in this chapter, whereas the second task will be dealt with in the
next chapter. The historical development of critical thinking will be
surveyed so that its various forms and its common characteristics can be
displayed.
Critical thinking has always been a vital motor for understanding the world
and our place within it, although it has taken various forms. There is much
evidence to suggest that "throughout history people have asked questions
about the kind of world that we live in, such as whether it makes sense, or
whether we can feel at home in it" (Sankey, Sullivan and Watson, 1988, 7).
Searching for a better understanding of the world, in the belief that this
will enhance the quality of life, has been the hope of human beings. It is
through critical thinking that people question the world, grasp their
circumstances, and solve problems.
* noesis: see below p. 150.
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In recent years many educators have become convinced of the importance
of critical thinking as an educational reform (Lipman, 1990, 1).
Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the definition of critical thinking
(Martin, 1990, 4). Some consider critical thinking to be a skill for
problem-solving, e.g. cognitive psychologists (Piaget) and Dewey, while
others take critical thinking to include all forms of rational thinking, e.g.,
Robert Ennis (Ennis, 1962; Ennis, in Baron & Stemberg (ed.), 1990),
Harvey Siegel(1988) etc.
In order to grasp the very nature of critical thinking and avoid sinking into
confusions of definition, it will be helpful to take a look at the various
forms of critical thinking. Purpose can be taken as the key criterion for
distinguishing among various modes of critical thinking, due to its role in
human activity.
In this thesis, four modes of critical thinking are picked out from history as
models to clarify the function of critical thinking in human progress, and
their common characteristics. They are: the supernatural mode, the
empirical mode, the subject-dialectical mode, and the communicative mode.
With the increase of human knowledge and the changes of circumstances,
critical thinking has undergone changes in form from the supernatural
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mode to the empirical mode, from the empirical mode to the
subject-dialectical mode, then to the communicative mode. It is still
developing today. These modes possess different forms but have the same
underlying nature: a) they are a motor in the progress of human
development, including personal and social aspects; and b) there are
common characteristics among the various modes of critical thinking. The
common nature of critical thinking will be justified, when its four modes
are surveyed.
I. The supernatural mode
The supernatural mode of critical thinking reveals an advance in human
knowledge in a society when men do not know very well about themselves
or circumstances. Therefore, they tried to make the universe clear to
people by explaining the mystery of the universe, e.g., working out the
order and movement of the spheres; and clarifying the enigma of human
genesis, e.g., how God creates the world (i.e. theistic religion), and what
the Way of Heaven is (i.e. Confucianism).
Human purpose, at that moment, rested on clarifying the myth of cosmic
activity. In Chinese history,
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the Confucians are eager to seek after the ordinance of God in order to fulfil
life in accordance with the fundamental principle of harmony. The Taoists
are eager to go by the primordial root of Tao in order to embrace all beings
in its sympathetic unity; Mo-izu and his follows are desirous to become
identified with the will of Heaven in order to practise universal love for the
complete satisfaction of life: they do all of these things for the reason that
the ordinance of God, the primordial root of Tao, and the will of Heaven are
the very headspring of universal life. (Fang, 1980, 97)
From the above quotation, the relationships between men and the
supernatural world, and men and the Natural world are formulated on the
basis of religious worship.
Heaven shows 'His' authority, for example, in the theory of five elements
and 1-Ching in Chinese thought. According to the theory of five elements,
logical, mathematical and intuitive methods were used to link the Way of
Heaven with human events. Chinese people explained the cosmological
order, the genesis of the universe, and the phenomena of the world by
virtue of five elements: Wood, Fire, Earth, Metal, and Water. Kuan Tzu
(about 135 B .C), one of the books of Confucianism, confirmed that
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Heaven has five elements... Wood comes first in the cycle of the five
elements and Water comes last... This is the order which Heaven has made.
Wood produces Fire, Fire produces Earth, (i.e. as ashes), Earth produces
Metal (i.e. as ores), Metal produces Water (either because molten metal was
considered aqueous or more probably, because of the ritual practice of
collecting dew on metal mirrors left Out at night ), and Water produces
Wood (for woody plants require water)... (quoted in Ronam, 1978, 148)
Also, the relationship of men and God (Heaven), and man and man were
regulated by the five elements. The leader for a state was viewed as the
messenger of Heaven. For the Chinese, Heaven showed the right person
by auspicious signs, viz., five elements. For example,
the dynasty of Shun ruled by the virtue of Earth, the Hsi dynasty ruled by
the virtue of Wood, the S hang dynasty rules by the virtue of Metal, and the
Chou dynasty ruled by the virtue of Fire. When a new dynasty is going to
arise, Heaven exhibits auspicious signs to the people. During the rise of
Huang Ti large earth worms and large ants appear... It indicates that the
element Earth is in the ascendant, as our colour must be yellow, and our
affairs must be placed under the sign of Earth... (Ronam quoted these from
the Chinese naturalist, Tsou Yen -- about 350 and 270 B.C; Ronam, 1978,
144)
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Apart from the theory of five elements, the authority of Heaven showed in
1-Ching (about 300 B.C.), in which human events were explained in terms
of ritual. Likewise the theory of five elements, 1-Ching were derived from
the form of the natural world. As Meskill indicated,
Yang meant the sunny side of a hill, while Yin meant shadow. More
generally, the pair of terms came to stand for a ceaseless alternation of
opposites throughout all nature (including human nature): day and night,
sun and moon, summer and winter, male and female,.(strong and weak)...
(Meskill, 1973, 33)
The authority of Heaven which shows in 1-Ching is a gigantic whole.
According to 1-Ching, each event constitutes part of one gigantic whole,
which gigantic whole produces two forces Yin and Yang. These two
forces are divided into four levels and, then into eight kua ... " (1-Ching).
Yin and Yang are separate, but each contains half of its opposite in a
recessive state, as is seen when the second division occurs (Ronam, 1978,
162). That is, all things in the world are constituted by the two forces,
which carry the order of Heaven, so men can grasp the Way of Heaven by
decoding the meaning in eight kua.
Heaven is taken as the universality for all things in Chinese society, as in
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western society, in which "God is thought to be among the causes of all
things and to be a first principle" (Oates,1963, 222). In addition to the
above quotation, taking the Shang Dynasty as an example, people asked
questions regarding the weather, the battles or the outcome of hunting
excursions, and were answered by the crackle of the bones, which was
taken as the unique medium between man and the Gods (Meskill, 1973, 7).
Therefore, any event, no matter whether in the past or in the future, would
be explained through the crackle of bones. It implies that an unexperienced
supernatural world dominates the universe, and only wise men were
thought to be able to seek rules from the crackle and decode the meaning of
them.
In Chinese thought, "only the wisest can think over events thoroughly.. .He
has profound insight to make a judgment" (The Doctrine of the Mean). If
such a wise person can be called a critical thinker, then critical thinkers
explain to other people what happened and what could happen, while other
people just believed in what they explained. In this case, critical thinkers
must have the abilities of understanding and reflection, to question the
meaning and purpose of the world, and then to have the ability of
reconstruction to infer the existence of the unexperienced entity by using
creatively their imaginations, so that an acceptable principle can be
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established. During this course, the activities of inquiry, reflection,
emancipation (emancipating themselves from the perplexity of mystery)
and reconstruction have been shown in the reconstruction of an accepted
principle.
The more men know themselves and circumstances, the more men can
manage their lives. The supernatural mode of critical thinking functioned
effectively in solving problems of man and the world, and man and God, so
that men could profoundly grasp the world, and then improve their own
lives. In other words, men through critical thinking developed their
knowledge of the human world. Their well-being can be promoted,
through deferring to the acceptable principle they worked out.
The principle can be accepted, because it is reasonable. According to M.
Black, "in order for an action to be reasonable it must be
well-considerated, intelligent, sensible, far-sighted, etc. and may be
presumed to be prudent, wise etc. (Black, in Dearden (eds.), 1972, 198)
Those are rough but fundamental conditions for a reasonable action.
Similarly, a principle which will be accepted must be qualified at least with
these features. In fact, these qualifications are included in the
characteristics of critical thinking. That is, a person who must be qualified
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as a reasonable person, could be a critical thinker, because inquiry,
reflection, emancipation and reconstruction must be exercised by a
reasonable person. Also, autonomy must be grounded in reasonableness.
However, such an acceptable principle lodges its authority in efficiency and
a kind of certaint y in human life. As Husserl claims, "the prescientific
world is a cultural world already informed by predication, values,
empirical techniques, and the practice of measurement and inductiveness
which themselves have their own style of certainty" (Husserl; Derrida
(trans.), 1978, 120). It is clear that the supernatural mode of critical
thinking, in a way, bears the miniature of scientific methods. Hence, once
efficiency is added to certainty, the authority of universality would be
confirmed in a society. Such an authority can be seen in Confucianism,
which has been analysed in chapters one and two. Confucius instructed
people not to rebel against the Natural law by stressing the power of
Heaven. He argued that "if Heaven intends to have the culture destroyed,
nobody could save it... On the contrary, if the Heaven dispatches me to
keep it (Chinese culture), then nobody could keep me from it (even by
killing me)" (Confucius, The Analects). Also, he suggested that
understanding the Way of Heaven is crucial for men to grasp human
affairs. He says, "people do not know how to manage human affairs so
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that they should not know about the affairs of the gods and spirits"
(Confucius, The Analects).
For the Chinese, the authority of the supernatural world cannot be fought
against. All men can do in conditions of which knowledge is short, is to
grasp or formulate supernatural orders and follow them. Therefore,
critical thinkers within the supernatural mode, like others who lack critical
thinking, believe in the authority of Heaven. Nevertheless, critical thinkers
within the supernatural mode did not merely believe in God's or Heaven's
authority, on the contrary, they linked God's law with human activity by
virtue of their experiences from seeing and thinking of the natural world.
They built up an acceptable rule, using logical, mathematical and intuitive
method for combining observation with imagination.
Therefore, critical thinkers can be distinguished from non-critical thinkers
in two ways. In epistemological terms, critical thinkers pursued the truth
of the world, instead of being situated in the perplexity 'of mystery; while
in methodological terms, critical thinkers developed their reason through
experiencing and thinking, rather than making a judgment grounded in
common sense. The first way shows the intentionality of human beings is
different between critical thinkers and non-critical thinkers. The second
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difference between critical thinkers and non-critical thinkers lies in the
method they used.
However, God's authority would be hidden behind the efficient
universality, in which the myth of the universe was worked out. The initial
principle of the cosmic activity could be understood and it could be
successfully tested in human life. Then universality would become an
authority, like the authority of Heaven in Chinese thought.
Similarly, the supernatural mode of critical thinking can be seen in
Babylonian history. As Sankey concluded,
The Babylonians were keen astronomers and made some very accurate
observations of the stars... Yet, like all the other ancient civilisations, their
view of the sky was mainly religious. The heavens were thought to be the
home of the gods, and the sun and planets were thought to be gods. They
developed the signs of the zodiac and studied the movement of the stars in
order to learn how they influence human life (astrology). (Sankey, Sullivan
& Watson, 1988, 8)
Critical thinkers themselves launched inquiry into not only "know-that"
knowledge but also "know-how" and "know-why" knowledge, in order to
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reach a profound understanding before accepting it. In contrast, other
people merely accepted "know-that" knowledge from critical thinkers. In
order to uncover the mystery of cosmic activity and work out an acceptable
principle for life, critical thinkers shed light on questions such as, who
creates the world and how, what 'the rule' of the creator is, and so on.
Skepticism marks the criterion for critical thinkers. Skepticism is more
than curiosity. By skepticism, critical thinkers within the supernatural
mode struggled to emancipate men from a blind acceptance of the activities
of Heaven, even though the amount of knowledge they possessed was
limited.
Critical thinking is not an isolated action, but a serial process of mental
activity. Using skepticism, critical thinkers examined the situation they
faced and targeted their purpose. They had to struggle against control
from the external world, before a rule was established. Skepticism
stimulated critical thinkers to investigate the world and person, whilst the
ability of reflection helped them to understand the world in order to locate
the problem which needed to be solved. Then, they reconstructed society
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through emancipating* themselves from the yoke of the chaos. At that
moment, critical thinkers, taking skepticism as the starting point, not only
engaged in emancipation* from the constraints of Heaven or God, but also
reconstructed human beings for a progressive life, in terms of the progress
of knowledge and the enlightenment of reason.
Reflective characteristics are manifested in the process by which critical
thinking was formulating rules from chaos to order, through skepticism
(inquiry), reflection (understanding), emancipation and reconstruction
(formulating rules). This process indicates human purpose: in trying to
understand the meaning of life or the universe, and then aiming at building
a role for the person. This is also the process towards autonomy.
Autonomy cannot be reached at the first try. It is a process of
development, because to be autonomous is concerned with both personal
development and the circumstances the person faces. Autonomy lies in the
interaction between personal development and circumstances. On the other
* here, emancipation appears as a result of critical thinking, however, it also shows human
intentionality to shake off the constraint of mystery, although they reconstructed an
accepted principle in the belief of God's or Heaven's transcendental power.
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hand, autonomy could hamper personal development, if it is distorted into
egoism or concealed by false-consciousness. False-consciousness, here,
means that individual judgment is confined to a certain value system
without reflection, so that individual judgment may cause dysfunction on
personal and/or social well-beings. In this sense, the function of autonomy,
as an effective principle, could become negative rather than positive.
An enlightened reason could become a dominating authority over life, if
the enlightened reason ceases to be reflected upon. Two reasons for the
transfer of enlightened reason from emancipation to domination are: a) the
new principle cannot be justified as the truth by dint of the limited amount
of knowledge; and b) whether this principle can be acceptable depends
upon the criterion of effective functioning in human life. Thus, the task of
enlightenment of reason must be continuous, otherwise, today's
enlightenment might become tomorrow's domination. The key reason for
continuous reflection or enlightenment is that universality might be
exclusive to human contingencies. In this case, if men did not reconstruct
another principle for solving problems, then men would be forced into
either adapting to universality, or suffering from perplexity. In these
circumstances, critical thinkers could become dominators in society, if
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other people lack critical thinking and merely adapt to the previous
principle. Psychologically, if men lack critical thinking, they will prefer to
adapt to the existing principle rather than stay in perplexity. Accordingly,
the originally enlightened principle will stretch its power from efficient
instrumentality to legitimation.
As the above analysis shows, critical thinking could be a paradox. Men and
society need critical thinking to emancipate themselves from negative
authority and reconstruct a rationality as the value system for their lives;
on the other hand, the liberators - the critical thinkers will dominate those
who lack critical thinking. If this is the case, then everyone should be
encouraged to be a critical thinker. Also, no matter whether there is a
guarantee of final truth, critical thinking must be a process of continuous
reflection, otherwise, the negative function cannot be avoided.
Bringing people to be autonomous is a motive of critical thinking though
critical thinkers in the supernatural mode might not have put it in this way.
Take, for example, critical thinkers within the supernatural mode. They
believed in the authority of God (the West) and Heaven (the Chinese), yet,
they also contributed to personal and social developments, in terms of
cognitive attitude and methods. They helped people to understand the
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world, to reduce external control, and to construct a rationality for human
development, when they analysed the mystery of the universe. It seems to
me that the range of autonomy might be varied, which is corresponding
with human knowledge and circumstances. If this is the case, to be
autonomous, like the task of critical thinking, must be continuously
developing.
Human life is also continuously developing. For example, people made a
great advance in material civilisation during the Shang Dynasty, which is
one of the most civilised stages in Chinese history. This progress can be
shown from the facts that human civilisation was transformed from the
Stone-age to the Bronze-age, and pottery became covered with geometric
designs. These achievements revealed an advance in human knowledge. At
the least, geometric designs, at that moment, acquired two significances for
human progress in life. One, knowledge was not only an abstract theory,
but also applied to reality; and life has not only the physical aspect, but also
the aesthetic aspect. This is the contribution of seif-actualisation.
Trying to understand the world more implies psychologically trying to
escape from its control. This intentionality implies that critical thinkers
within the supernatural mode tried to strengthen the role of the person in
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the world. The more one can grasp the circumstance, the more one can be
autonomous, and the less one will be controlled.
Self-realisation, self-reflection and self-actualisation constitute autonomy,
while autonomy qualifies a person as a critical thinker. Let us take the
master and the expert for example. Critical thinkers can be distinguished
from others by virtue of the distinction between the master and the expert.
Masters show their abilities of self-knowledge and self-reflection, while
experts exercise their skills. Masters commit themselves to the activity
when they demonstrate their abilities, while experts are alienated from
their achievements. In this sense, an expert can display the skills of critical
thinking; he might be skillful in solving problems by using effective
principles, however he is not a critical thinker. In other words, he may be
good at operating the skills of inquiry, examination, formulation and so on,
but he operates these skills without reflecting upon the rationality of
principles he uses - he does not ask questions, such as, what are 'my'
intentionality and purpose? Do I reflect upon the rules before I use them?
Do I consider multiple dimensions of circumstances? and so on.
Therefore, the skills of experts all issue in the same results. In contrast,
each master could reach a different product. They are committed to their
tasks so that their diversities are shown in their achievements. In a word,
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an expert is just a person who is doing without reflective thinking. He is
not an autonomous person. In this way, those who lack the abilities of
seif-realisation, self-reflection, seif-actualisation, and whose rationality is
grounded in instrumentality rather than subjectivity, cannot be masters.
From the above case, autonomy is significant for critical thinkers. If
critical thinkers were not autonomous people, critical thinking could be
developed as merely an instrument for understanding the world.
The characteristics of critical thinking, skepticism, reflection, emancipation
from preconceptions, reconstruction and autonomy have been explained in
this section, so they will not be repeated within the following modes.
Rather, I shall stress the characteristics which are significant within the
other modes but are lacking or weak in the supernatural mode of critical
thinking. In addition, the comparison between different modes will be
discussed.
II. The empirical mode
Skepticism is one possible way which is open to us of viewing our situation
and reflecting upon ourselves. With skepticism, critical thinkers within the
empirical mode reflected upon the achievement of the supernatural mode
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of critical thinking. When men ask questions such as, what is God? does it
exist? what is the world? how does God create the world? how should
men follow the supernatural law? can men create any law for themselves?
etc., the previously accepted universality, and the relationship between the
world and men are reflected upon. Darwinism is an outcome of such
inquiries, which tried to answer the questions raised in Genesis.
Therefore, this sort critical thinking, which involves reflecting upon
religious rationality is classified into the empirical mode of critical
thinking in this thesis.
The abilities of skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction are
common characteristics for critical thinking. They are revealed not only in
facing problems in the supernatural world, but also in the natural world. I
shall go further to justify this.
Critical thinkers within the empirical mode tried to work out a 'useful'
principle for solving human problems both in the supernatural and natural
worlds. This intentionality can be seen in the history of the natural science.
The universality was assumed to apply to all phenomena comprehensively,
so that human activities and experiences can be expressed in it and through
its methods of reduction and induction. "A scientist, for instance, may see
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his work as a way of making a comfortable living, as a vehicle of his
ambition for prestige; it may satisfy a fascination with solving puzzles; and
it may express his wonder at the glory of the universe" (Winch, 1987,
137). There is a hint in the last phrase that critical thinkers within the
empirical mode intended to combine knowledge about the supernatural
world with knowledge about the natural world. In this sense, they intended
to establish a universality for not only the natural world but also the
supernatural world.
The empirical mode of critical thinking aims at establishing an objective
universality to explain all human activities as well as other events. The
empirical mode of critical thinking can also be identified in terms of
human purpose: having control over human life through a single kind of
universality. With the triumph of Copernicus and Galileo, and with the
amazing rise of exact science, critical thinkers within the empirical mode
were interested in discovering the objective universal law of the natural
world. In a word, they tried to emancipate themselves from the religious
authority and to reconstruct an objectivity by and for themselves.
Skepticism stimulates men to question the previous authority, whereas
reflection brings men to emancipate themselves from the previous
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authority. Then, the previous authority (rule) will be rebelled against, and
a new rule could be reconstructed. That is the process of critical thinking,
i.e. skepticism (inquiry) --------> reflection (understanding) ----->
emancipation* ----> reconstruction (formulating a rule).
	 Three
possibilities to constitute a new principle in this process are: a) the previous
principle is completely replaced; b) the previous principle integrates with a
new circumstance, and c) the previous principle is justified and confirmed
again.	 In other words, similar to the supernatural mode of critical
thinking, skepticism stimulates men to question the objectivity of the
principle, and reflection brings men to struggle for a better rationality
which is not confined to a certain archimedian point. Meanwhile,
emancipation prevents us from being confined to an archimedian point,
while reconstruction builds up universality.
Critical thinkers within either the supernatural mode or the empirical mode
intended to establish a universality for human life. Yet, the substance of
universality, established by different modes of critical thinking, is
different. The universality established within the supernatural mode of
* emancipation features here as if it was a mental process. However, it must be grounded
in the results of inquiry and reflection.
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critical thinking is grounded in 'reason', while it was grounded in
objectivity within the empirical mode of critical thinking. Instead of
believing in religious relation, critical thinkers within the empirical mode
believed in scientific inquiry. For example, Francis Bacon's inductive
method, Thomas Hobbes' mathematical application were cases of scientific
method.
Method is the vital sign of the empirical mode of critical thinking. Critical
thinkers within the supernatural mode shared imaginative method with
critical thinkers within the empirical mode. Both of them framed
hypotheses, but critical thinkers within the empirical mode, instead of
simply reasoning about their experiences and imaginations, collected facts,
tested hypotheses, and then formulated a law, which was viewed as
scientific truth. In this case, their methods showed the vital sign of the
empirical mode of critical thinking. They are neither the method of
observation nor imagination with reason, but the methods of collecting
facts and testing hypotheses. These are parts of inductive method.
According to the above analyses, the purpose and the sequence of the
empirical mode of critical thinking are the same as the supernatural mode
of critical thinking. Both of their purposes lay in forming universality
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through serial activities of thinking, i.e. skepticism, reflection,
emancipation and reconstruction.
On the other hand, their crucial differences lay in intentionality and
methods. Critical thinkers within the supernatural mode focused on
religious worship, while critical thinkers within the empirical mode
targeted the natural world. This difference of intentionality constitutes the
different substance of universality. Therefore, critical thinkers within the
empirical mode established universality grounded in objectivity, instead of
reason without verification.
Critical thinkers within the empirical mode made progress for human life,
including the discovery of empirical methods, and the extension of human
insights from the religious dimension to the dimension of the natural
world. More significantly, the empirical mode of critical thinking
produced enlightened reason, by which men emancipated themselves from
religious authority. Accordingly, human autonomy was confirmed through
controlling the natural world. The achievement of the supernatural mode
of critical thinking was a sort of miraculous 'knowledg&, whilst critical
thinkers within the empirical mode seemed to go toward the enlightenment
of reason further and deeper than those within the supernatural mode.
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Emancipation and reconstruction are revealed within the empirical mode of
critical thinking. Human development was promoted from following God's
law to inquiring into the objectivity of supernatural rules, and to
formulating the law of the natural world. This also reveals men's spirit of
autonomy. They tried to control the natural world by discovering the
natural law.
The motive of autonomy pushed men to question whether religious
reasoning is sufficient for human development. Critical thinkers within the
empirical mode perhaps found that religious reasoning locked human
knowledge, ability and circumstances into the framework of the a priori, so
that men could not be capable of being themselves, in terms of controlling
their circumstances and themselves. It is through reflection that critical
thinkers within the empirical mode emancipated themselves from the
domination of religious worship.
Knowledge is a necessary condition for making progress. As Theobald
emphases, "the progress of science depends upon the scientists' ability to
see the unfamiliar as an example of the familiar, to see therefore the
familiar anew and to see it with new words" (Theobald, 1968, 36). It is
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evident that, with the increase in knowledge, methods for solving problems
were improved. The improvement of tools became an effective help for
critical thinking within the empirical mode. Tools helped critical thinkers
to emancipate men from the myth of the supernatural world. As Wald
claims, "men's generalising and abstracting power increased with their
increased mental power over the environment, with the improvement of
tools" (Wald, 1975, 129).
The experimental method of Francis Bacon could be viewed as the
hallmark of scientific method. His method became the basis of the appeal
to experience of John Locke and David Hume, the basis of Cartesian
method, and even, indirectly, the basis of the transcendental method of
Kant. This becomes clear to us from Miller's explanation that
Locke is, in one basic sense, the leading spirit of modern scientific
empiricism, even though men like Bacon helped to introduce the empirical
method. He switched his emphasis from philosophical subject matter to
methodology... Along with Descartes, Locke was one of the first to give
extreme prominence to the question of how we know what we know.
(Miller, 1971, 10)
As Sankey says, "the new view or picture of the world may be so powerful
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that it changes the course of history" (Sankey, Sullivan and Watson, 1988,
31). It was hoped that with critical thinking, natural science would be
increasingly adequate in dealing with our experiences (in the laboratory)
(Theobald, 1968, 12). Then, "the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo,
Darwin, or Heinsenberg did not mean only a change of theory. They came
into conflict with dominant views and caused many moral dilemmas"
(Hilpinen (ed.), 1980, 160). These moral dilemmas stimulated men to
think about the role of the person again.
Reflection with the aim of autonomy and with the improvement of methods
leads to scientific knowledge developing continuously. Conflict and
inconsistency, as in the case of moral dilemmas, causes men to reflect.
Reflection is stimulated by circumstances of cognitive conflict, in which
present knowledge is unsatisfactory. Popper claimed that science is not
static knowledge, though its aim is to "find satisfactory explanations"
(Popper, 1972, 24). Theobald provided an example to prove the necessity
of the continuous process of scientific discovery. He showed that "the place
of geometry is physics has been discussed since Greek times. For
Democritus, the atomists and the pythagoreans, reality was numerable, that
is, it consists of countable points. But the view suffered from the
irrationality of (Theobald, 1968, 6).
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Irrationality implies a conflict-situation, which cannot be solved through
the previous law. It was because of irrationality that scientists were forced
to rethink previous principles. That is, reflection emerges from a
conflict-situation, from which people suffer. For critical thinkers, a
conflict-situation emerges not only from the outer conflict, but, more
importantly, from inner struggle for autonomy.
The motive of autonomy and the experimental method inspire men to
reflect upon not only the unsatisfactory achievement, but also the
universality which was established on the basis of religious authority and
through ritual terms. In this sense, the desire for emancipation is raised by
the intention of autonomy. Theobald said that "Bacon wishes to see no
return to the medieval situation where knowledge was in the hands of a few
privileged persons, i.e. the clergy and nobility" (Theobald, 1968, 74).
Bacon deserves to be called a critical thinker, not only for his discovery of
the inductive method, but also for his questioning of authority. Bacon
questioned the authority which was held by both a certain school of
knowledge and by the people who have political power.
The nature of critical thinkers must not be limited to the level of skill. I
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have compared the master with the expert for example to reveal that it is
inadequate to limit critical thinking to the level of skill. However, critical
thinking is inevitably taken as a skill, or a set of skills of thinking in order
to solve problems, in particular, within the empirical mode. The empirical
mode of critical thinking contributed to human progress especially in terms
of the discovery of methods. In addition, the improved method opened a
possibility for men to control their circumstances.
Nevertheless, for critical thinkers, the ability of critical thinking is not only
skills or knowledge, but also the disposition of critical thinking. In other
words, human insight integrates skills and knowledge with dispositions.
Thus, critical thinking cannot be seen as merely a skill or disposition, but
needs to be perceived also as insight.
The term 'insight' is borrowed from Lonergan. Lonergan takes the story
of Archimedes to suggest that "Archimedes had his insight by thinking
about the crown; we shall have ours by thinking about Archimedes"
(Lonergan, 1957, 3). He also points out,
what we have to grasp is that insight
1) comes as a release to the tension of inquiry,
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2) comes suddenly and unexpectedly,
3) is a function not of outer circumstances but inner conditions,
4) pivots between the concrete and the abstract, and
5) passes into the habitual texture of one's mind. (Lonergan, 1957, 3-4)
Therefore, 'insight' can be viewed as an approach to understand
circumstances. It is insight that constitutes the possibility of learning and
understanding. In this sense, learning or understanding can be viewed as
the result that men add insight to a further insight. In this thesis, insight is
constituted by intentionality and cognitive style, while human beings
exercise their insight in method-choosing and purpose-setting. Therefore,
insight is gradually complemented with the horizon of reflective
understanding. In this way, critical thinking is marked into various forms
due to the range of insight.
The relationship between critical thinking and human insight can be drawn
in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 The relationship between critical thinking and human insight
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The above figure shows that cognitive style offers the resource for critical
thinkers to focus their intentionality, locate their purpose and choose
suitable methods to reach purposes. Cognitive style, formed after reaching
a purpose, will be complemented with the increase of knowledge. In this
sense, cognitive style constitutes the basis of human insight, and insight
synthesises the constituents of critical thinking: intentionality, purpose and
method.
For instance, in ancient Greece, critical thinkers worked out the order of
the spheres by recording the movements of the sun and planets. At that
time, simple mathematical theorems were used to combine their intuition
and meditation with their religious beliefs. In this case, their intentionality
was the myth of the universe; their purpose was to decode this myth; and
their cognitive style was based on religious knowledge. Consequently, they
worked out the answer with ritual terms, and established universality in
terms of acceptable reasons with religious worship. In other words, human
insight within the supernatural mode of critical thinking constitutes a
religious understanding about circumstances, so that critical thinking was
grounded in religious worship.
However, with the help of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton's scientific
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discoveries, critical thinkers developed their insight into the truth of the
natural world through scientific investigation. Therefore, they focused on
different intentionality and purpose from those of the supernatural mode of
critical thinking. They verified the truth by empirical methods rather than
imagination and intuition.
The empirical mode of critical thinking might be far more difficult to
develop in Chinese society than in Western society. Although scientific
intentionality on controlling the natural world seemed to be revealed in
Chinese thought, especially in Hsun-tzu's theory. Hsun-tzu says,
you glorify nature and meditate on her, why not domesticate her and
regulate her? you obey nature and sing her praises, why not control her and
use her?.., you depend on things, marvel at them, why not unfold your
abilities and transform them? ...you vainly seek into the cause of things,
why not appropriate and enjoy what they produce? (Hsun-tzu; Knoblock
(trans.), 1988, 236)
Hsun-tzu's exclamations can merely reveal the wish to control the Nature.
Yet, there is no evidence to show the achievements of enlightened sciences
in Chinese culture. Besides, from the above quotation, 'why not' implies a
contradiction between an ideal and the status quo. In other words,
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following the Way of Heaven was accepted as social legitimation in that
society, and Hsun-tzu tried to change this social value system. However, in
the end, Hsun-tzu failed to persuade people to take control of the natural
world; they continued simply to appreciate andi enjoy what the natural
world offered. That is also the reason why I claim in this thesis that there
was no enlightened science in Chinese society and also the empirical mode
of critical thinking is hard to develop in Chinese society.
Although Needham appreciated the relation of Confucianism and modem
science (Needham, 1971, 26 - 9; 493 - 5), the Chinese do not successfully
shake off the yoke of the authority of Heaven. They suffered from the
ingrained idea - the authority of Heaven and Confucianism. (This has been
analysed in chapter two.) Throughout Chinese history, there were
scientific discoveries, e.g., the compass, movabtie type (the techniques of
print), gunpowder and acupuncture. Yet, the Ifundamental spirit of the
'scientific' discoveries is far from that of enlightened science in the West.
Scientific spirit here includes not only the epistemological attitude, but also
the enlightenment of reason, by which men tried to unfetter the domination
of the supernatural force.
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The scientific discoveries in Chinese society might be masked by the form
and the content of science, yet, they are not grounded in enlightened
reason. That is, the Chinese discovered scientific tools and knowledge, but
they had never intended to create a rule to control Heaven. Confucius
claimed that "human beings cannot be allowed to rebel against the Way of
Heaven" (Confucius, The Analects). Instead, the Chinese invented the rule
to be accordance with the Way of Heaven, while enlightened science in
Western countries was open to a possibility for human beings in controlling
the natural world.
III. The subject-dialectical mode
Skepticism and reflection on the empirical method resulted in the
subject-dialectical mode of critical thinking. The achievement of the
empirical mode of critical thinking was still unsatisfactory, although the
vagueness about the supernatural world was partially revealed. Scientific
achievements helped critical thinkers to go beyond human experiences and
beliefs. Namely, by the discovery of scientific techniques, unfamiliar
religious beliefs were replaced by familiar scientific knowledge. As P.
Winch says, "science has developed out of common-sense ... and has better
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techniques of observation and reasoning" (Winch, quoted in Tran, 1989,
92).
Nevertheless, as Habermas in Toward a Rational Society (1971) claimed,
science, by way of technology, should extend human knowledge not only
about the natural world, but also about the social world and the aesthetic
world. Thus, whether a universality grounded in the natural world is
sufficient for both the social world and aesthetic world, and whether
human beings are dominated by the natural power, caused men to reflect
upon the achievement of the empirical mode of critical thinking.
Different insights constitute different modes of critical thinking. From the
contributions of critical thinkers within the supernatural mode and the
empirical mode, it can be seen that critical thinkers within different modes
possess the similar characteristics of skepticism, reflection, emancipation
and reconstruction, but their insights, i.e. intentionality, purpose, cognitive
style and method are not necessarily similar to each other.
For example, morality rather than the natural science was emphasised in
Chinese society, because the Chinese believed in the authority of Heaven.
In a word, the insight of the Chinese lies on the supernatural world. The
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beliefs were shown in such as, "I-Ching attempts to give a cosmological
explanation. The 1-Ching became for some a key to a metaphysical design
governing events" (Meskill, 1973, 29). According to 1-Ching, "what exists
before physical form is called the Tao" (1-Ching), and in Tao De Ching,
"the Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao" (Tao
De Ching). That means that Tao is the Way of Heaven, which controls all
things and cannot be transcended.
It is negative ideology that hampers the development of enlightened reason
in Chinese society. In the fact that enlightened reason was not developed
successfully in Chinese society, the transformation of ideology from a
positive function to a negative effect is revealed - from solving human
problems effectively, to the universalisation of all events, and the avoidance
of examination of them. Therefore, any rule should be reflected upon
before and after being accepted or rejected, otherwise, it may become an
authority and keep men from rational life. The effect of the negative
function of ideology is described by J. Passmore that "outside the church
there is no salvation" (Passmore, 1978, 56).
Thus, when rejoicing in the achievements of science (i.e. natural science),
we should question the authority hidden behind its achievements such as,
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should it be only science that handles concepts or techniques? Should
critical thinking perform just the same function as science? Are the rules
of the natural world sufficient and universal for human life? Clearly they
are not. (People tried to apply scientific methods and findings to the whole
range of human experiences. This turned the natural science into a
dominating force.)
Objectivity within the empirical mode of critical thinking was established
through the processes of reflection and reconstruction, as Theobald's
description. He described that "all our judgments are at first merely
perceptual judgments, and are valid only for us, and only subsequently do
we invest them with new reference, reference to an object, and make them
valid at all times both for us and for everybody else" (Theo!bald, 1968,
110). However, whether there is an absolute objectivity is sti1 arguable.
Kant claims, "human experience never confers on its judgments true or
strict, but only assumed and comparative universality, through induction"
(Kant; Smith (trans.), l968, 44). Further, he claimed that a pure logical
judgment is a problematic judgment. He says,
problematic judgments are those in which affirmation or negation is taken
as merely possible (optional). The problematic judgment is thought only as
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an optional judgment, which it is possible to assume. ..The problematic
proposition is therefore that which expressed only logical possibility - a free
choice of admitting such a proposition, and a purely optional admission of it
into the understanding. (Kant; Smith (trans.), 1968, 109-110; also in
Kant; Ellington (trans.), 1985, I, E-68)
After reflecting upon the absolute objectivity, the importance of
subjectivity began to be noticed, in particular, in dealing with the
relationship between the individual and society. Along with Kant, Hegel,
Freud, Nietzsche and Marx can be seen as the major figures in recognising
everyone as a person during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when
scientific knowledge gradually becomes a tyranny over human life.
Critical thinkers advanced towards another new 'town' - the dialectic stage,
in which they attempted to construct human dignity.
Enlightened science needs to be reflected upon and the enlightened reason
needs to be examined as well. As Sankey claimed, "scientists usually think
that they are getting closer to the truth, but there is always the possibility
that today's theories will turn out to be only partly true. History shows
that scientific knowledge changes" (Sankey, Sullivan & Watson, 1988, 17).
Critical thinkers tried to free people from the domination of enlightened
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science. For critical thinkers, enlightenment must not only aim at
deconstructing and reconstructing, but also at reflecting and developing
continuously. The meaning of enlightenment, in Horkheimer's and
Adomo's definition, is that "enlightenment has always aimed at liberating
men from fear and establishing their sovereignty" (Horkheimer and
Adomo, 1973, 3). Positively, the power of enlightenment can liberate man
from fear. Negatively it can become a dominant power to limit men's
freedom to reflect upon their own ideology. In this sense, the
enlightenment of science needs to be examined continuously.
Philosophers like Descartes, Kant and Hegel etc. were keen on dealing with
the relationship between the subject and the object. As Miller said,
"Descartes sought to save his subjective system from pure skepticism by his
appeal to a combination of the geometrical method. ..Kant entered the door
that Descartes merely opened, in his stress upon the rational role" (Miller,
1971, 22). Kant points out three relational moments of thought. They are:
"a) subject-predicate; b) antecedent-consequence; and c) whole-parts"
(Kant; Ellington (trans.), 1985, II-E, 158). Earlier than his work
Philosophy of Material Nature, Kant in Critique of Pure Reason has
pointed out four antinomies (Kant, Smith (trans.); 1968, 396-415), which
also shows Kant's methodology of dialectic. Further, Miller pointed out
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that "they (most philosophers) have found it necessary to grapple with the
problem of linking the thinker and their external world on a much broader
and more rational basis which is particularly exemplified in the
philosophies of Kant and Hegel" (Miller, 1971, 22).
Men were puzzled by the problem of self, when they suffered from the
domination of the achievements of enlightened science. The 'instrumental
reason', after 'formal rationality', with its technological and scientific
revolution shows off its power to dominate human beings by its
conspicuous achievements. Davidoo confirms Adomo's critique and claims
that "the empty phrase, man, distorts man's relation to his society as well as
the content of what is thought in the concept of Man" (Davidov, in McLean
(ed.), 1991, 246). This was the circumstance with which critical thinkers
within the subject-dialectical mode were confronted.
In a word, they faced three issues:
a) whether science is the universal paradigm of rationality;
b) whether scientific rationality is good in a particular sphere, or is
unavoidably pervasive across human life; and
c) whether we must sacrifice the doings of science to universality in order
to open the gate to self, viz., self-consciousness.
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In order to reach different purposes, different methods could be employed.
Critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical mode used different methods
from those who within the supernatural mode or within the empirical
mode. The crucial method used by critical thinkers within the
subject-dialectical mode is dialectic method, which was used by Hegel.
Hegel, immediately after Kant, provided the dialectic as a new method for
critical thinkers to answer the above questions. In this sense, Hegel viewed
himself as a Protestant who "identifies the perceptions of reason with
faith" (Here, Protestant was taken as the rebel Christian.) (Lowith, Green
(trans.), 1964, 19), and tried to construct a world in which man can live
with himself (Hegel, Miller (trans.), 1977; Lowith; Green (trans.), 1964,
28). This examination consists of an examination of noesis. * That is
* noesis: according to Husserl, noesis is the act of consciousness, and anonymously
implicit transcendental ego. He says, "because the locutions, moments of
consciousness, awarenesses, and similar constructions, and likewise because the
locution, intentive moments, are made quite unusable by the many different
equivocations which will be distinctly brought out in what follows,we introduce the term
noeric moment or, in short, noesis" (Husserl; Kersten, (trans.), 1982, 205). In this
thesis, the term noesis, borrowing from Husserl, is used to contain experiences of an
intentional kind, and to inform an act of thinking towards the appropriate object.
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neither phenomena as such (the enlightened science - Bacon, Locke, Hume),
nor the conditions for the subject to gain truth (Kant), but the relationship
between the subject and the object.
That is the dialectic reflection, by which critical thinkers within the
subject-dialectical mode had avoided one-way thinking. They offered
insights not only into self-knowledge, but also into the relationship between
self and others. In this way, a critical thinker may emancipate himself
from negative ideology, because he investigates problems not only from the
positive viewpoint but also from the negative. The dialectical reflection
includes three steps: first, grasping the relationship between the object and
the subject; second, examining human beliefs by pointing out the inner
force between the subject and the object; then, synthesising the rationality
through the integration of the positive aspect with the negative. Wald
simplified the dialectical law as follows:
For example, in the subject-dialectical mode of critical thinking, the relationship between
the subject and the object is equivalent to noesis, because the relationship reveals the
movement of a context. By grasping the relationship, the context can be understood, even
though the context is shown in varied forms.
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S is P and non-P
S is not P but non-P
S is neither P, nor non-P
but P and non-P
Chart 3.1 The dialectical law
source: Wald, 1975, 174
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In addition to the difference of method, the crucial differences between the
empirical mode and the subject-dialectical mode are intentionality and
purpose. Critical thinkers within the empirical mode focused on the
natural world, while those within the subject-dialectical mode bring
universality to bear on self-consciousness. Namely, the authority which
came from God was fought against by critical thinkers within the empirical
mode, while the authority which came from the natural world was rebelled
against by those within the subject-dialectical mode.
Critical thinkers within the supernatural mode, the empirical mode, and the
subject-dialectical mode aimed at establishing universality. However, the
substances of universality established by different modes are different. The
universality established by the supernatural mode of critical thinking is
grounded in the supernatural world, and its criterion is what seems
reasonable; whilst the universality established by the empirical mode of
critical thinking is based on the natural world, and its criterion is
objectivity; whilst the universality established by the subject-dialectical
mode of critical thinking is based on transcendental self, and its criterion is
a relative subjectivity. In this case, individual freedom is picked out by
critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical mode. In this way, individual
autonomy within the subject-dialectical mode of critical thinking goes a
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step further than its previous modes.
The subjective-relativism, established by critical thinkers within the
subject-dialectical mode, like the previous universalities, might become a
negative authority, if men cease thinking critically. Therefore, some
questions were asked about whether Hegel's dialectical solution can play a
universal role for personal and social lives, and whether the universality
grounded in subjective-relativism can be absolute. Hegel's answers are
positive.
For Hegel, the dialectic is the reconciliation of being and non-being via
becoming, when becoming is extracted by an inner force which is the
relationship between the subject and the object, the object and the object,
and the subject and the subject (Hegel; Miller (trans.), 1977). For
dialectic, being, non-being and becoming are the primary categories both
of cognitive knowing and the real (Harris, 1987, 174). Habermas
explained that "Hegel's concept of Spirit is an implicit criticism of two
kinds of one-sidedness, one the mirror image of the other" (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 9). That is, one focuses examining on the object,
the other on the subject. If this is the case, dialectic does not leave its
contradiction abstract, but the contradiction functions as a motor of the
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conceptual movement to the binding decision concerning what has been
phenomenologically asserted (Adomo; Domingo (trans.), 1982, 6).
To be precise, dialectical method functions effectively in overcoming the
conflict through its synthesised integration. Harris appreciates that
dialectic "is the appropriate theory of change and development, but it is not
restricted to the dynamic and flowing, for it also makes room for
coexistence and fixing" (Harris, 1987, 169). Throughout history, the
person is assumed to be a dialectical unity between the natural and social
worlds, between the individual and society, and between the object and the
subject. According to Hegel, man is not only the crystallisation of
self-knowledge and circumstances, but also a creation of continuous
becoming, and spirit is taken as the universality of becoming and
developing (Hegel; Miller (trans.), 1977). Therefore, for Hegel, his
dialectic solution is able to play a universal rule for personal and social
development.
As analysed, dialectical method was used in Chinese thought to connect men
with the Earth and Heaven. However, the subjectivity in Chinese thought is
not as the same as autonomy in Hegel's spirit. According to Chuang-tzu,
the man is as a microcosm, a miniaturised version of the universe which
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contains all the elements necessary to make up Heaven and the Earth
(Chuang-tzu, The messes). Therefore, the true self must return to Tao, the
Way of Heaven. In this sense, individualisation is compatible with
collectivism in Chinese thought.
Self-consciousness is the intentionality of critical thinkers within the
subject-dialectical mode. It is significant that critical thinkers within the
subject-dialectical mode tried to be autonomous by emancipating
themselves from the domination of scientific rationality. Brookfield's
suggestion, "trying to shake off habitual ideas and behaviours so that we
can try out alternatives are emotionally potent activities. They, of course,
may well produce anxiety, fear, resentment and feelings of being
threatened or intimidated" (Brookfield, 1987, 232), so that not only
wisdom but also courage and will are required for autonomy. As P. White
and A. 0. Rorty claim, "traditional courage is a set of disposition to
overcome fear, to oppose obstacles, to perform difficult or dangerous
actions" (Rorty, 1986, 151), and redefined courage "enables us to act well
under stress, against our natural inclination towards self-protection"
(White, 1988, 69).
The dialectical universality needs to examine not only the relationship
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between commonality and individuality, but also the relationship between
subjectivity and autonomy. Confucius claimed that there is a common
nature among men and therefore established a moral principle that
"whatever you do not want to have, you should not give it to others"
(Confucius, The Analects), which is based on the compatibility of
individuality and public. It is not too hard to find out an example to debate
against Confucius' principle in daily life. Is it wrong to 'give' the clothes
what you do not want to have to those who need them? Is it wrong to elect
others as leader because you do not want to be the leader? In fact, this
principle can be understood merely as one of the possibilities. The
criterion for this possibility is whether human intentionality and purpose
are the same as each other.
In the above case, whether subjectivity can develop on the basis of
universality is dubious. D. Cooper claimed that existential freedom is a
fusion of individualisation and wholeness etc., and it is connected with
matters of responsibility and commitment (Cooper, 1990, 147). In
principle, individuality can be compatible with wholeness, while in
practice, the trouble is that socialisation unavoidably shaped the individual
into conformity with the whole. This trouble has been revealed in
Confucianism.
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The individual cannot be autonomous, if seif-actualisation is limited to a
closed framing, e.g., collectivism. Self-actualisation plays an instrumental
role, if it is not grounded in self-knowledge and self-reflection.
Self-knowledge deals with blindness to self (Mischel, 1977, 179-196),
whereas self-reflection copes with self-deception (Cooper, 1990, 117-9),
which is a 'bad faith' or 'false-consciousness'. Therefore, men cannot be
autonomous unless they have the abilities of self-knowledge, self-reflection
and self-actualisation. In this sense, subjectivity cannot be reached within
the framework of absolute universality, although Hegel's theory of Spirit
was intended to be universal for both the subject and the object.
Inquiry is a stimulus for critical thinkers. As Popper claimed in his The
Open Society and Its Enemies (1966), history is the process of
problem-solving. We can never stop solving problems, because another
problem will follow the current problem which has been solved. In
parallel with this, after reflecting upon the natural world, critical thinkers
within the subject-dialectical mode met another problem. They confronted
the conflicts between the individual and society, between objective
knowledge and the knowledge of intersubjectivity or subjectivity.
Therefore, we must keep asking whether the universality which is
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established by critical thinkers within the subjective mode is universal
enough to embrace all aspects of self and circumstances.
It may be doubted if human ideology can be corrupted merely through
reflecting on self-consciousness or by dialectic method. Apart from the
above arguments, taking Chinese morality as another example, the True
Chun Tzu (the virtuous man) has been taken as an ultimate criterion for the
moral person since Confucius (Confucius, The Analects). Chun Tzu,
acknowledged in Analects as the moral model, is a gentleman in every way.
In such a case, the concept of Chun Tzu in Chinese morality functions as a
universality. This ideology of universality stems from an ingrained
concept in Chinese thought, i.e. the authority of Heaven. (This ideology has
been analysed in chapters one and two.)
It is the case that we must reflect upon not only the individual
consciousness, but also the social consciousness, so that the negative human
ideology can be ruled out. These are the tasks of self-knowledge and
self-reflection. In other words, reflecting upon self-consciousness or
reflecting through dialectic method is helpful in examining negative
ideology. Therefore, understanding hermeneutically the contexts of
culture, society and grasping correctly the category of rationality are still
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important to emancipate men from the negative ideology.
Hegel's dialectic logic manifests its significance in the subject-dialectical
mode of critical thinking. Critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical
mode focus on self-consciousness, by which being-in-itself (the subject) and
being-for-itself (the object) can be integrated by dialectical method.
Critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical mode turned their
intentionality from the object to the subject, and to the relationships of the
subject and the object. Their purposes were also changed from external
objectivity to internal subjectivity. These changes imply that critical
thinkers within the subject-dialectical mode broadened the range of science
from merely dealing with the natural world to the relationship between the
natural world and the social world.
IV. The communicative mode
The characteristics of critical thinking, i.e. skepticism, reflection,
emancipation and reconstruction are still motives for human development.
They bring men towards autonomy through the process of critical thinking:
inquiry (skepticism) -----> reflection (understanding) ----> emancipation
> reconstruction. More importantly, with these characteristics and
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following this process, critical thinking was brought forward to the
communicative mode, when men suffered from absolute universality.
Habermas' theory of communicative action is brought within the
communicative mode of critical thinking. Three ideas are borrowed from
Habermas. They are:
a) critical theory lines up with historical research, and aims to keep people
from losing their autonomy in a modern society (Habermas; McCarthy,
(trans.), 1987, 382);
b) critical theory "connects the lifeworid and system paradigms through
autonomous action" (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, xi); and
c) critical theory confirms the function of dialectic. In Habermas's theory
of communicative action, a dialectical process is expressed by
characterising a rational person as a person who is able to put forward
an assertion, criticise, justify the given situation in terms of grounds and
evidence, legitimations and even intentions, and then provide reasons
for their expression or arguments (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984,
15-8).
According to the previous investigations, dialectical method and spirit are
emphasised by critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical mode, while to
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be autonomous is a common motive for all critical thinkers. Habermas'
theory confirms the significance of dialectic and autonomy. On the other
hand, Habermas proposes the concept of quasi-universality (Habermas;
Viertal (trans.), 1973, 35; McCarthy (trans.), 1979,3; Bernstein, 1983,
183) to overcome the predicament of Hegel's dialectical spirit. In this way,
the historical research extends its meaning and range from events to
culture, society and person; and communicative action bridges
understanding between intersubjectivities. In this sense, critical thinking,
added to the theory of communicative action, forms the communicative
mode.
The communicative mode of critical thinking, like its previous modes, is a
process and product of continuous activities of skepticism, reflection,
emancipation and reconstruction. Facing different problems, men locate
different purposes with different intentionalities. They reach their
purposes through suitable methods, and then the cognitive style is
reconstructed as soon as the outcome is reached.
In this way, critical thinking has been developed to the communicative
mode, in which critical thinkers focus on reflecting upon the sufficiency of
self-reflection, and on detecting the dysfunction, depersonalisation and
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dehumanisation of lifeworlds, so as to reconstruct rational and
communicative relationships between the subject and the object, the subject
and the subject, and the object and the object.
Dysfunction, depersonalisation and dehumanisation are new foci for critical
thinkers within the communicative mode to try to solve. These
predicaments push them to question the sufficiency and adequacy of
previous universality. Some of the features of the previous accepted
universality which this critique picks out are:
a) a misunderstanding of the nature of truth (It is a critique of empiricism
which concentrates on the object, and/or of idealism and
transcendentalism which emphasise the subject);
b) a misconception of methods (It is a critique of positivism and scientism
which believe in the omnipotent role of scientific method);
c) a false, naive belief in the nature of rationality (It is a critique of
positivism and rationalism alike); and
d) a logic of domination (It is the logic of identity, which assumes that
there is a universal truth, and it can be deduced by methods or logic).
The concept of absolute universality is questioned and replaced by the
concept of quasi-universality. No matter whether truth, rationality,
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method or logic is involved in a claim for universality, universality is just
valid within the given circumstances. This has been shown from the
history of the development of natural science, e.g., before quantum
mechanics, the ideas of absolute space and time left scientists in a state of
controversy and uncertainty (Russell, l988, 525). Similarly, in the social
world, e.g., criteria for morality, good and beauty are different both
between various cultures, and between varied ages within the same culture.
The scientific history and the criteria for morality, good and beauty are not
my focus here. I am suggesting that critical thinkers within the
communicative mode understand that trying to use any unique method or
logic to undertake all human problems is a myth, and trying to explain
lifeworids by an absolute universality is utopian.
Intentionality, purpose, method and cognitive style are changed within the
communicative mode of critical thinking. Critical thinkers within the
communicative mode cope with the conflicts of object-object, subject-object
and subject-subject, therefore, dialectic method has been extended from the
individual aspect, i.e. self-consciousness, into lifeworids, i.e. the material
life, and the life of value and religion. Meanwhile, their intentionality has
been changed from self-consciousness to lifeworid. Also, their purpose is
transferred from universality to quasi-universality. These changes show
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the reason why Habermas' critical theory is brought in.
Habermas tried to build a quasi-universality of rationality through
communicative action (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984).
Quasi-universality comes from an uncoerced communication so that an
undistorted consensus is possible (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984,
296-297). He picked up the Hegelians' concept of synthesis to claim that
an intersubjectivity shared lifeworid is possible. Furthermore, a
quasi-universality is taken as a criterion to balance the conflict between the
subject and the object, the object and the object, and the subject and the
subject (McCarthy, 1978, 110-111). Hereby, the conflict between the
individual and society will be conquered via communicative action or
discursive action. (The reason why a quasi-universality can be rationally
established via communicative action will be explained in chapter five,
where the rationality of a good life will be analysed, and the rationality
will be established on the ground of good argumentations rather than good
reasons.)
The conflict between the subject and the object, and the individual and
society can be overcome, during the course of reflection and
reconstruction. In addition, a tentative consensus will emerge as the
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criterion for rationality. Meanwhile, people emancipate themselves not
only by their communication with others in circumstances of security,
freedom and respect for persons, but also by self-reflection upon their own
ideology.
Instead of one-way thinking, a concept of varied, tentative rationality
becomes the intentionality of critical thinkers within the communicative
mode. Basically, this concept emerges partly from reflection upon
previous universality, partly from Habermas' idea of knowledge and
human interests. That is, negatively, previous universality is shown to be
not sufficient for lifeworids; positively Habermas' quasi-universality
compensates the insufficiency of universality. According to Habermas,
lifeworlds include three kinds of sciences, i.e. empirical-analytical,
hermeneutic-historical and critical sciences. Also, each science is
established on a sort of human interest, i.e. technical, practical and
emancipatory interests (Habermas; Shapire (trans.), 1971).
The criterion for truth, therefore, in different sorts of sciences is varied.
For instance, scientific knowledge in the view of positivism or
neo-positivism, in particular Popper, is independent of the knowing
subject. As Magee concluded, "knowledge in the objective sense is
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knowledge without a knower: it is knowledge without a knowing subject"
(Magee, 19752, 72). However, in Habermas' critique, objective knowledge
is merely one kind of knowledge, and its tentative nature will cause its
renewal. In this sense, social life requires a tentatively intersubjective
truth, which is different from the truth of objectivity in the natural world.
Similarly, instead of the absolute universality which was established within
the previous modes of critical thinking, critical thinkers within the
communicative mode intend to work out various forms of
quasi-universality of rationality for different problems. It seems that
criteria for rationality within the communicative mode of critical thinking
are more varied and broader than in previous modes of critical thinking.
The contribution of the communicative mode of critical thinking is shown
in looking into more encompassing aspects of human activity than previous
modes. The dimensions of human activities they searched are:
a) the man-nature relationship: (all modes of critical thinking might be
used, especially, the empirical mode of critical thinking);
b) the man-man relationship (intersubjectivity): (the communicative mode
of critical thinking is especially taken); and
c) the man-God, and man-himself relationships (for example, hope): (apart
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from the communicative mode, the subject-dialectical mode, and the
supernatural mode of critical thinking could also be used.)
In brief, the communicative mode of critical thinking begins with dealing
with the insufficiency of the universality in previous modes in two ways:
first, searching for the categorical errors; and secondly, examining the
possibility of universality. Then, the range of universality will be located
through the actions of reflection and communication. Hence, a critical
thinker will be assumed to be able to recognise these relationships as
dealing with the problems he faces. The understanding horizon* in a
certain range of knowledge, and the abilities of self-knowledge,
self-reflection and seif-actualisation with open-mindedness are needed for
critical thinkers to reconstruct rationality in lifeworids.
* horizon: The word has been used in philosophy since Nietzsche and Husserl to
characterise the way in which thought is tied to its finite determination, and the nature of
the law of the expansion of the range of vision" (Gadamer; Glen-Doepel (trans.), 1975,
269). Following Gadamer, I assume that an understanding horizon must be achieved in
'the fusion of horizons', in which "we regain the concepts of an historical past in such a
way that they also include our own comprehension of them" (Gadamer; Glen-Doepel
(trans.), 1975, 337). Therefore, the understanding horizon, in this thesis, is the range
of vision that includes to know not only the flow of experiences, but also the relative
significance of everything in the same horizon.
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The insight of critical thinkers within the communicative mode can be
shown in seeking the noesis of critical thinking. The intentionality of
critical thinkers within the communicative mode is the relationships of the
subject and the object, the object and the object, and the subject and the
subject; and quasi-universality rather than universality is their purpose.
Critical thinkers within the communicative mode, by communicative
action, deepen the understanding of the natural world or social world.
There is a move from understanding the world through imagining,
explaining and reasoning to categorising different lifeworlds; from
establishing universality for the natural world and social world to
overcome conflicts among different sciences via constructing
quasi-universality. During this reflective process, critical thinkers must
consider questions such as, whether conflicts arise among varied categories
of sciences; whether categorical errors are made, so that knowledge
becomes hardly intelligible or reasonable; and whether rationality is far
from sufficient for consensus among different viewpoints. The
characteristics of critical thinkers are again revealed from the process of
skepticism (inquiry) ----> reflection (understanding) ----> emancipation
----> reconstruction.
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Conclusion
According to the above investigations into the developmental history of
critical thinking, skepticism (inquiry), reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction constitute the characteristics of critical thinkers, whereas the
motives of developing and becoming foment critical thinking. This is the
reason why critical thinkers with the same characteristics perform different
modes of critical thinking. In other words, synthesising critical thinkers'
characteristics with the motives of critical thinking, critical thinkers show
their different insights in different circumstances, which are constituted by
intentionality, purpose, cognitive style and method. This can be shown
from the fact that human knowledge has been extended, and men have
progressively improved their lives, either in material aspects, or in moral
or aesthetic aspects.
It is hard to deny that some of the ideas of these four modes of critical
thinking are taken from Piaget's cognitive development theory, viz., the
process of cognitive development and its concept of equilibrium, which
will be quoted as follows. According to Piaget,
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the cognitive structure is the system of connections that the individual can
and must use, and is no way the contents of his conscious thought, since it
is he who imposes certain forms rather than others, and this according to
successive levels of development. (Piaget; Rosin (trans.), 1972, 33
He says, in explaining the concept of equilibrium "the fact is that a
discovery, a new motive, a statement, etc. must balance with the others"
(Piaget; Rosin (trans.), 1972, 29). He also stresses,
I (Piaget) take the word equilibrium not in a static stage but in that of a
progressive equilibration, the equilibrium being the compensation by
reaction of the child to the outer disturb balances... Equilibrium appears to
me to be the fundamental factor of this development.. Balance takes time...
but the equilibration can be more or less rapid. (Piaget; Rosin (trans.),
1972, 30)
Furthermore, critical thinkers deal with not only the problems of the
individual but also those of society. In this respect, Kohlberg and
Habermas' theories compensate for Piaget's insufficiency. Critical thinkers
within the subject-dialectical mode of thinking and the communicative
mode of thinking take Hegel and Marx's ideas of dialectic, and Habermas'
theory of communicative action as their insights so as to figure out various
relationships by finding out the noesis of the relationships of object-object,
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object-subject, and subject-subject. The general movement of critical
thinking, which is led by its noesis will be discussed in the next chapter.
Taking account of the vicissitudes of the world, Brookfield, unlike Piaget
or Kohlberg, claims that "critical thinking is a dynamic and ongoing
process to undertake stock taking" (Brookfield, 1987, 78). Therefore,
critical thinking should be continuously developed, so as to avoid being
confined to a negative ideology. Hegel's idea of dialectic and Habermas'
idea of quasi-universality, therefore, provide critical thinking with
theoretical foundations.
Critical thinking itself is an epistemological and dialectical process.
According to its historical survey, critical thinking, epistemologically,
emerges from a perplexing situation to which human problems give rise.
This is the process of inquiry. Human problems stem from conflicts
between human interests. Each human interest formulates a kind of
science; each of which possesses its own logic and categories (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 51). Critical thinkers work out the logic and
categories of various sciences or lifeworlds. This is the process of
reflection.
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After the processes of inquiry and reflection, a profound understanding can
be reached. After reaching such an understanding, the conflict or
perplexity can be penetratingly revealed and solved by examining the
adequacy of fit between logic, category and its corresponding science. This
is the process of emancipation and reconstruction - emancipation from the
conflict or perplexity; reconstruction of other principles, i.e. rationality.
This process implies that rationality is not necessarily universal.
The communicative mode of critical thinking covers the previous modes of
critical thinking. The previous modes of critical thinking are not in
themselves adequate as critical thinking, from the viewpoint of a critical
thinker within the communicative mode. However, all of them had borne
the characteristics of critical thinking. The reason why they are not critical
thinking, after the communicative mode of critical thinking has developed,
is that either their insights or characteristics have been merged into the
communicative mode.
If people are to live as autonomous individuals in a democratic society,
critical thinking must be cultivated, especially in Chinese society. As I
have analysed, we can hardly find critical thinking in Chinese society. It is
partly because traditional ideas, in particular, Confucianism, are deeply
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rooted in Chinese thought; partly because education has been distorted by
cultural, social, political and economic interests. Therefore, if we attempt
to add critical thinking to Chinese society, educational reform must be
taken as the first crucial step to emancipate people from clinging to a
universal authority.
Education in Taiwan needs to be reformed and its crucial goal should be
aimed at struggling for autonomy. Teaching critical thinking must be
taken as the first step of such an educational reform.
The nature of critical thinking must be further clarified, before the
teaching of critical thinking in Taiwan is carried out. In sum, the
characteristics of critical thinking in four modes, in terms of intentionality,
purpose, method and cognitive style, will be illustrated here in Table 3.1.
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Table: 3.1 The characteristics of critical thinking in four modes
m o de
I	 II	 III	 IV
haracteristics
supernatural natural
	 lifeworids
intentionality	 transcendent	 world	 world of self-
world	 -consciousnes
universality	 universality universality
through	 in	 through
purpose
ritual terms	 physical	 spiritA .	 A
terms
intuition	 logic	 dialectic
methods	 logic	 mathematics
mathematics empirical
research
cognitive	 imaginative-	 experiential- dialectical-
style	 reason	 empiricism synthesis
quasi-univ
-ersality
on
ommunic-
-ative actior
ill possible
methods,
especially
communic-
-ative actiol
categorical-
constructior
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From the above table, the general characteristics of critical thinking in
different modes can also be briefly analysed as follows.
I. Working out an accepted answer to explain the enigma or mystery of the
universe, by intuition, logic and mathematics. Meanwhile, a society with
order is established from the chaos.
II. Taking the empirical research to establish a universal law to justify
systematically the previous truth in physical instead of ritual terms.
Consequently, a society full of objectivity, and non-imagination is expected.
Men instead of God become the creators of the universe.
III. Focusing attention upon self-consciousness in order to emancipate
human beliefs from the domination of scientism via the dialectic movement
of self-consciousness. With the dialectic method and its spirit, critical
thinking reveals the characteristics of reflecting, correcting, developing
and becoming. Obviously, a society dominated by the material is reflected
upon, and society with humanity is praised. The mental activity is noticed
more than the physical activity.
IV. Concerning not only for oneself, but also for society. All methods,
e.g., intuition, logic, mathematics, phenomenology, dialectic, hermeneutics
and communication, could be used for an adequate rationality, based on
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human interests and forming its science. Ultimately, the aim of critical
thinking in mode IV is a democratic, autonomous society iiii which people
possess communicative literacy, including abilities, skills and attitudes. As
Kurfiss claims, "critical thinking is an essential capacity ol citizens in a
healthy democratic society... and it contributes to a more rational and
human society" (Kurfiss, 1988, vi).
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Chapter IV
THE NATURE OF CRITICAL THINKING (II):
INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITION
I. Critical thinking deals with universal and particular
situations
II. Its commonality: revealing through manifesting its inner
logic
A. Pivoting its common motive on autonomy
B. Interweaving genetic with dialectical development
C. Enriching cognitive style from one dimensionality to
multi-dim en sio n a lity
D. Emancipating men from alienation
E. Establishing rationality as its inner logic
III. Reinterpreting its characteristics
IV. Redefining its meaning
Conclusion
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Chapter IV
THE NATURE OF CRITICAL THINKING (II):
INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITION
In this chapter, I try to turn the fragmentary concepts of critical thinking
into a system, which is grounded in its modes. Therefore, not only the
noesis but also the definition of critical thinking must be dealt with. These
are the two tasks of this chapter. The noesis of critical thinking can be
shown in its dealing with universal and particular situations in life. The
definition of critical thinking will be given through clarifying its
commonality and reinterpreting its characteristics.
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I. Critical thinking deals with universal and particular situations
There has been no consensus about the definition of critical thinking among
those who study critical thinking nowadays. According to the records of
ERIC (1983-1990), there are about two thousand articles on 'critical
thinking and education'. (The main perspectives of critical thinking will be
reviewed later on.) It seems that giving critical thinking a common
definition is difficult.
Understanding the nature of critical thinking merely on the basis of
epistemology will narrow the nature of critical thinking. Some
psychologists, such as Glaser and Watson, develop tests of reasoning
(Kurfiss, 1988, 8); others, e.g., Piaget, Ennis, study the organisation of
knowledge, i.e. cognitive skills and reasoning abilities. (Piaget, 1968;
Ennis, 1962, 1985); others again either following Dewey or influenced by
Piaget, try to extend informal logical skills or reasoning abilities to
reasoning dispositions or attitudes (McPeck, 1981, 59; Schrag, 1988, 80).
All of them are dealing with critical thinking, but they limit critical
thinking to the level of cognition, rather than understanding critical
thinking as the whole dimensions of culture, society and person.
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We have witnessed that most studies of critical thinking reduce it to either
the technical level or to reasoning. For instance, Ennis takes critical
thinking as rational reflective thinking concerned with what to do or
believe. He lists twelve aspects of mental skills for critical thinkers
(Ennis, 1962; 1985). In his recent work Teaching Thinking Skills: Theory
and Practice, he stresses critical thinking as centring on "practical,
reflective, reasonable thinking, belief, and action" (Ennis, in Baron &
Sternberg (ed.), 1990, 10). Also, Kurfiss states that "in cognitive terms,
critical thinking is problem solving in situations where 'solutions' cannot be
verified empirically" (Kurfiss, 1988, iii). Like Ennis, scholars in the
Centre for Critical Thinking in Montana State University define critical
thinking as "a parallel process by which individuals analyse given
information in a contextually specific situation and create new ideas,
concepts, or constructs based on their analysis" (Fulton, 1989, 6).
McPeck also claims that "the core meaning of critical thinking is the
propensity and skill to engage in an activity with reflective skepticism"
(McPeck, 1981, 22).
On the other hand, Siegel argues that "a critical thinker, then, is one who is
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appropriately moved by (good) reasons: she has a propensity or disposition
to believe and act in accordance with reasons; and she has the ability
properly to assess the force of reasons in the context in which reasons play
a role" (Siegel, 1988, 23). Yet, Siegel dislikes the term 'critical thinking'.
He prefers to use 'good reason' rather than 'critical thinking'. He says, "I
do not like the term 'critical thinking', because it gets confused with
literature and critiquing" (Siegel, 1988, 11).
Baron holds that a critical thinker is capable of rational thinking, by which
one might avoid being blind and remain open to other possibilities (Baron,
1988, 31), which is called by Baron 'open-minded' thinking. Baron
emphasises the role of thinking in problem-solving, in relation to learning,
intelligence, creativity, logic and disposition. He claims that "rationality
concerns the methods of thinking we use, not the conclusions of our
thinking" (Baron, 1988, 32). However, he acknowledges that "rationality
is not the same as error. We can use good methods and reach erroneous
conclusions, or we can use poor methods and be lucky, getting a correct
answer" (Baron, 1988, 32).	 In addition, he did a research on
'overconfidence', and pointed out that "cultural differences affect the way
that people think about probability [The research indicates the confidence
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as a probability]" (Baron, 1988, 201). For Baron, critical thinking then is
not only a set of skills or the outcome of problem-solving, but also a
disposition and a process of rational thinking.
Schrag points out that critical thinking is a virtue as well as a skill. He
argues that "if we define thinking by way of a certain normative model, say
Dewey's complete act of thought, then our conception seems one-sided"
(Schrag, 1988, 7). Apart from that, he does not "believe there are isolable,
general strategies or skills for problem-solving" (Schrag, 1988, 77). He
proposes that "both skills and virtue depend on innate capacities" (Schrag,
1988, 8). In this sense, although Schrag stands on the viewpoint of
cognitive psychology, and maintains the importance of inner capacities, he
has not shaken off the yoke of effectiveness. For example, he highlights
the virtue of autonomy, but anchors it merely on the level of
problem-solving (Schrag, 1988, 85).
There seem to be as many definitions of critical thinking as there are
scholars. However, those who deal with critical thinking can be divided
into two fields: philosophers and psychologists. Although both
philosophers and psychologists have their own perspectives, they share at
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lest one concern - the teaching of critical thinking.	 As Lipman
summarises,
both philosophers and psychologists have come to view the teaching of
critical thinking as their own special skill, but their perspectives are
intrinsically different... One is grounded in the humanities and the other in
the sciences. Philosophers are basically interested in the exercise of logic
and reason as tools to elucidate certain fundamental truths... Psychologists,
on the other hand, are concerned with the thinking process...Their field has
evolved, not from argumentation and discourse, but rather from a tradition
of objective experimentation and research. (Lipman, 1989, 2-3)
When noting the narrow development of critical thinking, Weinstein tries
to broaden the concept of critical thinking by the connection of Habermas'
theory and educational practice (Weinstein, 1990, 7-8). He claims that
the task for critical thinking is to develop an adequate theory that grounds a
general strategy consistent with the particulars of education in many fields,
while sustaining a clear and identifiable core that sufficiently distinguishes
critical thinking from other general perspectives while offering guidance for
practice unavailable elsewhere. (Weinstein, 1990, 7-8)
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In my view, Weinstein has not gone far enough to show the cultural, social
and personal aspects of critical thinking, although he has paid more
attention to the real circumstances critical thinkers face than those who take
critical thinking as skills and/or dispositions (Weinstein, 1990).
It can be seen from the above discussions that there is a crisis in the
definition of critical thinking, because critical thinking itself is a
dynamically developing ability rather than one which has reached a static
end-point of development. As Hirst claimed, we cannot give any account
of thinking either as an abstract movement of mind, or as an operational
machinery of the brain (Hirst (ed.), 1974, 72). Similarly, it might be
wrong to take critical thinking either as psychological: skills for
problem-solving, or as philosophical: human reasoning. Therefore, giving
critical thinking a definition through clarifying its inner logic might be an
appropriate way.
An inner logic connects self-consciousness with the object of knowing. In
other words, an inner logic locates the relationship between the object and
the object, between the object and the subject, or between the subject and
the subject. In this sense, an inner logic can determine the direction of a
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movement of cognition and thinking. The inner logic of critical thinking
here means its motive of thinking which indicates the direction of human
insights, and locates the range of thinking. To be precise, inner logic of
critical thinking is the relationship between intentionality, purpose,
cognitive style, method-choosing and human insight.
The characteristics of critical thinking include the aspects of both the
subject and the object. Critical thinking is not only a concrete operation of
mind, but also an inner motive of human insight to locate the realm of
intentionality, purpose, cognitive style, and methods of problem-solving. It
manifests itself in various forms when it faces different circumstances,
including the dimensions of the subject and the object. The dimension of
the subject refers to human knowledge, including human intentionality and
cognitive style; whereas the dimension of the object refers to the situation
which man faces, including purpose and method. In this way, the common
characteristics of critical thinkers can be divided into external and inner
characteristics.
The external characteristics of critical thinking can be displayed only by
the person who in Barrow's terms possesses 'the expert knowledge of
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critical thinking'. According to Barrow, "the expert knowledge of critical
thinking consists in assessing whether the individual has enough ability, the
intelligence, the background and the state of mind to make something of it,
to grasp the object which you want to criticise" (Barrow, 1984, 32).
External characteristics of critical thinking, the expert knowledge, can be
acquired through learning.. That is, a person can be trained to exercise the
skills, and even possesses such dispositions such as, skepticism, reflection,
emancipation and reconstruction, if he has inherent basic learning ability.
However, the consciousness of autonomy can not be acquired through
learning, rather, it must be acquired through the interaction between
self-reflection and circumstances. To be precise, it is an ability of
self-experiencing. Therefore, education can simply provide a learning
circumstance, which is suitable for self-reflection and self-actualisation.
Education, however, cannot 'teach' a person to be an autonomous person.
For example, education can offer the same contents for pupils who possess
similar abilities and dispositions, however, it cannot be expected that those
pupils will draw the same picture for their life, unless education proceeds
under a dominated condition. Here, the abilities of emancipation and
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autonomy are not clear-cut, because emancipation from alienation must be
grounded in the consciousness of autonomy. Nevertheless, emancipation
can be trained as merely skill, by which one can emancipate oneself merely
from a certain range of external alienation, but can hardly from self
ideology. This case is similar to the case of one-way thinking. Such
people, on the face, reveal the characteristic of emancipation; on the other
hand, they are in fact dominated by a certain ideology and can hardly be
authentically themselves. If this is the case, then such a person is still
alienated from himself so that he has never emancipated himself.
In this sense, external characteristics can be used to distinguish critical
thinkers from others who lack critical thinking. However, there are no
universal criteria by which to distinguish better critical thinking from
worse, unless the comparison is limited to certain conditions, i.e. critical
thinkers are asked to deal with the same situation within the same
circumstances. Nevertheless, in practice, this comparison is of less
significance. For example, we can probably evaluate comparatively the
skills of two pianists, however, it will make no sense to compare their
abilities at the level of interpretation of art. In addition, critical thinkers
must be capable of dealing with different contingencies in their lives, and
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their inner characteristic reveals human insights diversely in different
purposes and methods. Therefore, the criterion for distinguishing better
critical thinking from worse is hard to locate. More than that, it also
makes no sense to improve the capacity of critical thinking.
The inner characteristic of critical thinking is displayed by an autonomous
person. As mentioned, critical thinking is an insight of autonomous people.
With this inner characteristic, people with critical thinking can emancipate
themselves from authority, through reflecting continuously upon ideology.
Then, the rationality of a good life may be reconstructed.
Critical thinking deals with both universal principles and particulars on the
way towards the reconstruction of the rationality of a good life. Peter
Winch says, "one's life is subject to contingencies, rather than an attempt to
control these" (Winch, 1972, 40). This does not mean that Peter Winch
agrees with the 'ambition' of scientists. Nevertheless, he assumes that there
is a human desire for living in a easy way. This is also one of the reasons
why universality has become the purpose of critical thinkers since the
supernatural mode. With regard to universality, general principles can be
used to reach one's purpose; while as for contingency, instead of general
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principles, sufficient wisdom is required for solving different problems in
different contexts. Therefore, there is no way to confine critical thinking
to a specific type of thinking.
The function of critical thinking in dealing with contingencies also shows
that critical thinking is not a purely genetic development. (The term
'genetic', which is borrowed from Piaget, will be explained later on.) As
Theobald claims, the genetic development lacks a system of variables which
we can deliberately manipulate to change society as we wish. (Theobald,
1968, 44) In fact, the development of critical thinking is interweaving
genetic and dialectic nature. This interweaving offers the power for
critical thinking to deal with the consistent and contingent situations. That
is, synthesis enriches human insight, and deepens human understanding, so
that it can provide the confidence of enlightenment for individual
autonomy.
A critical thinker is expected to be able to make his own decision about his
purpose, and to take rational action, after reflecting upon the circumstances
he faces. This implies that freedom of thought is a necessary condition for
an autonomous person and for a critical thinker. (The relationship between
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freedom, autonomy and emancipation will be discussed later on.) Thus, the
capacity of autonomy must be developed, and its power must be
strengthened for a critical thinker. This idea is grounded in Kant's theory,
where freedom is emphasised. For Kant, "the ground of possibility of
categorical imperatives is this: that they are based simply on the freedom of
the power of choice, not on any other characteristic of choice (by which it
can be subjected to a purpose)' (Kant, in Gowans, (ed.), 1987, 38). That
is, for Kant, inner will is the basis of morality, while for critical thinkers,
inner freedom opens the possibility for autonomy.
Then, a critical thinker will be expected to be able to deal not only with
universal situations through established principles and a set of skills of
problem-solving; but also with contingencies, which emerge from different
contexts, when previous principles cannot be employed effectively. In this
sense, what a critical thinker needs is not only the expert knowledge, but
also the 'wisdom' to detect the problem, to focus his intentionality, to set up
his purpose and choose suitable methods etc.
Critical thinking is a complex concept. Thus, a number of notions
regarding its noesis will be grasped in order to manifest its commonality.
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Then, its nature involving the characteristics of skepticism, reflection,
emancipation, reconstruction and autonomy can be reexamined, so as to
give critical thinking a proper definition.
II. Its commonality: revealing through manifesting its inner
logic
A. Pivoting its common motive on autonomy
Etymologically, autonomy is rooted in Greek words: self and rule or law.
Thus, it means literally self-rule. Berlin and Lindley interpret the nature
of autonomy clearly. They explain,
I wish my life and decision to depend on myself, not on external forces of
whatever kind... I wish to be a subject, not an object... a doer - deciding,
not being decided for, self-directed not acted on by external nature or by
other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing
a human role... I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking,
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to
explain them by references to my own ideas and purpose. (Berlin, 19692,
131; also quoted by Lindley, 1986, 6)
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From the above interpretations, two main dimensions of autonomy can be
brought out: one, the role of self; and the possession of freedom. (These
two dimensions will be analysed in chapter V.)
The pursuit of autonomy is a common motive for critical thinkers, and the
intention to be autonomous becomes stronger and stronger mode by mode.
The intentionality of autonomy was revealed from the four modes of
critical thinking, i.e. focusing on the supernatural, transcendent world
(mode I); on the natural world (mode I); on the transcendental world of
self-consciousness (mode Ill); and on the whole lifeworid (mode IV).
As analysed, in the supernatural mode of critical thinking, men admitted
that they could not be independent of God or Heaven. Within the
limitations on human knowledge, men took the principle of God or Heaven
as the only consistent principle. On the other hand, at that time, human
activities were thought so contingent that a consistent principle was
impossible to establish. Under such an acknowledgment, all men could do
towards autonomy was to decode and grasp the principle of God or
Heaven.
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Men with the empirical mode of critical thinking tried to grasp knowledge
about the world and work out the law of the world, instead of decoding
God's principle. The intention of autonomy became stronger within the
empirical mode than within the supernatural mode in the motivation of
establishing the law of the natural world. In this way, men could control
their lives via the principles they established, then they were expected to
escape from the control of God.
However, whether men within the empirical mode of critical thinking can
really escape from the control of God or Heaven is questionable. As Peter
Winch reminds us "from the present point of view technological
independence is yet another form of dependence. Technology destroys
some dependencies but always creates new ones, which may be fiercer -
because harder to understand - than the old" (Winch, 1972, 39). That is,
critical thinkers within the empirical mode had not become independent
yet, although they did demand more autonomy in certain ways than did the
critical thinkers within the supernatural mode.
Critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical mode gained some sense of
autonomous life. "We rightly stand on the shoulders of our forebears"
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(McLean, 1986, 8), so that we might learn that man is not merely part of
the world, but also a whole which is relative to the world. In
acknowledging this, the consciousness of autonomy is shown to be stronger
than in the empirical mode. Peter Winch suggests that "what a man says or
does may make a difference not merely to the performance of the activity
upon which he is at present engaged, but to his life and to the lives of other
people" (Winch, 1972, 41). Although Peter Winch does not focus on the
changes of human intentionality, his suggestion confirms that critical
thinking must focus not only on the world, but also on the individual
himself and social life.	 This is the very intentionality of the
subject-dialectical mode and the communicative mode of critical thinking.
Meanwhile, the consciousness of autonomy, in terms of self-reflection
shows its significance, in that the sense of individual life is stressed.
Winch's reflecting upon the sense of life also describes the task of critical
thinkers within the communicative mode. The task is to deal with the
problem of lifeworld, which includes the lifeworlds of subject, the object
and the inter-subjective. Critical thinkers within the communicative mode
made an achievement in categorising multifarious life through reflection
upon the dysfunction and insufficiency of rationality. As analysed, they
195
found that universality cannot include all dimensions of life. Finally they
replaced absolute rationality by quasi-universality, in which the
contingencies of human life were noticeable.
Peter Winch tries to account for the meaning of contingencies by
introducing Wittgenstein's philosophical use of language games. He says,
what we may learn by studying other cultures are not merely possibilities of
different ways of doing things, other techniques. More importantly, we
may learn different possibilities of making sense of human life [this reveals
human intentionality], different ideas about the possible importance that the
carrying Out of certain activities may take on for a man, trying to
contemplate the sense of his life as a whole. (Winch, 1972, 41)
With such enlightenment of reason, human beings are free from subjection
to contingencies, through emancipating themselves from the yoke of a
unique law, i.e. universality. Not only the commonality and diversity of
individuals, but also the efficiency and possibility of universality are
considered, when critical thinkers deal with human problems on the basis
of quasi-universality. Man is then open to the possibility of making
multifarious interests, activities in both individual and social lives.
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More significantly, the shift of the purposes of critical thinkers from
universality to quasi-universality implies that a critical thinker must not
only recognise where the authority is, but also be brave enough to face the
risk of emancipating himself from authority. It is the mark of fortitude
that critical thinkers inquire bravely about authority, and reflect
continuously upon it. In this sense, as I have emphasised, for a critical
thinker, not only knowledge and abilities of critical thinking, but also
wisdom, will and courage are needed.
Sufficient knowledge and abilities are fundamental capacities for dealing
critically with problems, while will and courage are especially needed for
men to face authority and to emancipate themselves from it. Further,
while knowledge, abilities, will and courage are required in dealing with
consistencies, wisdom is important and necessary in coping with
contingencies. Dealing with consistency can follow existing principles,
whereas contingency must be dealt with by creating new principles for a
new circumstance. From the process of critical thinkers' dealing with
contingency, the relationship between the achievement of critical thinking
and the abilities, dispositions of critical thinkers can briefly be inferred.
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That is, the more expert the knowledge and abilities of critical thinking, the
stronger the will and courage needed for critical thinkers to emancipate
themselves from authority; and the more comprehensive wisdom a critical
thinker possesses, the more possibility he has to be autonomous for
reconstructing his own life.
B. Interweaving genetic with dialectical developments
Critical thinking is not a static but a dynamic development. It is a system
of transformation that becomes progressively rational. Critical thinking
reveals the nature of integrating genetic into dialectical development from
its transformation of modes of thinking. The term 'genetic' is borrowed
from Piaget. According to Piaget, "genetic epistemology attempts to
explain knowledge on the basis of its history and especially by the
psychological origins of the notions and operations upon which it is based"
(Piaget, in Modgil (eds.), 1982, 27). With regard to the genetic
development of critical thinking, the changes of its modes are never sudden
but always gradual. The changes lie in the process of becoming itself from
one mode to another. Perhaps, this development can vary from one society
to another, but there is a constant order of succession. In this sense, with
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the increase of knowledge, critical thinking is a genetic development in
terms of autonomy: from the supernatural mode to the empirical mode;
from the empirical mode to the subject-dialectical mode, then to the
communicative mode.
However, critical thinking is not a pure genetic development. The fact that
life is not only consistent, but also contingent led critical thinking to a
dialectical development. Contingency can hardly be dealt with merely
through existing principles, which are universal, because contingency is
relative to a specific context. Dialectics, as conceived by critical thinkers
both in mode III and mode IV, is not reduced to its simple form of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis; nor is it equivalent to just the rule of cognitive
activity. It is a process towards autonomy which implies conscious
reflection from the instrumental level to the spiritual level; from one
dimension to multiple dimensions. In this sense, dialectic implies the
potential of creativity. In addition, the dialectical process enriches the
contents of autonomy, and strengthens the eagerness for autonomy.
The most obvious modes which manifest the dialectical development of
critical thinking are its subject-dialectical mode and communicative mode.
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The subject-dialectical mode of critical thinking can be viewed as the
outcome of the supernatural mode and the empirical mode of critical
thinking. Critical thinkers within the supernatural mode considered merely
the supernatural world, while in the empirical mode they tried to reject the
belief in supernatural power. A dialectical movement is shown in the
relationship of 'thesis' and 'antithesis'. Synthesis is crystallised through the
integration of thesis and antithesis. In this way, critical thinkers within the
subject-dialectical mode assumed that universality must be established
neither on the basis of the belief in supernatural power, nor on the basis of
external world.
	 It must emerge from self-consciousness, and
self-consciousness shows its inner movement to connect the object world
and the subject world.
Dialectical method and spirit also contribute to human autonomy. As
analysed, with regard to the intentionality and purpose of critical thinkers,
if the supernatural mode of critical thinking is aimed at formulating the
principle of God or Heaven, then the empirical mode of critical thinking
would be intended to rebel against the principle of God or Heaven. Critical
thinkers in the empirical mode, instead, created the law for themselves
through understanding the natural world. In this sense, establishing the law
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of the natural world, rather than following the principle of God or Heaven,
critical thinkers within the empirical mode manifest their intention to
control the world. Intending to control the world, e.g., critical thinkers in
the empirical mode, does not necessarily mean to throw away the principle
of universality. Yet, trying to be the master of oneself is revealed.
Similarly, the communicative mode of critical thinking is the synthesis of
the empirical mode and the subject-dialectical mode of critical thinking via
dialectical spirit and method. The communicative mode of critical thinking
emerged from reflecting upon the natural world and the transcendental
world of self-consciousness. The empirical mode of critical thinking
focused on the natural world, whereas the subject-dialectical mode of
critical thinking focused on the transcendental world of self-consciousness.
In Habermas' theory of communicative action, the communicative mode of
critical thinking leads to integrate the natural world with self-consciousness
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984; 1987). According to Habermas, the
theory of communicative action is established by synthesis from the
investigation of social pathology and perspective, such as phenomenology,
hermeneutics and symbolic interactionism (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.),
1984, xi; 1987, 77). In other words, he tries to connect the lifeworid and
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system paradigms through autonomous action (Habermas; McCarthy
(trans.), 1984, xi). In addition, a dialectical process is exercised by a
rational person, who is able to put forward an assertion, criticise or justify
the given situation in terms of grounds and evidence, legitimations and
even intentions, and then provide reasons for his or her expressions or
arguments (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 15-8). Hence, the
development of critical thinking in integrating the object with the subject,
and integrating the subject with the subject are as a dialectical movement of
synthesising the empirical mode and the subject-dialectical mode. If the
empirical mode is taken as the 'thesis', then the subject-dialectical mode is
the 'anti-thesis'. In other words, it is a change from the objective
external-world to the subjective inner-world.
From the above discussions, both the subject-dialectical mode and the
communicative mode manifest the nature of the dialectical movement of
thinking, in terms of subjectivity and becoming. According to Hegel,
Being or truth exists neither in the supernatural world nor in the natural
world, but in the inner spirit of the subject, called Nous (Hegel; Miller
(trans.), 1977, 34, 190). 	 Nous is the crucial symbol of the
subject-dialectical mode of critical thinking. For Hegel, Nous (spirit),
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being visible and invisible, is indicated only in its process of coming to be
(Hegel; Miller, (trans.), 1977, 480). Thus, becoming is the nature of
dialectic.
The communicative mode is inclusive of the previous three modes of
critical thinking. It deals not only with the natural world and the
subject-dialectical world, but also with the supernatural world. It is
concerned not only with generality (consistency) but also diversity
(contingency). Its synthetic outcomes are shown in the intentionality
(lifeworlds) and purpose (establishing quasi-universality instead of any
universality). In this sense, the communicative mode of critical thinking
can be taken as the fully developed mode of critical thinking in this thesis.
C. Enriching cognitive style from one dimensiondlity to
multi-dimensionality
Cognitive style, here, is a pattern of thinking, which is used to categorise,
recognise, and constitute knowledge. It lodges in the schema of mind, but
governs thinking activity by locating human intentionality and purpose.
The relationship between cognitive style and human activity bears a certain
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resemblance to the relationship between the subject and the object.
Knowledge of the world is then possible, because cognitive style of mind
categorises the structure of our experiences, then integrates new
experiences with the existing ones.
The role of cognitive style for knowledge corresponds to Kant's theory
about transcendental self and knowledge. Kant puts the relationship
between transcendental self and knowledge as that "our knowledge must
conform to objects" (Kant; Smith (trans.), 1968, 75). Likewise it is the
function of cognitive style in human consciousness to know the world, the
function of cognitive style has the task of completing the movement of
critical thinking from skepticism and reflection to emancipation and
reconstruction.
In this way, cognitive style takes charge of knowledge by continuously
inquiring and reflecting upon previous knowledge. The contribution of
continuous reflection upon knowledge stretches the realm of cognition
from one dimensionality to multiple dimensionality. For example, we, at
the very first, learn the basic skills of dancing, then improve the skills
through reflecting upon learned skills. After delicate skills are acquired,
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we can go a step further to consolidate isolated actions or skills to achieve
harmonious expression of art. The step of expression cannot be merely
mono-dimensional but multi-dimensional. Further, only a person who can
think in multiple dimensionalities can be a connoisseur in a specific field.
In this sense, the critical thinker can be viewed as a connoisseur.
Cognitive style constitutes the immanent framework of human action. On
the other hand, cognitive style is influenced not only by inherited qualities,
e.g., intelligence and disposition, but also by cultural contexts and learning
abilities. Berry stresses the effect of the cultural context on cognitive style
so that
specific cognitive competencies are related to local cultural conditions (as in
the specific abilities), systematic relationships are sought (the pattern of
relationship being indicative of the style), and comparisons across cultures
are employed to tease out systematic relationships between cultural context
and cognitive styles. (Berry, 1984, 340)
The inherited quality is always hard to change. So, I prefer to locate my
account within the cultural context, in order to map out the inner logic of
critical thinking in varied cognitive styles.
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The cognitive style of the supernatural mode of critical thinking is
imaginative-reason. Here the term 'reason" is "tied up with the physical
doings such as going, working...on the one hand, and the mental doings
such as thinking, believing, speculating and inferring on the other"
(Theobald, 19772, 67). Imaginativeness is viewed as "an essential
characteristic of human thought" (Hilpinen, (ed.), 1980, 162). De Bono
clearly points out that there are three kinds of situations from which
imagination emerges (De Bono, 19712, 22). They are: a) not enough
information is given; b) no way of checking whether an idea is right or
wrong; and c) not so much a matter of checking ideas but of thinking them
up first (De Bono, 19712, 22). On the one hand, imagination arises from
limitations on human knowledge, e.g., when we are faced with a vague
situation; on the other hand, the scope of our imagination is dependent on
the extent of our knowledge. As Hilipnen claims, "human imagination can
augment or diminish anything; it can transpose or combine things; it can
modify or transform them; project them into completely different
environments; join disparate parts or decompose integral units" (Hilpinen,
(ed.), 1980, 161).
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Imagination used by critical thinkers is as a kind of reasoal for delivering a
rational answer. The more knowledge one possesses, the more profound
quality of imagination one exercises. The original explanatory hypothesis
is partly postulated by imagination-reason, whilst the problematic
hypothesis can be developed into another postulation, if it can be justified.
For example, in ancient Chinese society, that Yin is the representative of
the female, while Yang is the male, and that the universe is constituted by
Yin and Yang, is an imaginative hypothesis. Similarly, that the earth is
believed to be at the centre of the universe in western thought is an
imaginative hypothesis as well. In this sense, "it is difficult to separate
explanation and description" (Theobald, 19772, 40) at that moment. The
job of the supernatural mode of critical thinking ds to locate the
transcendental hypothesis and formulate the problematic hypothesis into an
acceptable postulation. Hilpinen confirms the function of
imaginative-reason when he says that "it is not possible to draw a strict
dividing line between accurate thinking and imagination. It plays the main
role in science as well as in the arts" (Hilpinen (ed.), 1980, 157). That is,
imagination may be an accurate thinking either in science or in the arts, if
it is kindled with reason. This is the reason why critical thinkers could
employ their imagination with reason to make out an acceptable answer
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even via ritual terms. In the process from locating a hypothesis to
formulating an acceptable answer, the supernatural mode of critical
thinking made a step forward in working out the theorem of the universe,
for example.
Critical thinkers within the empirical mode took the progress of human
development one more step forwards than critical thinkers within the
supernatural mode. Critical thinkers with advanced and well-founded
knowledge developed their cognitive style by adding
experiential-empiricism to imaginative-reason. They were led to ask how
to identify human substantial beliefs (hypotheses) about the nature of things
(Poteat, 1985, 11). Verifying the hypothesis with evidence became a task
of the empirical mode of critical thinking, and objective knowledge was
established through empirical verification.
Another cognitive style, i.e. dialectical-synthesis, gave rise to skepticism, as
men suffered from the demand of objectivity, and from ignoring
subjectivity. In other words, critical thinking emerges from a conflict
situation, which changes the world. During the process of dealing with the
conflict, critical thinking reveals its characteristics of skepticism and
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reflection. Moreover, a critical thinker must never abandon skepticism and
reflection, if he is to stretch the range of knowledge.
Identifying oneself with one's own self indicates individual autonomy. As
Feuerbach said, "I taught Hegelian philosophy.. .at first as a man who
identifies himself with his subject" (Löwith, 1964, 74). This is the crucial
style of cognition to which critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical
mode submit themselves. Nevertheless, whether "consciousness is nothing
more than a type of neutral occurrence" (Hilpinen, (ed.), 1980, 159), and
whether universality can be established via self-consciousness are arguable.
By noting the arbitrariness of self-consciousness, critical thinkers within
the communicative mode focus their task on quasi-universality, rather than
universality. Also, in shedding light on the closed purpose of universality,
critical thinkers within the communicative mode, overlooked intentionally
the possibilities of transcendence beyond consistency and contingency:
consistency, the criterion for generality; contingency, the criterion for
individuality.
In demanding dialectical synthesis from consistency and contingency,
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Habermas' theory of communicative action is entailed in that the
dimensions of critical thinking embrace not only objective and subjective
knowledge, but also intersubjective knowledge, which is concerned with
culture, society and person. As Habermas claimed, "communicative action
relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in which participants relate
simultaneously to something in the objective, the social, and the subjective
worlds" (Habermas, McCathy (trans.), 1987, 120). Further, he pointed out
that "corresponding to these processes of cultural reproduction, social
integration, and socialisation are the structural components of the
lifeworld: culture, society, and person" (Habermas, McCathy (trans.),
1987, 138). More importantly, the notion of consensus in Habermas'
theory of communicative action reaches epistemologically the goal of
freeing the yoke from universality (Habermas, Shapire (trans.), 1971, 35;
McCathy (trans.), 1975, 3; 1984, xi, 296-7; 1987, 377).
The communicative mode of critical thinking transcends universal
consistency and uncertain contingencies by connecting Piaget's theory of
equilibrium (Piaget, Rosin (trans.), 1972) with Habermas' theory of
communicative action (Habermas, McCathy (trans.), 1984, 68). As Modgil
claims, "his theory of equilibration naturally led Piaget to a dialectical
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concept of development" (Modgil (ed.), 1982, 415). According to Piaget,
equilibrium is defined by reversibility (Piaget, Rosin (trans.), 1972, 60).
The reversibility is the most apparent characteristic of the act of
intelligence which is capable of detours and returns (Piaget, Rosin (trans.),
1972, 61).
Meanwhile, the aspects of culture, society and person are involved in
human life via communicative action. According to Habermas,
communicative action is used in order to connect the system with lifeworid,
and its functions are involved in the relationship among culture, society and
person. Habermas says,
I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which participants in
communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an
understanding about something in the world....; I use the term society for
the legitimate orders through which participants regulate their memberships
in social groups and thereby secure solidarity...; and by personality I
understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and
acting, that put him in a position to take part in processes of reaching
understanding and thereby to assert his own identity. (Habermas, McCathy
(trans.), 1987, 138)
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From the above explanations, the scope of human insights has been
enriched from one dimensionality to multiple dimensionality. This
achievement is shown in the cognitive style of categorical-construction
within the communicative mode of critical thinking. Critical thinkers with
the cognitive style of categorical-construction question the possibility of
universality; reflect upon the insufficiency of universality; emancipate their
one-way intentionality from the domination of universality; and then
reconstruct a new rationality for their lives. In this sense, the
communicative mode of critical thinking strengthens human autonomy and
stretches human insights to the multi-sided aspect, including culture, society
and person.
D. Emancipating men from alienation
The communicative mode of critical thinking also marks human
achievement by emancipating men from the authority of universality,
which is one problem which causes human alienation (Marx, 1976; Lukes,
1985). In this sense, a progression is indicated on the range of rationality
by virtue of emancipating men from alienation.
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obstacle to their pursuit of their own real interests, and is incompatible with
their autonomy. (Lindley, 1986, 167)
Enlightenment of reason is then the very task of critical thinking. "The
enlightenment has always been aimed at liberating men from fear and
establishing their sovereignty" (Horkheimer and Adorno; Cumming
(trans.), 1973, 3). Therefore, the best way to wake men from false
consciousness is to thrust into the deep structure of their false
consciousness. In this way, one emancipates oneself from negative
ideology, especially one's own ideology. In addition, "the program of the
enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of
myths and the substitute of knowledge for fancy" (Horkheimer and
Adorno; Cumming (trans.), 1973, 3).
Freedom must be the bedrock of enlightenment: without freedom,
enlightenment will be severely constrained, and without enlightenment,
autonomy will not be authentic. According to Kant, freedom is taken as an
ability to resist being determined, so that it is possible for a free subject to
fulfil his moral autonomy. He argues that "freedom is not independence on
law which we can consciously follow, but independence on the physical
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relation of causality, not being determined by physical or sensible causes"
(Kant; Abbott (trans.), 196711, lix). Further, Kant regards "freedom as
an ability from which proceeds contradiction to the moral law"(Kant;
Abbott (trans.), 196711, lix). On a par with Kant, and more than Kant,
Hegel applies freedom not only to thought but also to human life itself. He
emphasises that "freedom in thought has only pure thought as its truth, a
truth lacking the fullness of life. Hence, freedom in thought, too, is only
the notion of freedom, not the living of freedom itself" (Hegel; Miller,
(trans.), 1977, 122). Similarly to Hegel, Peterson claims that "the mind
requires freedom necessary for transcendent thought" (Peterson, 1977, 23).
Furthermore, Bre'hier recapitulates these implications, and states that
freedom is the power to dispose of our thoughts, to confer on them an order
that is not of natural necessity... The search itself is an act of freedom that
confirms freedom... Our freedom is a creation of ourselves; to be free is to
do, not to become, but to do and in doing, produce ourselves. (Bre'hier;
Baskin (trans.), 1969, 60-1)
Therefore, critical thinking must not be separated from freedom, in which
autonomous life is grounded.
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In shedding light on the necessity of freedom for autonomy, a critical
thinker must be keen on enlightenment of reason by emancipating himself
and men from authority. As Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out,
the enlightenment recognised the old powers in the Platonic and Aristotelian
aspects of metaphysics, and opposed as superstition the claim that truth is
predicable of universals. Enlightenment has always taken the Q,asic
principle of myth to be anthropomorphism, the projection onto nature of the
subjective. (Horkheimer and Adorno; Cumming (trans.), 1973, 6)
In other words, the goal of emancipation in terms of self-consciousness is
enlightenment of reason, and the task of enlightenment of reason is aimed
at autonomy. An autonomous person must be free himself from inner and
external authorities which hamper individual or social development.
Taylor confirms Hegel's theory of spirit which relocates self-reflection in
inner self-understanding. He claims that "spirit comes to understand itself,
and at the same time the life-process itself will be entirely transparent as an
embodiment of this purpose (self-understanding)" (Taylor, 19862, 87).
More subtle than Taylor, Kant understands reason in its endeavour to
transcend dialectically beyond a priori knowledge via understanding (Kant;
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Smith (trans.), 1968, 177).
According to Dworkin's analysis of the nature of autonomy, an
autonomous person is capable of not only self-reflection, but also
self-emancipation, so that one is not constrained to narrow one's reason
(Dworkin, 1988, 6-11; 17-23; 26-39; 108). An autonomous person is then
a person who is capable of seif-realisation, self-reflection and
sell-actualisation. Autonomy, which can be acquired by emancipation from
alienation, is taken as the motive of critical thinking. In a word, the
relationship between autonomy, freedom and emancipation is not
independent but reciprocal.
E. Establishing rationality as its inner logic
Siegel and Barrow are quite right in holding the view that to be concerned
with critical thinking is to be concerned with the questions of rationality
(Siegel, 1988; Barrow, 1984). Barrow claims that "critical thinking itself
is a catch-all phrase... To be concerned with critical thinking is to be
concerned with the question of rationality" (Barrow, 1984, 7). Siegel,
although rejecting the use of the term 'critical thinking', claims that
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"critical thinking is principles of thinking" (Siegel, 1988, 34), besides, he
points out two principles: "subject-specific" and "subject-neutral". He
says,
subject-specific principles which govern the assessment of particular sorts
of reasons in particular contexts; subject-neutral problems include all those
principles typically regarded as logical, both informal and formal. Besides,
subject-neutral problems apply across a wide variety of contexts and types
of reason. (Siegel, 1988, 34)
Siegel's use of the term 'principle' is different from for Barrow's or
Ennis'. In fact, what Siegel calls 'principles' of thinking is equivalent to
what he calls 'rationality', whereas Barrow and Ennis take the term
'principle' as a general law which is transferable. Barrow claims that
one may say that it is highly likely that one who has had a critical and
rigorous turn of mind developed in one context will display it in other
contexts that he regards as serious, in so far as he can... He would only be
able to display rigour and critical acumen if he could handle the content (and
if he choose to do so). (Barrow, 1984, 85)
Further, he criticises the empirical research and points out that
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the empirical researchers will not be able to observe situations that involve a
combination of dispositions, skill and competence. The notion that has
been discredited by such research, namely that overall competence was
transferable was always absurd. (Barrow, 1984, 86)
Therefore, for Barrow, a general principle of critical thinking must be a
integration of all abilities of thinking, i.e. skill, disposition and
competences, so that it is inclusive enough to be transferable. Similarly,
Ennis is convinced that "there are general principles that bridge subjects,
that have application to many subjects" (Ennis, 1985, 29).
Here, I am not intending to be involved in the debate over whether critical
thinking is a transferable skill. Rather, I would like to claim that
rationality, which might either embody principles or be constituted by
principles, acts as the inner logic for critical thinking. Without grasping
adequately the nature of rationality, we cannot successfully deal with the
question of critical thinking. Siegel suggests that "the theory of critical
thinking must be deepened by a philosophical theory of rationality, and
theorists of critical thinking can best pursue their theoretical activity by
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pursuing the theory of rationality" (Siegel, 1988, 127). Similarly, for
Barrow, "good thinking (critical thinking) is the nature of rationality"
(Barrow, 1988, 32).
There are various meanings for rationality. First, rationality means "the
kind of thinking we would all want to do, if we were aware of our own
best interests, in order to achieve our own good" (Baron, 1988, 3).
Rationality in Baron's definition is a kind of instrumental, or purposive
reason. Baron understands rationality in terms of means-ends. That is,
rationality is a kind of reason relying extensively on its technical nature,
and widely used by Capitalism, in which society, based on the economic
interest, operates for the material achievements in terms of efficiency.
Black also analyzes the reasonable action in terms of calculated purpose.
He asserts that "it is reasonable to A rather than B, because it is more likely
to achieve what you want" (Black, 19522, 203). It seems to me that the
meaning and range of purposes on this conception, is given by human
'desires'. Human activity, guided by purpose, as analysed, is a product of
human insight. In this sense, desire can be taken as one factor or
constituent of human insight. Therefore, Black's theory, as Baron's, is
criticised as being too close to teleology, which Horkheimer grades as a
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kind of instrumental reason, while Habermas calls it technical reason.
According to the communicative mode of critical thinking, instrumental
reason is merely one aspect of human rationality.
Following Habermas, Tran categorises rationality into three types. There
are: Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness . He explains these types as that
"(II) reason is the principle of our ultimate concern, (if) rationality is the
instrumental, purposive principle in the natural science, (then)
reasonableness can serve to be the principle of human practical life such as
morality, laws, arts etc" (Tran, 1989, 1). According to Tran, rationality is
different when it is rooted in a different lifeworld. Rationality in the
transcendental world is called reason; it is called rationality in the natural
world, while it is called reasonableness in the social world. He points out,
Reason, by virtue of its expressive power of the human world, may reveal
itself in its multi-dimensional form, depending on which kind of relation,
and on which subject it deals with. That means, rationality, if it is isolated
or separated from lifeworids, will be a mere tool, and deprived of the
meaning of life. (Tran, 1989, 36)
Tran's theory confirms the realisation achieved by the communicative
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mode of critical thinking, that various dimensions of rationality are
identical to various modes of critical thinking.
Siegel takes rationality to be coextensive with critical thinking. He is not
quite satisfied with McPeck's viewpoint on the relationship between
rationality and critical thinking. He compares his own idea to McPeck's,
and points out that McPeck takes rationality as a universal dimension to
include all instances of the intelligent use of evidence in the solution of
problems, while he himself limits critical thinking to only some of those
instances (Siegel, 1988, 29). Siegel insists that 'critica1 thinking is
coextensive with rationality, not merely a dimension of it, for rationality
and critical thinking are both coextensive with the relevance of reasons"
(Siegel, 1988, 30).
The relationship between critical thinking, rationality and reason is not
clear in Siegel's claims. For Siegel, whether critical thinking is limited to
the technical level needs to be clarified. The thesis that rationality and
critical thinking are coextensive gives rise to a number of questions, such
as: is critical thinking a sort of rationality? Can rationality be reached
through critical thinking? Do critical thinking and rationality deal with
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different fields of knowledge? How is rationality established and what is
critical thinking for? Does rationality mean 'good reasons'? Is working
out 'good reason' the unique task or achievement of critical thinking? and
so on. These questions are avoided if rationality is not merely coextensive
with critical thinking, but an inner logic of critical thinking. Rationality
locates human insight, while human insight marks the target of critical
thinking.
III. Reinterpreting for its characteristics
Here, in order to reveal concretely the characteristics of critical thinking -
skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction, I shall take R. M.
Hare's distinction between intuitive thinking and critical thinking (Hare,
1981) as a target to justify the necessity of these four characteristics for
critical thinking, before the definition of critical thinking is given.
Hare distinguishes intuitive thinking from critical thinking in following
ways:
a) critical thinking is necessary to resolve the conflict, while for intuitive
thinking, the conflict is irresolvable (Hare, in Gowans (ed.), 1987, 206);
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b) critical thinking consists in making a choice within certain constraints
(Hare, in Gowans (ed.), 1987, 218);
c) critical principles have to be compatible with specificity (Hare, in
Gowans (ed.), 1987, 218-9);
d) critical thinking results in a universal principle, which used in critical
thinking can be of unlimited specificity. (for Hare, a universal principle
is similar to quasi-universal consensus in terms of Habermas (Habermas;
Shapire (trans.), 1971; McCarthy (trans.), 1984; 1987).) (Hare, in
Gowans (ed.), 1987, 221, 227);
e) critical thinking is epistemologically prior, while intuitive thinking
cannot be self-supporting (Hare, in Gowans (ed.), 1987, 222); and
1) critical thinking aims to select the best set of prima facie principles for
use in intuitive thinking (Hare, in Gowans (ed.), 1987, 225, 227).
Hare's concept of critical thinking is aimed specifically at dealing with
moral conflicts and justifying moral principles; he is not concerned with
clarifying the nature of critical thinking in general. Nevertheless, his own
discussion provides examples which can be used to illustrate the
characteristics of critical thinking.
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In brief, according to Hare's theory, "critical thinking considers
conflict-situations and frames a universal principle, which is established on
philosophical logic, and thus, based on linguistic intuitions only" (Hare, in
Gowans (ed.), 1987, 205). However, "when they [principles] are in
conflict, critical thinkers can put the principles aside for the time being and
examine carefully the particular case to see what the situation is" (Hare, in
Gowans (ed.), 1987, 227). In this sense, critical thinking also plays the
role of solving conflicts, in which everything would be done by reason so
that solving conflicts can be possible through understanding different and
specific circumstances.
Thus, even in a moral dilemma in which principles conflict, there will only
be scope for critical thinking if the thinker recognises that the absolute
status of the principles can be questioned. If two conflicting principles are
simply taken as unchallengable, this will appear as a situation of tragedy, in
which critical thinking can offer us no resolution. As R. B. Marcus
suggests, "moral dilemmas, on their face, seem to reflect some kind of
inconsistency in the principles from which they derive" (Marcus, in
Gowans (ed.), 1987, 189). Yet, I do not mean that critical thinking is
aimed at solving moral or practical dilemmas. Rather, solving moral or
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practical dilemmas might be viewed as the medium to reach a good life,
through employing its characteristics.
First, skepticism is the starting point of critical thinking. Yet, one is not a
critical thinker, if one's thinking is confined to skepticism. De Bono
emphasises that skepticism is not critical thinking but a signal for thinkers,
as a lighthouse for boats in the sea (De Bono, 1971). In his work, The
Mechanism of Mind, De Bono differentiates vertical thinking from lateral
thinking to emphasise that the task of skepticism for thinking is to generate
a direction of thinking and life (De Bono, 1971). He claims that "with
vertical thinking one moves only if there is a direction in which to move.
With lateral thinking one moves in order to generate a direction"(De Bono,
1971, 238). For critical thinkers, skepticism should not be their end of
journey of reflection, but a continuous task. As Hare claimed, "only when
he has done it can he be sure that he was right" (Hare, in Gowans (ed.),
1987, 226).
The seeds of skepticism are to be found in Plato's Republic, where
knowledge and opinion are distinguished. Peterson claims that "knowledge
arises from inquiry" (Peterson, 1977, 31). Inquiry is the action which
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follows from skepticism, while the function of distinguishing locates the
dimension of inquiry. In their skepticism about scientific discovery,
Popper and Kuhn emphasise that knowledge is developed by falsification
(Popper) or by revolution (Kuhn). By skepticism, the mind is triggered to
aim at knowledge, which leads the outcome of falsification and revolution.
Therefore, skepticism cannot guarantee knowledge, but it may guide men
to reflect upon previous knowledge, in which negative ideology or false
consciousness may be involved.
Skepticism must not be taken as an end but a medium. Skepticism emerges
from one's belief in that there are no absolute criteria for problematising a
whole life (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 73). lEn addition, "usually
we are forced to this [the possibility of critique] only when we are under
the pressure of a problem situation in which background-knowledge breaks
down. Such situation is a fertile place for critique to start" (Young, 1989,
28). However, we cannot demonstrate skepticism for the sake of rebellion,
but for reconstructing the rationality of truth, good and beauty. In a word,
skepticism must be grounded in reason. For the sake of good life, we
question any irrationality and authority around us, which will hamper
personal and/or social development, then emancipating men from negative
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ideology or authority could be possible. That is the very reason why
Lindley appreciates K. B. Miller's insistence on the importance of critical,
rational inquiry (Lindley, 1986, 70).
Second, reflection opens the possibility for reasonable decision-making.
Reflection improves understanding about the circumstances, and "if we
have this understanding, the difficulties disappear" (Hare, in Gowans (ed.),
1987, 208). De Bono claims the power of understanding for critical
thinking. He says,
understanding is a very powerful process because it is the means by which
man multiples his knowledge. He can only learn response to a few special
situations but through understanding he converts any number of new
situations into already familiar Situations and thus knows what to do about
them at once. (De Bono, 1971, 19)
Let me take Hare's example (Hare, in Gowans (ed.), 1987, 210) to manifest
the necessity of reflection in confronting a dilemma. His example is:
suppose that I get into a situation in which I must decide whether I ought,
in the circumstances, to tell a lie or not, where not telling a lie will involve
hurting my parents or friends. Two principles - that I should not tell a lie,
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that I must not hurt my parents or friends - are in conflict. This is the
situation whatever you do, you will break either the former or the latter
principle. Under such a situation, one must overcome self-contradiction.
Not only these principles but also their circumstances must be examined
and judged, so as to select the best choice. In this case, critical thinking
plays a role of reflection in understanding what the principles and
situations are, and how far each of them is suitable for resolving
self-contradiction. That is, critical thinking guarantees that thinking is
guided by reason. Meanwhile, principles and circumstances are examined
carefully before a decision is taken.
Finally, emancipation serves the function of overcoming self-contradiction,
whilst reconstruction establishes or invents new acceptable principles.
Taking Hare's example again explains the emancipatory and reconstructive
characteristics of critical thinking. Hare says that "in playing games, when
we are faced with a conflict of rules we abandon the game or invent new
playable rules" (Hare, in Gowans (ed.), 1987, 196). However, it is hard to
abandon our action and, perhaps, there is no justification for truth. In such
a case, as Hare suggests, "we proceed with choices as best we can" (Hare, in
Gowans (ed.), 1987, 196). In this example, abandoning the game or our
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action is a sort of emancipation, while inventing new playable rules or
choosing as best as we can is a job of reconstruction.
Both emancipation and reconstruction must be undertaken by autonomous
men within a situation in which there is no coercion. As Habermas claims,
a consensus can only result from communicative action in an ideal speech
situation (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984). Here, an ideal speech
situation implies an uncoerced situation. In other words, consensus must be
reached by autonomous persons within circumstances of freedom.
Choosing as best as we 'can' implies that we are our own masters in making
decision. Emancipation is connected with reconstruction by consensus, in
which communicative action is engaged in through debate. While the
debate, to produce uncoerced consensus, must be rational, this does not
mean that it has no use of rhetoric.
For Willard, the common rationale of the argumentation discipline, which
is concerned with argument, decision-making, rationality, critical thinking
and debate, is a rhetoric of rationality which underwrites an explicit
pedagogical path, and an implicit theory of knowledge (Willard, 1989, 4)
Rhetoric can be viewed as a coherent package of skills and techniques,
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while debate is the cornerstone of democracy (Willard, 1989, 4). "This
rhetoric paints a comforting picture of rational decision makers
confronting thesis with antithesis, claim versus claim, thus transcending the
passivity and powerlessness to which they might otherwise be condemned"
(Willard, 1989, 4). Therefore, when confronting conflicts; when making a
decision; when rejecting unplayable rules; when transcending the social
status quo and creating a new playable rule, emancipation and
reconstruction are integrated together. It seems that knowledge can be
acquired through varied paths, yet, it must be tested by argumentative
'give' and 'take' within an uncoerced circumstance of thought. Then,
rationality can be reflected upon and reconstructed through the
communicative action of reason, i.e argumentative give and take.
In this sense, critical thinking cannot be taken over by a computer by dint
of its nature of autonomy. Critical thinking is exercised by autonomous
people, therefore, it cannot be programmed into a computer. Its general
principles could be carried out by a computer, however, a computer cannot
deal with a specific situation. Computers are designed under a condition,
in which it must follow an already established rule. Even though a
computer can 'invent' a new rule to deal with contingencies, it cannot
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'transcend' itself from its original condition, but defers to it. In this way,
computers cannot be taken as autonomous 'actors'.
Further, an autonomous person is qualified not only by the ability of an
agent, but also by his dispositions to acknowledge, to wish, to desire, to feel
and so on. In this sense, a computer cannot act in accordance with
individual dispositions. Perhaps, such an ideal computer could be invented,
however, it will be arguable whether such a 'computer man' can also be
still called a 'computer'.
More importantly, human life includes not only the relationship between
the subject and the object, but also the relationship among subjects. In
other words, human life must be involved in physical, moral and aesthetic
aspects. However, all computers can do is merely the physical aspect. In
this sense, the moral aspect and the aspect of consciousness of human life
can hardly be replaced by a computer.
These three impossibilities for computerising critical thinking reveal the
significance of autonomy for critical thinking. A person who can exercise
the actions of skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction but
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without autonomy, cannot be viewed as a critical thinker. He at best
employs merely the skills of critical thinking, as a computer does,
therefore, by no means can be an agent. In this sense, even though one
takes critical actions, i.e. skepticism, reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction, one is not doing critical 'thinking', but merely an
instrumental act. In a word, one is merely taken as an object but not a
subject. A critical thinker however must be an autonomous person.
In addition, there are another two tasks which cannot be replaced by a
computer, but exercised by an autonomous person. There are:
'responsibility to self and 'free will'. The concept of autonomy has been
philosophically and psychologically analysed by scholars such as Cooper
(1983), Lindley (1986), Dworking (1988), Meyers (1989) and White
(1990). Here, I would like to manifest the significance of autonomy for
critical thinking. As White claims, "autonomous persons need more than
knowledge or understanding. They also have to have certain dispositions
of character" (White, 1990, 23). This is also the part which a computer
can hardly play. An autonomous person, in terms of critical thinking, does
not entangle himself in self-contradictory belief and action systems. As
Mayers suggests, "personal autonomy is a way of living in harmony with
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one's true self' (Meyers, 1989, 20). In noting the significance of autonomy
and harmony, it seems to me that 'responsibility to self and 'free will'
indicate the disposition of a critical thinker. In this sense, a critical thinker
is a person who is capable of coping not only with rational life, but also
with emotional life.
The function of critical thinking in the lives of reason and emotion will be
discussed to reveal the significance of 'responsibility to self and 'free will'
for an autonomous person. Actually, this is a traditional argument between
romantic and conservative philosophies. In general, tradition, imagination,
feeling, and religion are regarded as natural and positive by romanticism,
whereas conservatism conceives that man and society could be made better
by following a universal law, by which the universe is governed (Zeitlin,
19812,
 39).
As analysed in chapter III, critical thinkers within the subject-dialectical
mode tried to bring the subject into epistemology. The subject in the
subject-dialectical mode of critical thinking stands merely on the basis of
reason, or rational thinking. In this sense, whether critical thinkers within
the subject-dialectical mode had been successful in coming to grips with the
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reality of the individual was in question. As Kierkegaard in his "Concept
of Irony" indicates, irony was "the task of the age to translate the results of
scientific knowledge into personal life to appropriate them personally"
(Llwith, 1964, 147). This methodological shift from Hegelianism to
Kierkegaard reflects the suspended argument of the relationship between
mind, body and reality. From the viewpoint of critical thinkers in the
communicative mode, reality is constituted by both mind and body.
Therefore, the task of a critical thinker, as an autonomous person, lies in
harmoniously integrating body and mind into the whole life.
Then, a practical question - how the task can be done - will be asked. In
order to answer this question, the crucial function of reason must be
clarified in advance. As Peterson claims,
reason is the embodiment of intellective process; it is that process which
determines the attitude of mind toward truth. Reason brings attitude into
being. The reasoning mind is the mind in the process of evaluation; it is the
evaluative process which structures attitude. (Peterson, 1977, 12 1-2)
It seems to me from the above quotations that Peterson is in step with
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Kierkegaard in making reality real. On the other hand, the trip from truth
or intellective mind to reality-being appears not to be accounted. In other
words, how a person 'leaps' from intellective mind to reality-being is not
informed. Thus, it is interesting to investigate how a critical thinker
achieves this task.
Communicative action carries out this task during the due course of
integrating harmoniously. (Communicative action in its broadest sense
here.) During communicative action, one's free will is respected, so that
the room for contingency and creation is protected. On the other hand,
everyone is expected to take responsibility for rational argumentation, in
which self-reflection and the individual postulation are rooted in individual
reason. It is in this way that individual free will is bridged with rational
responsibility.
Here, I do not take emotion to be equivalent to free will. However, in the
sense of self-interest, they at the very least rooted in the same realm. The
unconformity of free will and social legitimation may emerge from the
conflict of interests between self and others, while emotion may result
from the conflict of varied interests within self. There are situations in
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which man needs to emancipate himself from conflicts so that a harmony
may be reconstructed. Harmony cannot be guaranteed daring this course;
however, conflicts are reflected upon rationally through critical thinking.
In this way, emotion and free will are led to the path of reason.
It can be concluded from the above analyses that the emotion and free will
of critical thinkers are prevented from becoming an obstacle to rational life
through communicative action, especially rational argumentation. On the
other hand, emotion and free will might further yield self-transcendence
through the desires for creation and emancipation.
This is not the case that "emotion is, no doubt, a formidable obstacle to
critical thought" (Sabini & Silver, 1985, 15). It is understandable that an
emotional state makes it particularly difficult for a person to "look at his
own situation from a broader, moral perspective" (Sabini & Silver, 1985,
15). However, this is the very task of an autonomous person who
possesses the abilities of self-realisation, self-reflection and
seif-actualisation. Apart from these dispositions and abilities, an
autonomous person with critical thinking can emancipate himself from the
fetter of emotion without reason.
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Therefore, education must take the responsibility to improve pupils' ability
for critical thinking so that they can live a rational life, rather than live a
life of emotion without reason. According to the sufficient and necessary
relationship between critical thinking and autonomy, improving the ability
for autonomy will be as important as improving the knowledge and skills
of critical thinking. As discussed, the significance of critical thinking must
be revealed in the whole life. Thus, the teaching for critical thinking must
be linked with pupils' lives.
IV. Redefining its meaning
The noesis of critical thinking consists of a set of inner movements. They
are:
a) pivoting its common characteristics on autonomy;
b) interweaving genetic with dialectical development;
c) enriching cognitive style of critical thinkers from one dimensionality to
multiple dimensionality;
d) emancipating men from alienation; and
e) establishing rationality as its inner logic.
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In this sense, the noesis of critical thinking has been clarified into a system
of rationality of autonomy. An ideal type of critical thinking thus can be
briefly mapped out from the noesis of critical thinking, and from its
common characteristics. In this thesis, the communicative mode of critical
thinking can be taken as the ideal type of critical thinking, because it is
most fully developed in three ways:
a) focusing intentionality on whole lifeworids: in the belief that there are
varied criteria for rationality, critical thinkers in the communicative
mode question any singular, unquestioned universality. Not only the
power of the supernatural belief and the natural law, but also the
ingrained concepts rooted in culture, society and person are fought
against. In the previous three modes critical thinkers' intentionality
focuses on merely one dimension of lifeworids, viz., supernatural,
natural or transcendental world, whereas in the communicative mode,
their intentionality is drawn by whole dimensions of lifeworids;
b) Proposing a quasi-universality: they propose a quasi-universality as the
criterion for rationality, instead of a permanent, absolute universality
for rationality. Each rationality represents a criterion for universality
merely in a given circumstance. This contingent concept of universality
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makes it possible for men to reflect upon any universality in our life.
In this sense, a critical thinker must continuously examine the
universality in individual and social lives.
c) Reconstructing a quasi-universality via communicative action: critical
thinkers stand on the bases of quasi-universality, so that they do not
believe in a unique universality. Therefore, they hold that universality
must be established through rational dialogues or argumentation and
under the circumstance of equal freedom.
Then, the definition of critical thinking I give, which is grounded in the
ideal type of critical thinking, is as follows:
critical thinking is a dialectical practice of mind of an autonomous person,
by which the mental activities of skepticism, reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction can promote a rational life, including physical, moral and
aesthetical aspects, because of its potential of sell-emancipation not only
from external irrationality, but also from inner self-blindness and
self-deception. In this way, critical thinking can be viewed as a drawing
force to connect history with current life, through integrating human
knowledge in different contents, in terms of time and space. In a word,
critical thinking is an action of practice of reason, by which
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self-transcendence becomes possible, due to the function of the self, i.e.
seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation.
This definition assumes that human beings are rational people. As Peters
claims, "a reasonable man (i.e. a critical thinker) is one who is prepared to
discuss things, to look at a situation impartially from the point of view of
others than himself, to discount his own particular biases and predilections"
(Peters, in Dearden (eds.), 1972, 212). Also, as for Plato, cultivating a
rational person is at the very least significant for society.
Conclusion
Critical thinking cannot be isolated from rationality, which locates the
inner logic of critical thinking. In this sense, the claim that critical
thinking is rational thinking cannot be rejected. Further, critical thinking
emerges from a conflict situation, in which self-contradiction manifests a
deficiency of intellectual power in dealing with human problems. Under
this circumstance, critical thinking must be involved in lifeworld, which is
constituted by both consistency and contingency, rather than a metaphysical
concept. Thus, not only expert knowledge and abilities, but will, courage
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and wisdom are also required, because human life is a life of reason with
emotion in their broadest senses.
Critical thinking is significant for human beings to engage in continuous
reconstruction for a good life. Kurfiss claims, "critical thinking is an
essential capacity of citizens in a healthy democratic society... and it
contributes to a more rational and humane society" (Kurfiss, 1988, vi).
Lipman suggests that "educated people should develop both the capacity to
solve challenging problems and the ability to think critically about political,
social, and cultural issues" (Lipman, 1989, 20). However, as Zeitlin points
out, "enlightenment thinking had a negative and critical as well as a positive
side" (Zeitlin, 19812, 5), it however must also be admitted that critical
thinking is not a panacea for solving human problems.
There may be no established teaching methods and contents to cultivate a
person into a critical thinker. Instead, simply principles which will help
teachers and pupils develop their potentialities of critical thinking, i.e.
abilities, dispositions, will, courage and even wisdom, very likely can be
offered for teaching critical thinking. That is, the teaching for critical
thinking must be contingent in varying contexts, while learning by thinking
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and learning by experiencing must be taken as significant principles for
perceiving contingent teaching contexts. Meanwhile, an open and free
circumstance must be appreciated.
In chapter six, I shall first distinguish the teaching of critical thinking from
indoctrination in education, in order to bring out in chapter seven
instructional principles for critical thinking teaching in primary school
education in Taiwan. Before that, more needs to be said about the nature
of the good life to which, as already indicated, critical thinking has an
important contribution to make.
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Chapter V
CRITICAL THINKING AND GOOD LIFE
I. The contemporary problematic
A. Dehumanisation and depersonalisation
B. The constraint of ideology: an unquestionable authority
II. The sketch of a good life through autonomy and harmony:
a happy and intelligent life
III. Critical thinking is significant for a good life
Conclusion
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Chapter V
CRITICAL THINKING AND GOOD LIFE
This chapter aims at drawing a picture of a good life through critical
thinking, and justifying the value of critical thinking for a good life. The
ideas tested are that: a) the problems which are harmful for a good life
result from the lack of critical thinking; and b) critical thinking is
instructive or necessary for a good life. In other words, these problems
can be removed through critical thinking.
Three tasks will be dealt with in this chapter. First, it will review those
245
problems which contribute to the failure of a good life. Second, the
picture of a good life will be dialectically sketched out from reflection
upon these problems. Then, the significance and the value of critical
thinking for a good life will be justified. In other words, this chapter will
be divided into three parts: pointing out the contemporary problems of
human beings; drawing out the picture of a good life; and highlighting the
value of critical thinking for a good life.
I. The contemporary problematic
Three contemporary problems - dehumanisation, depersonalisation and the
constraint of ideology - will be picked out from the viewpoint of critical
thinkers, and then the cause of these phenomena will be analysed. The
problems of life are not easily solved, even though a good life does not
necessarily mean an unproblematic life. However, some problems do
damage a good life.
Dehumanisation and depersonalisation make a man less individual and less
autonomous. That is, social dissatisfaction and individual isolation
increasingly influence our life. Thereby, man is degraded into an
instrument of culture or society.
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The tension between culture, society and person imposes on us in two ways:
traditional heritages; and social legitimation. Both of them are expected to
contribute to individual development, whereas they restrict the range of
individual diversity through narrowing the scope of the communicative
horizon.
Doing one's obligation instead of actively taking responsibility weakens the
ability for self-reflection. In the end, self-identity might become the
reproduction of culture and/or society, when the person is concerned
merely about instrumental rationality, and when self-reflection also stresses
merely the instrumental aspect. Then, personal potential would be
moulded within an one-dimensional aspect, rather than within a
many-dimensional aspect.
A. Dehumanisation and depersonalisation
In a way it is surprising that humanness in social life (humanisation) and as
a person in individual life (personalisation) are being defended here, after
the modern power of scientific rationality has produced so many benefits
for human beings. Its revolutionary achievements have been confirmed,
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and have pervaded not only the physical aspect of life, but the mental aspect
of life as well. No doubt, the machine rather than the worker has created
the progress of material civilisation, i.e. a rich and convenient material
life, since the eighteenth century. Such a series of triumphs can also be
seen nowadays in technological achievements such as the Euro-Tunnel
which will start in 1993; the subway system in greater Taipei; and the
skyscrapers of New York, Chicago, and in Taiwan. Enlightened rationality
in the physical aspect is pervasive and powerful as such; but it can also
destroy a city and even threaten the planet.
Enlightenment has been as a dominator in the mental aspect of life as in the
physical aspect of life. Corresponding to such triumphs of enlightened
scientific rationality, man suffers from exploitation both within and
between culture, society and person, viz., person-society, person-person,
and culture-culture. This leads to the analysis of one-dimensional man in
Marcuse's terms (1986), instrumental reason in the terms of Horkheimer
and Adorno (1973), and alienation in Marx's terms (1976). All of them
reflect upon the domination of enlightened scientific rationality.
Horkheimer and Adomo analyse the positive and negative functions of
enlightened rationality in human life. They say,
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The instrument by means of which the bourgeoisie came to power,
the liberation of forces, universal freedom, self-determination - in
short, the enlightenment, itself turned against the bourgeoisie once,
as a system of domination, it had recourse to suppression.
(Horkheimer & Adomo; Cumming (trans.), 1973, 93)
By the same token, Habermas points out four crises in our lifeworids.
These are: "the politics and economy crisis", "the rationality crisis", "the
legitimation crisis", and "the motivation crisis" (Habermas; McCarthy
(trans.), 1975), which emerge from the dissatisfaction with political
policies, social systems, dogmatic reason and self-identity.
It is easy to see that a paradigm, a rule (norm), or society which is
governed under dogmatic authority or power may be accepted uncritically.
For example, in a social group, any change from an earlier pattern of
action may be noticed or exaggerated by others, such as 'you are not the
same as you used to be', 'oh, we are seeing the real you', or 'we never
knew you were really like this'. These group-pressures could probably
force someone to return to his previous behaviour, and, psychologically, to
look for conformity instead of diversity, in order to live securely. As
Stephen claims, personal relationships can come to be seen "as
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characterised by continuously tortuous change" (Brookfield, 1987, 228).
To avoid this, people are inclined to move to conformity with common
patterns of action. Then, this conformity will reduce people's capacities for
creativity and reflective thinking.
In this way, the individual is alienated from real life. Marx claims that
alienation was a necessary result in a capitalist industrial society (Marx,
1932), though he holds that "men make circumstances (Trigg, 1988, 104)".
Trigg summarises Marx's key concept of alienation as that "the more the
worker creates things, the more they seem to become an alien, objective
world.... Work, instead of being the free and creative expression of
individuality, becomes an instrument of degradation and dehumanisation"
(Trigg, 1988, 105).
Similarly, when analysing Marxism and morality, Lukes points out that
ethical rules are determined by powers stronger than individual will. He
claims that "ethics is not a matter of convention, nor something which the
individual chooses at will, but are determined by powers which are
stronger than the individual, which stand over him" (Lukes, 1985, 17). In
Lukes' words, Marx believed that "morality is what serves to destroy the
old exploiting society and to unite all the working people around the
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proletariat" (Lukes, 1985, 22). It is true for Marx (1932) that the working
class in an instrumental society was bound to develop an attitude or ability
to be in accordance with the social ideal, and morality serves rules for
individual development. The above discussion of alienation confirms that
men are suffering from dehumanisation and depersonalisation.
Instrumental rationality, which is one of commonalities of human nature,
cannot be completely ignored in human life. However, it could become the
dominator of life, if the ability of reflection disappears. It seems to me
that the commonality of human nature or the consensus of social action
should not have been ignored by Marx and Lukes. It can be agreed that
once man becomes an instrument of culture or society, he must be far away
from freedom, imagination or creation. Further, once the whole of life is
dominated by instrumental rationality, man will be alienated from himself.
In this sense, Marx and Lukes' reflection upon instrumentality reminds
men not to be dominated by instrumental rationality. Yet, this does not
mean that instrumental rationality must be expelled from human life. On
the contrary, instrumental rationality, like moral or aesthetical
rationalities, must flourish through seif-realisation, self-reflection and
seif-actualisation.
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Establishing a rational relationship between culture, society and person is
one of the tasks of critical thinkers in practical life. In order to show that
human beings must adjust tradition to conform with human development
(Nyiri 9eds.), 1988, 25), Nyiri distinguishes 'primary tradition (strong
traditionalism*) from 'secondary tradition (weak traditionalism)'. In fact,
not all rules are ultimately grounded in traditions, but some are constituted
by 'freedom fighters' (Brookfield, 1987, 67). That is, 'secondary
tradition' might be created by men, though it must grounded in primary
tradition. Brookfield reminds us that "unless we become critical thinkers
during periods of crisis, we are condemned to view our lives as constantly
changing, essentially irrational sequences of random happenings that are
out of our control" (Brookfield, 1987, 42).
It seems to me that establishing a rational relationship between culture,
society and person is the task of critical thinking in practical life.
Brooklield is keen to apply critical thinking to practical life. He claimed
* strong traditionalism: according to Nyiri, "strong traditionalism' implies that reason
itself is ultimately grounded in traditions" (Nyiri (eds.), 1988, 25), or "rationality just
is the certificate we give to any conduct which can maintain a place in the flow of
sympathy, the coherence of activity, which composes a way of living" (Nyiri (eds.),
1988, 25).
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that "critical thinking is not an abstract, rarefied academic process,
observable only in college classroom or undergraduate essays. It is an
activity embedded in the vivid contexts of adult lives" (Brookfield, 1987,
228). It appears from Brookfield's notion that the problems of
dehumanisation and depersonalisation, which are caused by enlightened
scientific rationality, can be solved through critical thinking. Then, the
question will be asked: how can critical thinking reach such a great
achievement?
Basically, according to the characteristics of critical thinking, a thinker is
shown to be an independent 'subject' through self-reflection. In this sense,
a critical thinker needs to be a free subject with free self-consciousness.
Apart from that, with the characteristics of emancipation and
reconstruction, (s)he is a creative participant with self-reflection both in
social life and in individual life.
McLean in his 'Person, Creativity and Social Change' tries to answer the
question which concerns the nature of the person as the subject of social
life. He respects the value of the person in the universe. He says,
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The individual, then, is not simply one thing rather than any other;
he or she is a being of a definite - in this case a human - kind relating
to other beings each with their own nature or kind. Only thus can
one's life in the universe have sense and be able to be valued.
(McLean, 1991, 5)
This notion implies that the characteristics of the subject make the person
significant, not only for oneself but also for society. This implication is
significant for critical thinking, especially for the fourth mode of critical
thinking.
Critical thinkers are expected to be open to new actualisation. Dealing
rationally with the social life and the personal life is one of the core tasks
of critical thinkers within the fourth mode of critical thinking. The
individual subject relates with himself through seif-realisation,
self-reflection and self-actualisation, while the subject exercises rational
argumentation with others through communicative action. In other words,
with self-realisation and seif-actualisation, critical thinkers act as
independent subjects, i.e. each is a whole agent and acts in his own
rationality. Simultaneously, with self-reflection and through
communicative action, people reach a rational consensus, by which
conflicts are temporarily dissolved. In this way, individual diversity is
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mixed up with social commonality, and then, the social consensus is
therefore expanded.
Dehumanisation or depersonalisation is relieved temporarily through
critical thinking in two ways. First, seif-realisation and self-reflection keep
a person away from being dominated by self-ideology or by external
authority. Second, rational argumentation, grounded in communicative
action, helps the person to establish and expand rationally the consensus
between the individual and society, between society and society. In the
course of this, critical thinkers take themselves as independent subjects,
while they also take others as independent subjects. Thus, each is
fundamentally free to express himself, and each has respect for the same
dignity in others. This capacity, process and outcome are viewed as
humanness.
B. The constraint of ideology: an unquestionable authority
Apart from the problems of dehumanisation and depersonalisation, another
pattern of problem, found in the individual, family, society and state, is the
constraint of ideology. All man can do is to defer to such an unchangeable
principle, when such an ultimate authority, e.g., divine law or logos, is
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rooted in human ideology. Such an unchangeable authority, in Western
culture, is God, whereas it is Tian (the Heaven) in Chinese culture; for the
Chinese, it is parents' or elders' authority in a family, while it is the moral
law or social legitimation in society. Whatever types it has, this authority
seems not to allow itself to be questioned. More dangerous than that, such
ideology has to be accepted as a universal law through the powers of
culture, society and politics. That is, it is viewed as the law of a priori for
a good life. Therefore, any rebellion against this principle will be viewed
as the termination and the destruction of human development. This
ideology has been shown in Chinese thought (Confucius, The Four Books;
Lao-tze, Tao De Ching), for example.
Accepting such a belief without justification confines the development of
reason to a closed system of thought. Noting this crisis, Habermas (1984)
tries to establish the rationality of a modern society characterised by
communicative action. This is a society in which the lifeworids of culture,
society and person are not split from each other (Habermas; McCarthy
(trans.), 1987). In order to engender human critical thinking, Habermas
shows us the imperfection of society when he criticises M. Weber's theory
for not being complete (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987). The
following problems he identified are particularly useful for us when we
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reflect upon the ideology of culture, society and person. They are:
a) why the differentiation of economics and administrative systems
of action at all pushes beyond the bounds of what is necessary for
the institutionalisation of money and power;
b) why the subsystems build up irresistible internal dynamics and
systematically undermine domains of action dependent upon social
integration;
c) why cultural rationalisation not only sets free the inner logic s of
cultural value spheres, but also remains encapsulated in expert
cultures;
d) why modern science serves technical progress, capitalist growth,
and rational administration, but not the understanding that
communicating citizens have of themselves and the world;
e) why, in general, the explosive contents of cultural modernity have
been defused. (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 327-8)
The ideology of holding that there is an unchangeable authority
projects the characteristic of belief in the unchangeable social ideal
and in the unquestionable authority in life. In my view, the social
ideal suggests that man is always socially determined, and
collectivism is always the guide not only in personal life but also in
natural environments. The unchangeable authority shows us that it is
the right way of human action so that it must be deferred to, instead
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of being questioned.
Under the control of such ideology, self-reflection rests in how the
person adjusts to, rather than goes beyond, this authority. That is,
self-reflection is absorbed in this authority, and then
self-determination is covered with the framing of
social-determination. In this way, the person becomes a role, a given
rather than a subject - a role, playing what he will do. At that
moment, the relationship between individual and society needs to be
clarified, in order to reveal its irrationality (Of course, a conflict
situation is also helpful in prompting reflection upon the irrational.).
Then, the individual may be emancipated himself from the negative
ideology, e.g., the authority of collectivism.
The study of the relationship of the individual and society has had a
vast variety of forms: for example, what is a person and what is a
society; how are these two interwoven; how does society or cultural
heritage influence the person; whether society is changed through the
person or vice versa etc. However, these questions can be dealt with
from the aspect of the person, mainly, the concept of self.
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R. A. Graham in his 'The Traditional Self in a Changing Society'
examines the changing value of self and society from the viewpoint
of psychologists, educators and philosophers, e.g., Piaget, Kohlberg,
Bruner, Dewey, St. Thomas Aquinas and Spinoza (Graham, in
McLean (ed.), 191, ch.v). He agrees with Kohlberg's conclusion that
he has "found no better summary statement of the implications of his
studies than that made by Socrates t' (Graham, in McLean (ed.), 1991,
vol. 1-8, ch.v, 79). Socrates's conclusions quoted by Graham are:
First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same
ideal form regardless of climate or culture.
Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.
Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the
good. He who knows the good chooses the good.
Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is
philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of
good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional
beliefs. (Meno, Graham, in McLean (ed.), 1991, vol. 1-8,
ch.v, 79)
According to Socrates, to choose the good must be to know the good (or
virtue), which is universal. The reason why it is difficult for human beings
to choose the good is that the good is too abstract to know. Here, I do not
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intend to take the concept of good as that of Socrates' or Kant's (Kant;
Abbott (trans.), 1932), i.e. the idea of good grounded in the law of a
priori. Rather, I will deal with it as a posterior. The law, which needs no
justification because, according to Kant (Kant; Abbott (trans.), 1932), it is
self-evident, is hard to grasp. On the other hand, the functions of will, in
Kant's terms, such as rectifying the principle of acting, and correcting the
external influences on the mind (Kant, 1932, 10), can be brought down to
human life. In noting the absence of a priori argument, critical thinking,
in this thesis, will be applied to deal with real life.
In my view, the functions of will, in Kant's terms, belong to the tasks of
reflection and reconstruction, according to the characteristics of critical
thinking. According to the other characteristics of critical thinking, i.e.
skepticism, emancipation and autonomy, such a priori universality might be
reflected upon by critical thinkers. To be precise, the crucial constituents
and applications of critical thinking will be shown in the tasks of
seif-realisation, self-reflection and self-actualisation for establishing the
rationality of a good life.
Many-sided, reflective thinking is the crucial part of self-realisation,
self-reflection and seif-actualisation in helping men to extend the horizon
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of understanding, from the egoistic striving of individuals to uniting men
themselves with the objective circumstances. People with many-sided
thinking will be concerned with the relationship of the individual and the
individual, the individual and society, and the individual and culture. In
this way, the scope of cognitive style will be expanded. Also, in this way,
the range of reflection will be extended from the dimension of the person
to the dimensions of society and culture. Then, the achievements of
self-actualisation will be multifarious with the diversities of purposes on
varied dimensions of life. In this sense, universal authority may be
questioned by critical thinkers. In fact, to reflect upon authorities or
legitimation of culture and society is the key task for critical thinkers in
constructing a good life, because these authorities will distort the nature of
the person and of individual development, especially the enlightenment of
reason.
An authority might have contributed its positive function to society, before
men accept it as the universal law. Harmony, which is taken as the Way of
the Heaven in Taoism and Confucianism (Tao De Ching, 1-Ching, The
Analects), is equivalent to the Ultimacy, the Sacred or God in Western
culture. As J. Farrelly states in 'Human Flourishing and Contemporary
Experience' from the viewpoint of religion, "in classical Western and
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Eastern cultures, human flourishing was generally understood as brought
to completion only by the human person's relation to the Ultimacy, the
Sacred or God" (Farrelly, in McLean (ed.), 1992, ch.l, 1). All Chinese
virtues, e.g., loyalty, filial piety are based on the spirit of harmony (Tao
De Ching, 1-Ching, The Analects), because harmony did function
successfully to restore a chaotic society to social order, especially in the
period of the Spring-Autumn and the Warring State (770-221 B.C.).
Given what is achieved under it, harmony becomes the dominator in
Chinese culture and society, leading to the ideological belief that there is an
unquestionable authority. Thus, I shall take harmony as an example to
argue the possibility of ideological belief, for a person who lacks critical
thinking, constraining individual development from autonomy.
According to Chinese thought, harmony, being a dialectical crystallisation
of all things and the source for a good life (1-Ching), preserves a peaceful
life for us both in physical and in mental aspects (The Doctrine of the
Mean). The functions of harmony are also justified by philosophical and
psychological researches. Kant, for example, admits positively that "reason
is unable to bring them [objectives] into harmony with the universal laws of
nature. Yet they are not arbitrarily conceived" (Kant; Smith (trans.),
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l968, 422). He further argues that:
Every concept ...has its own honzon, that is, a variety of things
which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that
standpoint...Each of which has its own narrow horizon;... But for
different horizons, that is, genera, each of which is determined by
its own concept, there can be a common horizon.., at the universal
and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the
highest concept, and which comprehends under itself all
manifoldness - genera, species, subspecies. (Kant; Smith (trans.),
1968, 542-543)
The notions of "genera", "common horizon" and "the highest concept"
belong to the family of harmony. "Harmony", i.e. "co-existence", offers
the room for freedom and "natural necessity" so that they can exist without
conflict (Kant; Smith (trans.), 1968, 478-479). Therefore, there must be
a common horizon among the diversity, even though each can be
determined by its own concept.
Hegel also appreciates the value of harmony. He takes a universal I as an a
priori harmony to synthesise positive and negative truths. Hegel claims
that the highest aspect, "I", or "Spirit", is the thing which never disappears
(Hegel; Miller (trans.), 1977, 610). It implies that harmony (synthesis)
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exists metaphysically. He takes, now, tree and house for example to
explain the highest 1, which never disappears. He says,
...you turn round, then you see the house instead of tree... Both
truths have the same authentication,viz., the immediacy of seeing,
and the certainty and assurance that both have about their knowing;
but the one truth vanishes in the other. (Hegel; Miller (trans.), 1977,
610)
Further, he points out the universal nature of harmony, which is
synthesised harmoniously from thesis and antithesis. He says, "what does
not disappear in all this is the I as universal. What I mean is general, I is a
priori" (Hegel; Miller (trans.), 1977, 62). In this sense, the a priori I
involves the power of universality in dominating the worlds of the object
and the subject.
On a par with Hegel, Piaget's theory of equilibration is integrated from
two dimensions of cognition into a new set of schema. He claims that "the
various individual structures are not entirely independent, but are
themselves dynamically interrelated" (Piaget, in Modgil (eds.), 1982, 19).
Moreover, according to his theory of equilibration, cognitive development
"is a dialectical interrelation when two systems ... become integrated into a
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new totality, the properties of the latter transcending the properties of the
former" (Piaget, in Modgil (eds.), 1982, 415). Both Hegel and Piaget are
keen on harmony. They take harmony as the signpost of reconstruction for
a new rationality or a new scheme of cognition.
However, whether harmony exists metaphysically might be arguable. The
guiding function of harmony in our daily life, as showed in the above
discussions, cannot be rejected. A harmonious life makes men
comfortable. However, it means neither that man must give up his reason
in order to reach harmony, nor that harmony can be viewed as
unchangeable authority because of its efficiency in human life. On the
contrary, the rationality of harmony must be reflected upon, so as to
maintain for harmony a rational function, in which individual development
is improved rather than restrained.
Like harmony, any authority, which is established on the basis of its
efficiency in life and contribution to the development of human life, needs
to be continuously reflected upon, because of the possible change of the
relationship between culture, society and person. That is, skepticism,
reflection, emancipation and reconstruction reveal the significance for
human life from questioning the ideology which is sticking to an authority.
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In this sense, men should employ critical thinking to deal rationally with
conflicts between person and person, person and society, and person and
culture. That is, harmony can be viewed as an ideal of life, but its
rationality for human development in different circumstances might be
different with different purposes.
Critical thinking emerges from the situations of ambiguity, diversity and
frustration. As Brookfield claims, "most significant advances in peoples'
ability to think critically arise out of periods of frustration and struggle"
(Brookfield, 1987, 234). In this sense, "a degree of ambiguity should be
expected as a constant feature of attempts to encourage critical thinking,
given the complexity of variables present. Diversity in methods and
materials is necessary" (Brookfield, 1987, 233).
In Brookfield's view, ambiguity, diversity or frustration are not
necessarily in conflict with harmony. In fact, three possible results will
occur on the way toward reconstructing the rationality of harmony. They
are: confirming the established harmony; integrating a new conflict into the
established harmony; and creating an entirely new harmony. Each
possibility implies a different form: reinterpreting the meaning of
harmony; enriching the content of harmony; and recreating a new
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rationality of harmony.
In sum, an unchangeable authority, e.g., harmony, could either be a
contribution to a good life or a restraint of personal freedom. The criteria
for distinguishing the contribution from the restraint rest on: whether there
is enough room for personal freedom; whether personal development can
co-exist with authority; and whether such an authority can be questioned
and reflected on. In a word, the criterion for whether authority plays a
negative or positive role depends upon whether it contributes to human
development or it restricts human development under its power. In this
sense, critical thinking is taken not only as its criterion, but also as the
means for preventing authority from having negative functions in human
life.
II. A sketch of a good life through autonomy and harmony:
a happy and intelligent life
The concept of a good life is not universal. We may agree, for instance,
with the idea that "no pleasure in life other than books" (Becker, 1967, 61),
or the idea that one should "live for today and let tomorrow look after
itself" (Brown, 1986, 61). Nevertheless, everyone can draw his own
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picture of a good life. As A. Maclntyre claims, "there is no recipe for the
good life and the good life can never be found apart from the journey"
(Maclntyre, 1984, 219). Similar to Maclntyre, A. Brown claims that
"there is a lack of an adequate theory of the human good" (Brown, 1986,
131).
In Chinese culture, Tao (Way), or the Heaven projects the original
principle for human beings, from which the principle for a good life is
self-evident (Tao De Ching, ch. xxv). Lao-tzu confirms the nature of
self-evidence of Tao (the Heaven, the Way) by saying that
the function of the great virtue is to follow the Tao. The Tao is uncertain
and indefinite. Though uncertain and indefinite, there is form within it.
Though indefinite and uncertain, there is a being within it. Though
profound and obscure, there is the essence. The essence is a reality which
can be proved. From the beginning till the present, its name has remained
unchanged. It is the "common father", the Tao. (Tao De Ching, ch. xxi)
He claims implicitly that following Tao is the right way towards a good
life.
No matter whether there is a consensus about the concept of a good life, a
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good life is being approached, if questions are reflected upon such as,
"when serious questions of value arise, deliberation on who one is, and who
one wants to be, yields ethical advice concerning the good life" (Habermas;
Lenherdt & Nicholsen (trans.), 1990, vii). Thus, in this chapter I look to
contemporary problems, and then bring the nature and significance of
autonomy, harmony and reconstruction, which are the characteristics of
critical thinking, to the concept of a good life.
The contemporary problems, i.e. dehumanisation, depersonalisation and the
restraint of ideology, have been analysed, then the concept of a good life
will be discussed through critical thinking. Habermas takes a good life as
the rationality by which the relationship between the individual and the
individual, the individual and community will be rationally dealt with
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987). Therefore, solving problems of the
lifeworid means moving towards a good life. He claimed that "the new
problems (of lifeworlds) have to do with the quality of life, equal rights,
individual seif-realisation, participation, and human rights" (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 392). In this sense, it is adequate to establish the
framing of a good life through critical thinking.
In investigating the contemporary problematic about human development,
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two crucial pivots relative to a good life grounded in critical thinking will
be noted. The first is the person, as an independent subject in personal life
and as a creative participant in social life. The person develops through
self-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation, where
seif-actualisation is taken as a process of continuous reconstruction. The
second is the idea that emancipation from the authority which hampers
human development must be encouraged through seif-realisation and
self-reflection. Emancipating men from the alienation or authority which
hampers human development could passively make a person autonomous,
while the reconstruction of rationality for a good life is an active creation
of one's own autonomy.
The relationship between person, society and culture is reciprocal, as
described. In order to flourish, the person needs to integrate individual
potential into an understanding of society and culture, whereas the
accumulation of culture and society is grounded in the development of the
person. Self-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation are the
distinguishing characteristics of autonomy. An autonomous person will
integrate individual life and social life into a "rational harmony", in order
to establish a good life.
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In due course, further questions will be raised such as, can an autonomous
person emancipate himself from alienation and authority; and how does the
person reconstruct a good life after emancipation? These two questions
will be discussed, where an autonomous person pictures a good life through
critical thinking. That is, the tasks of autonomy and emancipatory
rationality will be revealed in order to show the significance of critical
thinking for a good life.
The first pivot of a good life is autonomy, in terms of critical thinking.
Searching for autonomy has been shown in every mode of critical thinking
in this thesis. In other words, it is through intentionality for autonomy that
human beings have unfettered themselves from universality in the
supernatural world, in the natural world and in the world of
self-consciousness. This has been explained in chapter III. Here, I will
focus on the significance of autonomy for a good life.
As Lindley pointed out, autonomy is vital to human happiness. He says,
a distinguishing feature of the values of liberal democracy is that
individual autonomy is regarded as of vital importance - not just as a
means to further ends, but for its own sake - as a constituent of
human happiness or well-being. (Lindley, 1986, 115)
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Nevertheless, questions will be confronted such as, does autonomy confirm
that this is the case and how; does autonomy express each person in his
uniqueness, etc.? These questions reveal the large range in the notion of
autonomy. Moreover, in approaching the study of autonomy, one will
encounter a considerable diversity regarding the notion of autonomy as the
concept of freedom and choice. In other words, autonomy has so many
meanings, and is as broad as the variations of human beings, no matter
whether in ancient Greek times, e.g., Aristotle, or in the enlightened age,
e.g., Kant, Hegel, or in contemporary times, e.g., Piaget (1970), Peters
(1972), Rawis (1972), Cooper (1983), Lukes (1985), Lindley (1986),
Trigg (1988), Dworkin (1988), Meyers (1989), Taylor (1989), White
(1990) etc.
Therefore, for the sake of convenience in understanding the essence of
autonomy, a categorisation would be helpful in identifying the
understanding and concerns of a particular thinker regarding autonomy.
This categorisation will be worked out through understanding the nature of
critical thinking, by which one will be able to focus on the comparisons
between thinkers on specific issues.
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Three dimensions which are relative to autonomy will be picked out, by
examining the various notions of autonomy in different modes of critical
thinking and by identifying its possible criteria, and then narrowing them
down to a small category, They are: the freedom one possesses; the role of
self; and the mode of autonomy. The freedom of possession indicates the
limitation of freedom, whereas the mode of autonomy is corresponding to
the range of freedom through self-realisation, self-reflection and
seif-actualisation.
In this sense, autonomy is limited to the range of freedom. Thus, to
expand the range of autonomy must release the limitation of freedom. The
limitation of freedom can be removed through self-realisation,
self-reflection, and self-actualisation. That is, the range of autonomy can
be expanded by the processes of understanding (via self-realisation),
emancipation (via self-reflection) and construction (seif-actualisation).
Freedom of possession, by which the range of freedom is indicated, can be
divided into three types, according to the nature of critical thinking. They
are: circumstantial freedom, rational freedom and conscious freedom.
Corresponding with these three types of freedom of possession, three
modes of autonomy are patterned in the ground of critical thinking. The
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three modes of autonomy are: extrinsic autonomy, instrumental autonomy
and romantic autonomy. For example, one exercises political autonomy
under favourable political circumstances; one employs instrumental
autonomy within the capacity of calculated reason; similarly, one strives
for romantic* autonomy with acquired wisdom, will and desires. Each
mode of autonomy is exercised by self through self-realisation,
self-reflection and seif-actualisation. The scheme of autonomy in terms of
critical thinking can be sketched as follows.
Table 5.1 The scheme of autonomy
reedom of possession I role of self	 mode of autonomy
circumstantial freedom	 seif-realisation	 extrinsic autonomy
rational freedom	 self-reflection	 instrumental autonomy
conscious freedom	 seif-actualisation	 romantic autonomy
* romantic autonomy: in this thesis, a person who exercises romantic autonomy is assumed
to be rational, even though irrational affection indispensably partly constitutes his action.
However, his reason will be expected to be able to handle the irrational action. More than
that, being authentic to oneself is taken as his ultimate reason by the person who
exercises romantic autonomy. Also, in this sense, it is understandable that Cooper
appreciates the concept 'authenticity' rather than that of 'autonomy' (Cooper, 1983).
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The essence of autonomy in the view of different thinkers can be grasped
by the scheme of autonomy I have worked out as the above. For instance,
I. Berlin's claim in his 'Two Concepts of Liberty' (1969) that 'I wish to be
my own self is significant for the mode of romantic autonomy.
For Kant, autonomy is the obligation of the self-legislated principle, viz.
Reason. He states that "a being which gave itself the moral law, and where
freedom, therefore, is autonomy, would not be conscious of obligation or
duty, since the moral law would coincide with its will" (Kant; Abott
(trans.), 196711, iv). Also, he claims that "the moral law is not a mere
precept imposed upon us from without, nor is it forced upon us by our
sensitive nature, it is a law prescribed to us, or, more correctly speaking,
revealed to us, by our own Reason" (Kant; Abbott (trans.), 196711, liv).
That is, Kant appreciates also romantic autonomy. This intention can be
shown in Kant's pointing out two objects, i.e. nature and freedom, for the
legislation of human reason (Kant; Smith (trans.), 1968, 658). For Kant,
nature relates to physiology of pure reason, while freedom relates to
transcendental philosophy, which deals with moral principle, i.e ought to
be (Kant; Smith (trans.), 1968, 662). Apart from that, Kant also states
that "the interests of my reason, speculative and practical, combine three
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following questions: a) what can I know; b) what ought I to do; and c) what
may I hope (Kant; Smith (trans.), 1968, 635). Compared with the scheme
of autonomy, "what can I know" and "what ought I to do" belong to
instrumental autonomy, which is exercised by a person who possesses
rational freedom. On the other hand, "what may I hope" seems to me that
one tries to strive to "transcend all limits of experience" (Kant; Smith
(trans.), l968, 23), in Kant's terms.
Following Kant's idea, J. White tries to connect Kant's romantic autonomy
with the practical life in society. In my view,, he tries to connect romantic
autonomy with extrinsic autonomy. His notion about autonomy can be seen
in his criticism of Callan's and Raz' ideas of autonomy. First, he argues
against E. Callan that if "there are no experts on the good life, it does not
follow that autonomy is a good life" (White, 1991, 96). It is the case that
White assumes the existence of romantic autonomy. Then, he criticises J.
Raz's concept of autonomy that it seems to work merely for the weaker
sense of autonomy*. White instead emphasises the significance of the
* weaker sense of autonomy: for White, personal autonomy is divided into a stronger sense
and a weaker sense. The stronger sense requires critical reflectiveness about social
structures, while for the weaker sense, one simply accepts the conventional structure
around one (White, 1991, 100), because in the view of the weaker sense of autonomy,
the conventional structure is taken as a rational product, by which a stable society can be
maintained.
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stronger sense of autonomy (White, 1991, 100).
The stronger sense of autonomy, for White, is close to the concept of critical
thinking in this thesis in the sense that an autonomous person must be capable of
reflecting critically upon conventional structures. This idea would avoid the
pessimism of Dworkin's account. Dworkin claims,
our dispositions, attitudes, values, wants are affected by the mass media, by
the force of public opinion, by social class, and so forth. To a large extent
these institutions are not chosen by us; we simply find ourselves faced with
them. From Humboldt, Mill, and De Tocqueville to Marcue and
Reismann, social theorists have worried about how individuals can develop
their own conception of good life in the face of such factors, and how we
can distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate ways of influencing the
minds of the members of society. (Dworkin, 1988, 11)
Haberrnas tries to integrate extrinsic autonomy, instrumental autonomy and
romantic autonomy into communicative action. He points out the
reciprocal interaction between the individual and society. He explains that
autonomous organisation is that, by means of membership conditions that
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have to be accepted all at once, they can make themselves independent from
communicatively structured lifeworld relations, from the concrete value
orientations, action dispositions - susceptible to conflict as they are - of
persons who have been pushed out into the environment of the
organisation. (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 172)
The values of autonomy have been shown in the development of critical
thinking. They are: autonomy is called for when men try to avoid being an
instrument of culture, society or person; autonomy is indispensable for
widening the scope of either individual diversity or communicative
horizon; and autonomy functions actively for creating the person, society
and culture, instead of becoming passively the reproduction of culture and
society. In this sense, none but an autonomous person is free enough to
function as a self-identity, i.e. the self possesses self-assertion,
self-sovereignty and self-dignity, and acts through self-realisation,
self-reflection and seif-actualisation.
Next, the significance of autonomy for a good life will be revealed. As in
Dworkin's analysis, an autonomous person is capable of regulating himself
and circumstances around him. He claims that "autonomy is a term of art
introduced by a theorist in an attempt to make sense of a tangled net of
intuitions, conceptual and empirical issues, and normative claims"
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(Dworkin, 1988, 7). Further, he links autonomy with moral concern, and
highlights the function of self-reflection, especially, reflection upon
authority and tradition. He points out that in autonomy as
a moral notion - shared by philosophers as divergent as Kant, Kiergekaard,
Nietzsche, Royce, Hare, and Popper - the argument is about the necessity
or desirability of individuals choosing or willing or accepting their own
moral code. We are all responsible for developing and criticising our moral
principles, and individual conscience must take precedence over authority
and tradition. I am not defending this line of reasoning but it is certainly a
body of thought which makes use of the notion of autonomy, and has a
corresponding set of problems connected with responsibility, integrity, and
the will. (Dworkin, 1988, 11)
Human abilities, e.g., morality and imagination, function authentically
when the subject acts as an autonomous person both in social life and
individual life. Dworkin's explanations confirm this claim that autonomy
is assumed to make a person as a whole (Dworkin, 1988, 10). Dworkin
points out that "autonomy functions as a moral, political, and social ideal.
In all three cases there is value attached to how things are viewed through
the reasons, values, desires of the individual and how those elements are
shaped and formed" (Dworkin, 1988, 10).
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While Dworkin stresses the moral aspect of autonomy, Lindley connects
autonomy with happiness as such. He claims that "autonomy is a vital
interest not only because it is usually a means to the other ingredients of
happiness, but also because it is a constituent of happiness itself (Lindley,
1986, 106).
However, questions about the relationship between happiness (good life)
and autonomy might be raised. For example, why is autonomy a good
thing; is being an agent the value of autonomy; will a society get better
without autonomy etc.? Their answers can also be delivered from the
scheme of autonomy.
According to the scheme of autonomy, the range of freedom must be
expanded, before the mode of autonomy is broadened. Meanwhile, the
role of self can be viewed as the cornerstone of autonomy, because
self-realisation is the ground of 'mutual-understanding', and self-reflection
bridges the operation of communicative actions between different
dimensions of cognition. Then, seif-actualisation produces personal
development and growth. In other words, with the functions of
self-realisation, self-reflection, and seif-actualisation, an autonomous
person not only understands himself and circumstances around him, but
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also emancipates himself from extrinsic and intrinsic restraints, then he
reconstructs his life through expanding the range of autonomy. Therefore,
autonomy must be one of the keystones of a good life.
The second pivot of a good life is emancipatory rationality, which paves
the way for the reconstruction of a good life. Emanc pating man from
alienation or unchangeable authority, such as negative ideology, paves the
way for autonomous harmony. Given that unchangeable authority is
accepted as a universality - pseudo-universality - the person could hardly
be autonomous. That is, his seif-realisation cannot be just allowed to go
beyond such an authority, and self-reflection will be limited to the
framework of such an authority as well. Then, self-acttualisation will not
be achieved. Nevertheless, emancipation results will keep oneself away
from authority. During the course of emancipation, not only social
authority but also individual ideology are reflected upon, and from which
emancipatory rationality results.
Take tradition as an example. Individual development is influenced by
tradition in two ways. One is by the inherited cultural context; the other is
acquired from formal learning. Thus, emancipating the person from the
negative function of tradition will be necessary for a good life. Then
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questions would be raised such as, why is the heritage accepted; how is it
imposed on us, and how can one emancipate oneself from it? In order to
answer these questions, the positive and negative functions of tradition for
life will be analysed.
Tradition is the outcome of human life, the source of value systems.
Tradition not only shapes our individual value system, but also locates the
relationship of the individual and others, viz., person and person, or person
and circumstances. McLean stresses the positive significance of tradition
by claiming that
tradition then, is, not simply everything that ever happened, but what
appears significant. It is what has been seen through time to be deeply true
about human life. It includes the values to which our forebears freely have
given passionate commitment, either in specific historical circumstances or
over time in reaffirming a work of literature whose worth has progressively
emerged as something upon which character and community can be built.
(McLean, 1991, 135)
Similarly, Nyiri points out that "the tradition capable of absorbing a
variety of other traditions, or the tradition that emerges as an amalgam of
various particular ones, will then possess, or amount to, what might be
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called relative rationality" (Nyiri, 1988, 25). More than McLean, Nyiri
points out also the negative function of tradition, when the power of
tradition is revealed. He analyses,
tradition is surrounded by a family of related terms. This family would
include terms like authority, convention, custom, disposition, habit,
institution, mentality, morals, norm, paradigm, practice, prejudice, rule,
skill, style, taste, technique. (Nyiri, 1988, 27)
These quotations show us the power of tradition. This also reveals the
importance of the ability for reflection. Habermas points out that one
would be fettered by tradition, if one lacks reflective thinking. He says,
the more cultural traditions predecide which validity claims, when, where,
for what, from whom, and to whom must be accepted, the less the
participants themselves have the possibility of making explicit and
examining the potential grounds on which their yes/no positions are based.
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 70-1)
Therefore, reflecting upon tradition is the very place for emancipation and
reconstruction to plan a good life. Emancipation aims at questioning the
authority which hampers human development but does not permit itself to
be reflected upon or changed, whereas reconstruction works by shaping
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'autonomous harmony', which must be reached by an autonomous person,
and through many-sided reflectiveness.
In other words, emancipation must be grounded in rationality which is
constituted by good reasons or grounds. As Habermas claims, "rationality
is understood to be a disposition of speaking and acting subjects that is
expressed in modes of behaviour for which there are good reasons or
grounds" (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 22). In this way, the
rationality of a good life must lie in the process of becoming, with good
reasons or grounds and with the changes of human knowledge in the
broadest sense. Also, harmony will be built up for a good life, after one
emancipates oneself from authority.
Next, whether autonomous harmony can be reached will be discussed. In
other words, whether autonomy is in conflict with harmony will be
analysed. Harmony includes the balance within the individual life, i.e. will
and wish in Kant's terms, and the consensus between the individual and
society, in Habermas' terms. From the viewpoint of critical thinkers,
harmony implies the reconstruction of the relationship between the
individual's subjectivity and group's intersubjectivity.
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Harmony in itself is a good thing for life. Harmony is taken as a common
good in Chinese culture. This is revealed from Chung-Yung (The Doctrine
of the Mean) and Tao De Ching. Confucius said that "harmony is the way
for all people. Following it, everything will naturally grow up" (The
Doctrine of the Mean, ch.2). Lao-tzu claimed that "the Tao produces "The
One." "The One" produces "The Two"....All things carry the Yin and
Yang elements. They are united harmoniously" (Tao De Ching, ch.
xxxxii).
Harmony must be grounded in autonomy, because autonomy is aimed at
rational harmony. Kant holds that "happiness is the condition of a rational
being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and
will" (Kant; Abbott (trans.), 196711, 221). For Kant, "virtue signifies a
moral strength of will" (Kant; Abbott (trans.), 196711, 316). Therefore, a
good life, though either transcendent or transcendental, must be the
achievement of reason, including will, consciousness, and wish. Autonomy
is such an ability for rational harmony. As Meyers claims, "one reason to
think happiness is the guiding aim of autonomy competency is that the
autonomous individual's existence is harmonious" (Meyers, 1989, 73).
In noting the relationship between autonomy and harmony, Trigg stresses
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that "Aristotle connected virtue with harmony by demanding that virtues
must be in harmony with others. The three virtues which made man good
and virtuous are nature, custom and reason.. .each must be in harmony with
the others" (Trigg, 1988, 26). This means that although "Aristotle was
aware of the great divergence in practice between different constitutions,
with different laws in different places" (Trigg, 1988, 27), he insists that
harmony is necessary and fundamental for a good life.
In a word, autonomy is not in conflict with harmony as such, and in order
to reconstruct a good life, not only autonomy but also harmony are needed.
Both of them contribute to the same aim of life, i.e. the construction of a
good life. As analysed, while autonomy sketches the realm of
emancipation, harmony indicates the direction of the reconstruction of a
good life.
To sum up, the three elements involved in a good life, in terms of critical
thinking, are: autonomy, harmony, and reconstruction (or continuous
construction). Harmony marks the ideal of happy life, whereas autonomy
is against domination by exercising reason. Reconstruction, then, is in
charge of the balance and the integration between harmony and autonomy.
In the light of the relationship between autonomy, harmony and
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reconstruction in creating a good life, autonomy is the foundation of a
good life. With the function of autonomy, man emancipates himself from
dehumanisation, depersonalisation and unquestionable authority. After
that, man can reconstruct his life towards a rational development and
growth with harmony through many-sided understanding and reflection.
In this sense, reconstruction provides not just the integration of autonomy
and harmony, but the indication of a good life as well.
The characteristics of a good life, then, can be formulated from the above
discussions:
a) a good life is the ultimate concern of human beings;
b) the sketch of a good life can be illustrated from different viewpoints, but
such a life must be made by the subject with self-realisation,
self-reflection and self-actualisation;
c) the criterion for a good life is autonomous harmony; and
d) continuous reconstruction of a good life through critical thinking is a
guarantee for rational growth and development of human beings.
Such a sketch of a good life, in which harmony and autonomy indicate the
coordinates of a good life, and reconstruction points out the intersection of
autonomy and harmony, can be illustrated as chart 5.1.
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autonomy
Chart 5.1 The picture of good life
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Apart from the characteristics of a good life, the above chart shows a
number of notions about a good life in terms of critical thinking. They
are:
a) reconstruction is aimed at approaching to a good life;
b) a good life is enlarged gradually with the increase of the range and
degree of harmony and autonomy; and
c) the profit point, which is the short cut towards a good life, is indicated
by the balance of autonomy and harmony.
According to the above notions and characteristics of a good life, critical
thinking marks the signpost of a good life. In other words, critical
thinking is the signpost of autonomy, harmony and reconstruction. Critical
thinkers employ the approaches of dialectical and communicative action to
reconstruct the rationality of a good life via seif-realisation, self-reflection
and seif-actualisation. Habermas in his Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action confirms the function of critical thinking by
showing that self-reflection and rational argumentation in communicative
action are the guardian of rationality (Habermas; Lenherdt & Nieholsen
(trans.), 1990, 15).
The criteria for either harmony or autonomy must be both qualitative and
289
quantitative, though a good life is depicted geometrically in the above
chart. According to the nature of critical thinking, the criterion for
autonomy is human intelligence and wisdom, while that of harmony is
happiness. But the argument about the quality and quantity of happiness,
intelligence and wisdom are another story, which will not be discussed
here. Instead, Habermas' idea of consensus, i.e. quasi-rationality
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 1987), will be temporarily adopted as
the criterion for either quality or quantity of intelligence, wisdom and
happiness, because the rationality of such a good life must be reached via
communicative action in which the individual exercises his critical
thinking, i.e. skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction.
Self-reflection is the hallmark of autonomy, while harmony should be
established through communicative action. In this way, a happy and
intelligent life, being the very good life critical thinkers are searching for,
can be constructed.
III. Critical thinking is significant for a good life
The final task of this chapter is to make an appraisal for such a good life,
which is established through critical thinking. The value and significance
290
of critical thinking, in terms of methods and functions, for a happy and
intelligent life will be justified.
There are two approaches to justify the value and significance of critical
thinking for such a good life. One is showing the functions of critical
thinking for a good life; the other is showing the methods critical thinkers
employ for reconstructing such a good life.
First, the functions of critical thinking for such a good life are shown from
its characteristics of emancipation and reconstruction. According to the
characteristics of critical thinking, emancipation and reconstruction must
be grounded in autonomy. Making one's life significant is a way to show
autonomy because of self-identity. Also, it is the force of self-identity that
draws one into emancipation and reconstruction. Therefore, when we
speak of good life, we might question what is the right way to live and
what things are most important and significant for life. In this sense, a
good life should basically be significant either for the person or society.
Self-identity reveals the significance of an autonomous person.
Psychologically, one needs self-identity to make sure of his own
achievements and his value for his community, while self-identity needs
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seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation to point out the
direction of individual development. G. J. McCall cuts across self-identity
by a distinction into cognitive and judgmental self-appraisal (McCall, in
Mischel (ed.), 1977, 280). He holds that self-identity cannot be isolated
from either person or society. This implies that self-identity might
harmoniously integrate individual life with social life. McCall says,
we have touched on two senses of identity in relation to self:
1) social identity (mask, character), framed in terms of response to the
question, "who am I?" and ultimately glossed as role-identity;
2) personal identity, framed in terms of personal integrity and continuity
across role-performances, and glossed as the person's adaptively
organised prominence hierarchy of role-identities. (McCall, in Mischel
(ed.), 1977, 280)
A scheme, showing the framings of the person and a good life, will be
illustrated as follows, in order to complement McCall's analyses, and
clarify the relation between the autonomous self (a critical thinker) and a
good life.
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Table 5.2 The framings of person (self) and a good life
good life	 person	 culture
self	 social
cognition	 content	 personal knowledge	 knowledge about culture &
society
(seif-realisation)	 function	 integration	 understanding &
interpretation
judgment	 content	 self-reflection	 reflection on culture &
society
(self-reflection)	 __________ ____________________ __________________________
function	 location	 communication
Action	 content	 personal potential	 a desirable ideal
(self-actualisation) function	 synthesization and 	 equilibration
construction
* The meanings of person, social and culture are the same as in ch. II
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The above table illustrates that private life (individual-individual) and a
public life (individual-others) are coordinated by the person. With
personal-knowledge and seif-realisation, the person performs the functions
of integration, understanding and interpretation; with self-reflection, he
fulfils the functions of location and communication, i.e. the location of
one's value system, and communication being to interact with others' value
systems. Then, with self-actualisation, the person constructs an intelligent,
happy and harmonious life through the synthesis of personal potentials and
a desirable ideal through seif-realisation and self-reflection. The
equilibrations of person-society and of person-culture are executed during
the process of seif-actualisation.
In this sense, a good life implies that harmony must be involved in the
relation between private life and public life, between person and person,
between person and society, and between person and culture. As Trigg
claims, "it is not enough to have one's own private rule" (Trigg, 1988,
156); a good life must be involved in social life. Therefore, three
dimensions of life - culture, society, and person - need to be considered to
throw some light on the right way of life.
According to Habermas, the relationship among culture, society and person
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is the Three-in-one, which is explained as follows:
in the relation of culture to society, structural differentiation is to be found in
the gradual uncoupling of the institutional system from worldviews; in the
relation of personality to society, it is evidenced in the extension of the
scope of contingency for establishing interpersonal relationship; and in the
relation of culture to personality, it is manifested in the fact that the renewal
of traditions depends more and more on individuals' readiness to criticise
and their ability to innovate. (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 146)
From Habermas' viewpoint, a good life must be established on the ground
of the harmonious relationship between culture, society and person. The
elements of a good life, both autonomy and harmony, should be taken as
the signposts of the right way to live, not only in personal life but in social
life as well. In other words, the right way to live should be concerned with
both social life and individual life. Therefore, the way towards
autonomous harmony must count on the tasks of critical thinking, i.e.
skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction.
According to the characteristics of critical thinking, skepticism, reflection,
and emancipation are involved in reconstruction. Thus, in order to keep
reconstructing a good life, emancipation, which is grounded in skepticism
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and reflection, should be followed. Deutsch noted that "in actual life when
we meet a situation of power, of force, we react to it, we protect ourselves
from it, we might even act forcefully in turn" (Deutsch, 1979, 36). This
claim implies that emancipation from tradition, distortion or self-deception
might become an indispensable process towards an autonomous life.
Freedom is a precondition of emancipation. As discussed, freedom
constitutes the foundation for autonomy. Without freedom, autonomy is
empty. Therefore, a loss of freedom must be recognised and overcome, if
we would like to live autonomously. In other words, in order to struggle
for autonomy, one must examine whether one's freedom is fettered by
authority. In this sense, keeping exercising critical thinking must be
significant for a good life. Losing one's freedom can result from two acts:
from the obedience of tradition and the legitimation of bureaucratisation;
and from the habituated individual.
Emancipating oneself from authority might, on the face, conflict with
harmony. However, if it can be assumed that one can reflect upon one's
ideology and sincerely come to understand the opposite notion, then the
opposite point of view can be respected, and valid positions will be
tolerated. In this way, to be autonomous will not become a hindrance but
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an assistance in seeking harmony.
In contrast, autonomy works in cooperation with harmony for a good life.
According to the scheme of autonomy, as analysed, three modes of
autonomy, i.e. extrinsic, instrumental and romantic autonomy are exercised
through seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation. Therefore,
seif-actualisation will not be arbitrary, when one's potential is fulfilled,
because of seif-realisation and self-reflection. In this sense, only an
autonomous person can help himself to locate or construct the rationality of
human development, and only rational argumentation through
seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation can successfully
challenge the conflicts between the individual and the individual, the
individual and society, and the individual and culture. In a word, a
harmonious but autonomous life is constructed due to the functions of the
self.
A good life must not detach autonomy from harmony of the individual and
society. That is, an autonomous person must be capable of dealing
harmoniously with the public life and private life. Lindley stresses the
function of autonomy for individual life, when he claims that "a
distinguishing feature of the values of liberal democracy is that individual
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autonomy is regarded as of vital importance - not just as a means to further
ends, but for its own sake - as a constituent of human happiness or
well-being" (Lindley, 1986, 115). Also, he augments the notion about
autonomy by extending the function of autonomy from person to society.
He says that "a prime goal of liberal democracy is to produce a society
composed of autonomous citizens who would work and play productively
and co-operatively, motivated by their individual conceptions of a good
life" (Lindley, 1986, 115). In other words, a good life must be grounded
in individual autonomy and within the harmony between the individual and
society.
Critical thinking is indispensable for reconstruction a good life. Inquiring
and reflecting upon social structures are the starting processes of
reconstruction. This implies that skepticism, reflection and emancipation
cannot necessarily be separated from reconstruction. Also, it reveals the
significance of reconstruction: a continuous construction. Here the term
'reconstruct', borrowed from Haberrnas, is used to focus on the developing
nature of a good life. According to Habermas, "reconstructions undertaken
with philosophical means also retain a hypothetical character; precisely
because of their strong universalistic claims, they are open to further,
indirect testing" (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1987, 399).
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Individual development, being influenced by the circumstances around one,
viz., moral, political and social circumstances (legitimation), must be
reflected upon, in order to be open to further reconstruction. In this way,
an emancipated society will be expected. As Habermas points out, "the
decentralisation of world understanding and the rationalisation of the
lifeworld are necessary conditions for an emancipated society" (Habermas;
McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 74). Similar to Habermas, White confirms that
the social structure, like an unquestionable authority, needs to be reflected
upon (White, 1991, 100).
Reflecting upon social structures is a hard task. It needs to be done by an
autonomous person with critical thinking. As Trigg warns, tradition, like
self-deception, "is always a puzzling phenomenon but it represents a
genuine part of human experience" (Trigg, 1988, 135). Therefore, an
individual must conduct himself in an autonomous way, such as being
"suspicious of all appeals based on authority instead of reason and ready to
give his own evidence and his own reason for his own opinions"
(Chapman-Taylor, 1968, 16). Apart from that, autonomy must be in
company with responsibility. Habermas explains,
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only responsible persons can behave rationality. If their rationality is
measured by the success of goal-directed interventions, it suffices to require
that they be able to choose among alternatives and to control (some)
conditions in their environment. But if their rationality is measured by
whether processes of reaching understanding are successful, recourse to
such capacities does not suffice... only those persons count as responsible
who, as members of a communicative-community, can orient their actions
to intersubjectively recognised validity claims. (Habermas; McCarthy
(trans.), 1984, 14)
Responsibility is grounded in self-reflection. Merleau-Ponty emphasises
self-reflection on one's ability which "is able to be beyond the created
structures in order to create others" (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, 175). Giroux
goes further to bring Merleau-Ponty's idea of self-reflection into the
reflection upon society, by pointing out that "at the level of understanding,
critical thinking represents the ability to step beyond commonsense
assumptions, to be able to evaluate them in terms of their genesis,
development, and purpose" (Giroux, 1981, 570), and that
critical thinking becomes a mode of reasoning that, as Merleau-Ponty points
out, represents the realisation that "I am able" meaning that one can use
individual capacities and collective possibilities "to go beyond the created
structure in order to create others." (Giroux, 1981, 570)
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Responsibility to oneself is shown in the way that the capacity of reflection
of the subject goes beyond his irrationality, e.g., authority, ideology,
self-deception etc. Habermas confirms this possibility and function of
self-reflection by claiming that
anyone who systematically deceives himself about himself behaves
irrationally, but one who is capable of letting himself be enlightened about
his irrationality possesses not only the rationality of a subject...; he also
possesses the power to behave reflectively in relation to his subjectivity and
see through the irrational limitations.... (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.),
1984, 21)
In sum, the fetters of culture, society and person can be emancipated
through critical thinking, because of the function of autonomy. An
autonomous person can avoid being dominated through seif-realisation,
self-reflection and seif-actualisation. In addition, an autonomous person
can reach a harmonious relationship on the basis of understanding and
through communicative action.
Another significance of critical thinking for a good life is shown in the
methods which critical thinkers employ to seek for an autonomous and
harmonious life. The key methods critical thinkers employ stem from
301
reflective forces.	 They are: dialectic with skepticism, rational
argumentation or communicative action, and imagination-with-reason.
In the broadest sense, "dialectic" is involved in two dimensions of thinking:
space and time. That is the reason why Chinese philosophers can bridge
the way of the Heaven with the Earth. (As can be seen from the works of
Confucianism, Taoism, which were quoted in chapter two.) Also, that is
the reason why empirical, rationalistic thoughts are co-existent in the
human activity.
The contributions of dialectic method for a good life can be shown from its
function in struggling for autonomous harmony. For example, it is
through dialectic method that critical thinkers can be free from
subservience of authority. Also, it is through dialectic method that man
combines passion with intellect; combines emotion with reason. Critical
thinkers through dialectical method can emancipate themselves from the
fetters of culture, society or person because of its synthesised function.
Through dialectical method, critical thinking helps men to enlarge the
scope of thinking by understanding how our own cherished prejudices or
pseudo-rationality are distorted and dominated.
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Another method critical thinkers use, important for a good life, is
communicative action. According to the sketch of a good life, men
through communicative action overcome the conflict between grounding in
a rational way and an emotional way, no matter whether an evolutionary or
revolutionary reconstruction is taken. In order to guarantee that the way
men take is rational enough, communicative action is more profound than
good reasons. As Habermas claims, "an argumentation contains reasons or
grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the validity claim of a
problematic expression" (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 18).
Further, he stresses that "the strength of an argument is measured in a
given context by the soundness of the reasons" (Habermas; McCarthy
(trans.), 1984, 18). In addition, an argumentation is involved in inquiry
about both the rationality of a participant and the validity claim in and
among other thinkers which is taken as the rule of the argumentation
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 18). In order to highlight the
rational foundation of communicative action, Habermas distinguishes those
who are deaf to argument from those who are open to rational
argumentation. He analyses,
anyone participating in argument shows his rationality or lack of it by the
manner in which he handles and responds to the offering of reasons for or
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against claims. If he is open to argument, he will either acknowledge the
force of those reasons or seek to reply to them, and either way he will deal
with them in a rational manner. If he is deaf to argument, by contrast, he
may either ignore contrary reasons or reply to them with dogmatic
assertions, and either way he fails to deal with the issues "rationally".
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 18)
Also, Habermas praises the functions and profit of argumentation for
enlightened rationality by claiming that "argumentation makes possible
behaviour that counts as rational in a specific sense, namely learning from
explicit mistakes...[to] overcome self-deceptions and difficulties in
comprehension ..." (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 22).
Argumentation is a method for reaching understanding and for
emancipating men from distorted ideology by offering rational and
accepted evidence or reasons through self-reflection. That is the essence of
communicative action: a method for realisation and reflection on person,
society, and culture. This essence makes communicative action the
foundation for argumentation because of the function of informal logic.
As Habermas explains,
the logic of argumentation does not refer to deductive connections between
semantic units (sentences) as does formal logic, but to nondeductive
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relations between the pragmatic units (speech acts) of which arguments are
composed. Thus, it also appears under the name of informal logic.
(Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984, 22)
According to the nature of argumentation which Habermas mentioned,
communicative action is also an exercise of rational argumentation in a
situation, which is rational and autonomous without coercion. In this way,
rational agreement can be reached through communicative action.
Therefore, rational consensus can still be reached, even though uncoerced
circumstances are difficult to find, , because the individual must reflect
upon himself through offering reasons for or against others' and his own
ideas or value judgments during communicative action. In a word, an
autonomous harmony can be reached through communicative action.
The third crucial method of critical thinking is imagination with reason,
which has been used successfully, especially by critical thinkers within the
first mode of critical thinking. (Its function can be seen from chapter
three.) Critical thinkers within the second mode of critical thinking, left
little room for the imagination. Consequently, reason without imagination
offers the possibility for dogmatic, unreflected authority. Some
philosophers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, e.g., Hegel, the
existentialists, the Frankfurt School etc., produce a reaction to instrumental
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reason. As Worgul claims, "the radical vision.. .in the nineteenth century
would open a pathway for investigations into the imagination" (Worgul, in
McLean (ed.), 1991, ch. vi, 3).
The power and necessity of imagination to create a new leaf for human
beings has been claimed in chapter three. Here, imagination as a method
for a good life will be tackled.
Men create the law for human life through imagination with reason, while
the law will become a dominator of life. In Chinese thought, the idea of
Heaven (the Way) is like that of God in Western culture. No matter
whether Heaven or God is viewed as the arbitrator or the symbol of reason
etc., "He" was humanised via imagination. However, if with imagination
without reason, the idea of Heaven or God would not be universally
accepted and cannot last for such a long time, because imagination without
reason may lack the logical system of reason.
Imagination possesses the power of creation. "Imagination can bring
together the flow of disparate sensations" (McLean, 1991, 14), it can also
produce something totally different from its previous fundamental
elements. (This imagination is imagination-with-reason in this thesis.) This
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can also be seen from To De Ching. In To De Ching, Lao-tzu said that
"the Tao produces "The One". "The One" produces "The Two". "The
Two" produces "The Three". "The Three" produces all things." (Tao De
Ching)
The function of imagination-with-reason can also be seen from the sketch
of a good life. A good life can be established by two ways: partly by
human knowledge about the world, including the knowledge of culture,
society and person; partly through human imagination to lead men to an
ideal. Actually, it is through imagination-with-reason that a good life can
be sketched out, because imagination-with-reason is based on human
background knowledge; and it is ultimately led by a priori Being.
Farrelly, standing on the ground of E. Erikson's theory of developmental
psychology, characterises human flourishing by "absolute transcendence in
the sense of an orientation to constitute themselves freely by their relation
to an absolute horizon of being and value" (Farrelly, in McLean,(ed.),
1992, ch. 1, 1). In this sense, though Farrelly, as a priest, brought human
flourishing into relation with the Ultimacy, the Sacred or God, his idea of
human flourishing is still significant in manifesting a perfection of human
beings, viz., an ideal type of a good life. It is in this way that
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imagination-with-reason leads men to an ideal of life.
In sum, in order to construct an autonomous and harmonious life, the
methods of dialectic, communicative action and imagination-with-reason
are needed. Critical thinking as a means for emancipation and
reconstruction is necessary for a good life. Also, critical thinking as the
end of seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation is indispensable
for the reconstruction of rationality or an ideal of a good life.
IV. Conclusion
Men need to emancipate themselves not only from cultural and social
dehumanisation, but also from individual depersonalisation. As analysed,
this task is undertaken by the self. Therefore, autonomy must be valued
for a good life. More than that, autonomy must work effectively and
successfully not only in the individual aspect of life, but also in the life of
interaction with others. In light of the contemporary problems such as,
dehumanisation, depersonalisation and constraint by authority, a good life
for human beings nowadays must be a dialectical crystallisation of culture,
society and person, which will be established through critical thinking.
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Dehumanisation and depersonalisation narrow the horizon of understanding
about the relations of the individual and culture, the individual and society,
and the individual and the individual. The dehumanisation of culture and
society, and the depersonalisation of the individual have widened alienation;
and the lack of seif-realisation and self-reflection prevents the possibility of
seif-actualisation. Hence, critical thinking will be suggested to escape from
the problems of dehumanisation and depersonalisation.
One way for the solution of these problems is to awaken our critical
thinking. At the very least, two actions need to be taken: a) to move from
a passive posture to active searching; and b) to build up the horizon of
understanding in many dimensions. In this way, alienation, e.g.,
dehumanisation and depersonalisation, will be attacked by critical thinking.
This is an achievement of seif-realisation. Further, man through
self-reflection will reconstruct his own good life, grounded in
seif-reali sation and seif-actualisation; while through communicative action
man is concerned about a good life of others. These are the functions and
value of critical thinking for a good life.
Therefore, education, in its broadest range, should be an art of making
people critical, and the government should be a crucial supporter for
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teaching critical thinking. Then, under an ideal teaching situation,
including an open culture, a communicative and open-minded society, an
autonomous person will be able to plan a good life - a life with happiness
and intelligence. If this is the case, primary school education and teachers
education must be put on the top of the list for educational innovation, in
terms of teaching for critical thinking, because of their leading place in
human development.
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Chapter VI
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CRITICAL THINKING
FOR EDUCATION(I):
INDOCTRINATION OR EDUCATION
I. Reflecting upon the criteria of indoctrination: a critical
comment
A. Content
B. Method
C. Intention
II. Autonomy as a fundamental criterion
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Chapter VI
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CRITICAL THINKING
FOR EDUCATION(I):
INDOCTRINATION OR EDUCATION
It was shown in previous chapters that the dysfunction, dehumanisation and
depersonalisation of education in Taiwan result from non-critical thinking.
Indoctrination in education is one such case. In this chapter I shall apply
the concept of critical thinking to education, by distinguishing
indoctrination from education, so that the priority of teaching for critical
thinking can be sorted out.
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The criterion for indoctrination, in counter point with the characteristics of
critical thinking, will be set up in this chapter. The argument will be that
distinguishing indoctrination from education must be grounded in the
essence (inner characteristic) of critical thinking, i.e. autonomy; and
autonomy will thus be the fundamental aim for teaching critical thinking.
Varied criteria of indoctrination will be examined first.
I. Reflecting upon the criteria of indoctrination: a critical
comment
The distinction between indoctrination and education is still vague. Some
take the intention of teachers as the criterion for indoctrination, e.g., \Vhite
(White, in Peters (ed.), 197O), Gregory and Woods (Gregory & Woods,
in Snook (ed.), 1972b, 179), while some think that indoctrination can occur
without conscious intention, e.g., Wilson (Wilson, in Snook (ed.), 1972b).
Others take teaching content or method as the criterion of indoctrination,
e.g., Danto, Cooper and Wilson (Danto, 1968; Cooper, 1973; Wilson, in
Snook (ed.), 1972b). Some, like Snook, Barrow and Woods take all of
these as criteria for indoctrination (Snook, 1972a, b; Barrow & Woods,
1982 2 ,
 63-77). However, whether these criteria are sufficient for
distinguishing education from indoctrination is questionable and needs to be
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analysed further.
The meanings of indoctrination are concerned with the criteria for
indoctrination, which are multiple. The meanings of indoctrination in the
Oxford Dictionary are: "a) to put ideas into (someone's) mind; or b) to
instruct or to imbue with partisan or sectarian opinion, points of view,
principles..."
Other definitions of indoctrination are given by scholars. For instance,
Kilpatrick writes that "indoctrination is to implant doctrines which are to
be held uncritically" (Kilpatrick, in Snook (ed.), 1972b, 4) (which merely
moves the problem of definition to a different word) ; similarly, Snook
assumes that indoctrination is "to inculcate doctrines" (Snook, 1972a, 7).
For Wilson, indoctrination is efforts "to take over his [a person's]
personality in a much more radical way" (Wilson, in Snook (ed.), 1972b,
22). Also, Green holds that indoctrination is "to be frequently viewed as a
method of instruction" (Green, in Snook (ed.), 1972b, 25). Gregory and
Woods claim that indoctrination is "to try to get him [the personj to believe
that a proposition P is true, in such a way that nothing will shake that
belief" (Gregory & Woods, in Snook(ed.), 1972b, 179) A number of
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similar definitions of indoctrination are offered by, for instance, T. C.
Hatcher & L. G. Erickson (1979), and J. White (197O).
However, the demarcation between indoctrination and education can hardly
be grasped from these definitions. These definitions cause problems, either
because of their insufficiency or because they are too broad to locate the
borderline between indoctrination and education. For example, problems
such as whether indoctrination exists only in education, or also in different
areas, e.g., religion, politics etc., are not clarified. Nor is it clear whether
the term 'indoctrination' can be applied to 'good' activity in education as
well as bad.
Indoctrination is associated not only with the educational dimension, but
also with moral, religious and political dimensions. Indoctrination seems
to belong to a family of concepts such as education, instruction, training,
teaching and learning. As Snook claims, indoctrination leads
philosophically into questions about "how we ought to treat people and the
status of knowledge claims", while educationally, "it opens up discussion of
the rights of students, parents and teachers; the possibility of natural
education; and the part that society or culture is entitled to play in
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determining the curricula of schools" (Snook (ed.), 1972b, 1).
Similarly, Green claims, "indoctrination, nevertheless, has a perfectly good
and important role to play in education... Like the development of
attitudes, indoctrination may be useful as the prelude to teaching" (Green,
in Snook (ed.), 1972b, 45, 117). However, Green's claim is true only if
indoctrination and education are not incompatible.
Thus in order to clarify the concepts 'indoctrination and education',
criteria for distinguishing indoctrination from education need to be
analysed.
Snook suggests that there are "four possible criteria of indoctrination:
method, contents, consequences and intentions" (Snook, 1972a, 44-5).
Here, I shall partly borrow from his suggestion to investigate the adequacy
of the criteria of indoctrination. Consequences, (in fact, also process), are
in this thesis thought to be involved in teaching contents, methods and
teachers' intentions, while educational aim is assumed to be involved in
teaching contents.
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Therefore, in this thesis, three key criteria will be discussed: content,
method and intention. I will focus on educational activity, to argue that
education is and should be incompatible with indoctrination, in that
children lack ability for autonomy. It will be argued that autonomy is a
fundamental criterion for distinguishing education from indoctrination.
A. Content
First, I shall take two items from the textbook of the Social Sciences
syllabus in the primary school in Taiwan as examples around which to
discuss the insufficiency and non-necessity of the condition of content for
indoctrination. It will be argued that indoctrination may not be taking
place even though the doctrine is introduced to children (insufficiency);
and in contrast, that children may be indoctrinated even though the
teaching content does not underline the doctrine (non-necessity).
The criterion for the indoctrination of content will be analysed with
reference to these quotations. My argument will be that content of a
particular type, e.g., political propaganda, is neither a sufficient nor a
necessary condition of indoctrination. Yet, the content of a particular type
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may produce indoctrination, where the intention of the content, either
showing on the face of the content or implicit in it, involves the attempt to
constrain or dominate the way of children's thinking. This argument will
be justified through investigating two contents which are extracted from
the textbooks of Social Sciences for primary schools in Taiwan. These
contents will described first.
One of the items in the syllabus for Social Sciences (A) praises the
contributions of the Three Principles of the People. It says,
(A) The Three Principles of the People is the principle for national reconstruction
and for the people. Although recently there have been wars or battles in
China, nowadays and fortunately, the Republic of China in Taiwan founded
by Sun Yat-sen and led by Chiang Kai-shek, has managed achievements not
only in the economy, but also in society, and people work and live in peace
and wealth. The goal for the future is to implement the Three Principles of
the People, instead of Communism as on the Mainland. Then, the unified
New China, which is wealthy and powerful, can be naturally reconstructed.
(The National Institute of Compilation and Translation, Social Sciences,
vol. xi, 1990, 71)
The other extract (B) describes the seventy-two martyrs who sacrificed
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their lives in an abortive uprising against the Manchu Government, which
took place in Canton on March 29, 1911. The revolutionary spirit of
March 29 is exalted in the contents. It sketches how
(B) all members of the revolutionary political party who took part in the action
of revolution were full of devotion to this action: some had left their last
writings to their parents and wives. Those who were captured by the
Manchu Government sacrificed their lives for the principle of overthrowing
the Manchu Government, after they failed to persuade the officials of the
Manchu Government to give up their political power. The revolutionary
spirit of the seventy-two martyrs raised the morale of the people, so that the
revolutionary foundation for the reconstruction of the New China could
have been established then. (The National Institute of Compilation and
Translation, Social Sciences, vol. XI, 1990, 41)
The contents of (A) can be viewed as doctrine. According to Snook, "an
indoctrinator wants students to end up with false ideas" (Snook, 1972a, 7).
Similarly, White holds that "if indoctrination has to do with content, then
content must refer to the fact that the beliefs to be indoctrinated must form
part of an ideological system, in the broader sense" (White, in Snook (ed.),
1972b, 124). In this sense, political propaganda, being an ideological
system, can be viewed as one particular type of content which might
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produce indoctrination.
Such content might produce indoctrination, because it might narrow the
range of children's thinking. The schools impart this content to children
not because of its contribution to children's development, but because of
the political interest. It is clear that this doctrine constitutes part of history
of the KMT (Nationalist Political Party). In order to protect the interest or
image of the political party, children's questions about the adequacy of
political propaganda will not be encouraged, even if they are not
prohibited. In contrast, it is taken for granted that 'making' children
believe in this propaganda is measured as a successful 'teaching', because it
is in accordance with the official aim of education. In such a situation,
children will be asked to learn the contents by heart, rather than to find
evidence for or to argue against them. This is a case where the particular
type of content produces indoctrination. Yet, indoctrination is produced
not only because of such a content, but also because of the methods
employed and of the face that the content is involved with the intention to
dominate children.
Next, it will be argued that content which constitutes political propaganda
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is not a sufficient condition of indoctrination. Such contents do not always
indoctrinate children. In other words, indoctrination would not occur even
if teachers use such contents, if children can think over questions which call
for reflection, or if children are capable of discussing their own opinions
freely and rationally. Taking the extract (A) for example, pupils can think
critically about questions such as: why are Sun Yat-sen and Chiang
Kai-shek necessary for current achievements in Taiwan and in what way;
why can the Three Principles of the People unify Taiwan with the
Mainland, and reconstruct a wealthy and powerful New China; why are
there high achievements in the economy rather than in the politics in
Taiwan; what is the weakness in contemporary Taiwanese society; what
might have happened, either if the R.O.C. had been established without Sun
Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, or if the R.O.C. were not established? After
reflecting upon such questions, political propaganda in the contents will be
analysed and criticised, before it is accepted. Therefore, content which
constitutes political propaganda is not a sufficient condition for
distinguishing education from indoctrination.
In contrast, in this way, children are not forced to accept official value
judgments. Rather, they will form their own value systems through
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thinking rationally, e.g. by looking for evidence against which to test
political propaganda. This is an example in which the gap between
teaching and consequence occurs. Yet, this gap occurs not because of the
failure of teaching, but because children's ability of autonomy avoids the
indoctrination of content and even the indoctrination of teaching method.
After that, it will be argued that falsity of content is not a necessary
condition of indoctrination. The contents in the subject matter of (B),
quoted above are not a belief but, relatively, a fact. Fact is assumed as
'true' knowledge here. However, this content can be used to indoctrinate
children, in the belief that the KMT is worthy of support, because of their
significant contributions to the establishment of the R.O.C. In other words,
the contents can be used as evidence to claim that anyone who tries to
overthrow the Government of K.M.T. is mad, like the officials of the
Manchu Government, or even worse, is a betrayer of the State, and
immoral. This is an indoctrination by content in which political authority
is confirmed not through rational argumentation, but through the usage of
contents. Therefore, even if the content is true knowledge or content
whose truth or falsity is uncertain, indoctrination can proceed through it.
In short, content even when it is not official doctrine or political
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propaganda cannot guarantee that pupils will not be indoctrinated. In this
sense, falsity of content is not a necessary condition for distinguishing
education from indoctrination.
B. Method
Method has been taken as a criterion for distinguishing teaching from
indoctrination. For example, Nagai claims that "the real question,
therefore, as to the nature of teaching as distinct from indoctrination is not
about the contents but about the ways in which it is taught and defended in
the classroom" (Nagai, 1976, viii). Yet, Nagai does not make clear about
his argument whether irrational method is a sufficient or necessary
condition for indoctrination. Some scholars try to add other criteria to the
criterion of method so as to clarify the distinction between indoctrination
and education.
For instance, Barrow and Woods connect the criterion of content with
method to distinguish education from indoctrination. Therefore, they
claim that "not any way of imparting any kind of belief is ipso facto
indoctrination" (Barrow & Woods, 19822, 64). Analogously, although
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Cooper suggests "method or manners would be plausible candidates [as
criteria of indoctrination]" (Cooper, 1973, 52), he himself has noticed that
"my argument does not show that method or manner must always be the
relevant criterion; that would need further argument. It shows only that
some other criterion [i.e. other than intention] must be employed, in order
to fix moral responsibility" (Cooper, 1973, 52).
Here my argument will be that non-rational method is not a necessary
condition, but if used over the whole process of schooling, it is a sufficient
one, because it can be taken as a tool for indoctrination. Before moving to
this argument, the term 'irrational method' will be clarified.
In general, any method used to restrain the freedom of thought is
non-rational, such as: discouragement to giving one's own reaction;
restraint on debating the issues; and asking that people accept information
without questioning evidence. Irrational method will produce
indoctrination. As Nagai points out, "in regard to method, indoctrination
utilises non-rational means, [whereas] teaching, on the other hand, utilises
open examination, disinterested exchange of ideas and unrestricted critical
analysis" (Nagai, 1976, 14). In contrast, giving children room for
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reaction, debate and discussion etc. can be conceived using rational
methods.
Irrational method which is grounded in a tyrannical way produces
indoctrination, because it restrains the development of children's ability for
autonomy. As Snook points out "if a teacher tries to prevent a pupil from
acquiring any backing for his beliefs other than the say-so of an irrelevant
authority, he is not teaching but is doing something else, for example,
indoctrinating" (Snook, 1972a, 20), and, in contrast, "teaching requires us
[teachers] to submit our reasons to the students for their critical evaluation"
(Snook, 1972a, 20).
The argument that irrational method is not a necessary condition of
indoctrination but a sufficient one will be justified through examining the
contents which are extracted from the Textbooks of Social Sciences for
primary schools in Taiwan. In other words, the contents (A) and (B),
which were described, will be used to show that irrational method will
produce indoctrination. On the other hand, another extract (C) will be
used to argue that rational method, e.g., uncoerced thinking and debate,
can produce indoctrination.
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As mentioned, children in Taiwan are asked to memorise the contents in
textbooks, like content (A) and (B), as preparation for the examination. In
such a situation, memorisation rather than the heuristic method is
preferred. In this way, memorising all materials in textbooks and then
having them copy back during the examination is taken as the ultimate goal
of schooling. Children are expected neither to inquire the truth or falsity
of such materials, nor to reflect upon the relationship between textbook
'knowledge' and their lives. Moreover, inquiry and reflection will be
discouraged. Indoctrination occurs, because irrational methods as such do
prevent children from establishing their own value system. Instead, such
irrational methods encourage children to imitate rather than to think, and
thus indoctrination is produced. Therefore, irrational method is a sufficient
condition for indoctrination.
However, the method of indoctrination (non-rational methods) may also be
employed in education. As Wilson points Out, "we should certainly have
helped the child in the direction of rationality, but at the same time our
methods would have been far from ideally rational" (Wilson, in Snook
(ed.), 1972b, 21). In general, given that irrational methods are used
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during the whole process of schooling, then they will lead to
indoctrination. On the other hand, if irrational methods are used in a
particular episode, then indoctrination may not be produced. Therefore,
taking irrational method as a criterion for indoctrination, we should also
consider other conditions which are involved in the process of teaching.
That is, teaching should be viewed as a whole process rather than an
isolated activity of teaching and learning.
In acknowledging this, the claim that irrational method is a sufficient
condition needs to have the condition of the process of teaching added to it.
That is, irrational method will produce indoctrinatiom, in two
circumstances: either when it is used in whole process of teaching activities;
or when it matches the intention of indoctrination. The relationship
between content, method and intention will be discussed later on.
On the other hand, whether irrational method is a necessary condition of
indoctrination needs to be further explained. The content (C) will be used
to argue that rational method can also produce indoctrination. This content
describes the situation of people's life in Taiwan during the period of
Japanese occupation:
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(C) The Taiwanese lacked not only the freedom of speech, but also the freedom
of meeting, during the period of Japanese occupation. Further, the
Japanese Government in Taiwan did not offer a guarantee for Taiwanese
lives and properties. Life for the Taiwanese was very hard, so that the
Taiwanese rebelled continuously against the Japanese Government. (The
National Institute of Compilation and Translation, Social Sciences, vol. VII,
1990, 102)
Indoctrination can be produced even though rational methods are used
when the above contents are taught. For example, if children are
encouraged to discuss merely the tyranny of the Japanese Government
alone, but they are restrained from reflecting upon the political and social
weakness of the KMT Government, then a one-dimensional way of thinking
will be formed. Consequently, ideology especially negative ideology, will
be rooted in children's value system. In this sense, rational method will
produce indoctrination. Therefore, irrational method is not a necessary
condition for indoctrination.
From the above discussion, any method, irrational or rational, can be used
as a tool for indoctrination. This is the reason why teaching activities may
mix education with indoctrination, in that rational methods may be used for
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training, drill or conditioning, while irrational methods may be use for
instruction. In this sense, teaching or indoctrination will be hard to
distinguish by the criterion of method. In this situation, the whole process
of teaching needs to be considered. For example, the intention of education
which is either shown on the face of the official aim of education or hidden
behind it must be examined, so as to distinguish education from
indoctrination.
C. Intention
Snook confirms the importance of the intention of education for
distinguishing education from indoctrination. Snook claims that
"indoctrination only begins when we are trying to stop the growth in our
children of the capacity to think for themselves" (Snook (ed.), 1972b, 5).
Atkinson stresses the room for thinking in education. He says,
sometimes education is the term opposed to indoctrination, whilst
instruction is used for a rather direct sort of telling of people what is, or is
not so, a telling that smacks rather of indoctrination than education proper.
(Atkinson, in Snook (ed.), 1972b, 55)
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For Ryle, whether intelligent powers are developed marks the difference
between education and indoctrination. He claims that
a circus seal can be drilled or 'conditioned' into the performance of complicated
tricks, much as the recruit is drilled to march and slope arms. Drill results in the
production of automatism, i.e. performances which can be done perfectly without
exercising intelligence. This is habituation, the formation of blind habits. But
education or training produces not blind habits but intelligent powers...Drill
dispenses with intelligence, training enlarges it. (Ryle, 1971, 223)
It seems that the aim, intention and consequence of teaching need to be
considered, in order to distinguish education from indoctrination. As I
claimed, the aim and consequence are assumed in this thesis to be involved
in the intention, because they are hard to separate in a teaching activity.
Before I move to examine the condition of intention for indoctrination, the
relationship will be illustrated in Figure 6.1.
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figure 6.1 The relationship between intention, aim, content and method
' :carries direct influence
': carries indirect influence
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From the above illustration, intention guides the aim, contents and methods
of teaching through either direct or indirect influence. Therefore, teaching
should be an intended action, in terms of teachers 1 intention and the aim of
education. In this sense, the intention of indoctrination may also be
recognised directly through teachers' intention, or indirectly through the
goal of schooling. If the goal of schooling is far from developing
children's abilities for seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation,
then it will be indoctrination.
Thus, if intention will be taken as a criterion for distinguishing education
from indoctrination, it should be involved in educational aim (including
consequence), content, and method. In this sense, I agree with White's
claim that "the intention is logically tied to the concept of indoctrination"
(White, in Peters (ed.), 197O) Similarly, Barrow & Wood's claim that
"intention is logically necessary to the concept of indoctrination" (Barrow
& Woods, 19822, 69). My argument then is that intention can be claimed
as not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition for distinguishing
education from indoctrination.
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Snook also tries to set up a clear-cut relationship among varied criteria of
indoctrination. He concludes that
method is an inadequate criterion, since it loses its bad connotation and there
is no further way of distinguishing good indoctrination from bad...The
notion of content is itself vague...(and) to hold that aim, content and method
are required would provide a sufficient condition but not a necessary
one...Only intention can serve as an adequate criterion for distinguishing
indoctrination from education and attempts to link intention conceptually
with another factor such as content or niethod will destroy the delicate
balance. (Snook (ed.), 1972b, 153)
Yet, Snook seems to be unable to explain sufficiently the range of intention,
so that there is still confusion about what the intention concerns. For
example, whether the term 'intention', for Snook, refers merely to the fact
that 'teachers are aware what they are doing' or to the fact that 'teachers
plan to do something consciously', and whether intention plays a role as the
guide of the instructional purpose and method.
Therefore, the concept 'intention' needs to be clarified before the argument
that the intention of domination is not only a sufficient but also a necessary
condition for indoctrination. That is, whether intention is properly to be
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the criterion for distinguishing indoctrination from education is still vague.
For example, Cooper divides indoctrinators into two categories according
to their intention: "sincere indoctrinators" and "insincere indoctrinators"
(Cooper, 1973, 44). The sincere indoctrinator is one who "himself
believes the propositions he is teaching, and who thinks it important that his
students should believe them precisely because, according to him, they are
true" (Cooper, 1973, 44). The "insincere indoctrinator is one who either
does not believe what he is teaching, or at any rate thinks it important for
students to believe the propositions for reasons other than their truth"
(Cooper, 1973, 45).
However, Cooper disagrees with taking teachers' intention as the criterion
for indoctrination. He claims, "the whole approach to indoctrination in
terms of intention is being radically misconceived"(Cooper, 1973, 43), and
"whatever the merits of the 'intention' approach in general, these cannot be
the right definitions [for indoctrination]" (Cooper, 1973, 43).
Also, Wilson argues that it is hard to take intention as the criterion for
indoctrination. For Wilson, as for J. White, intention is emphasised at the
334
level of consciousness, i.e. knowing what one is doing. However, Wilson
argues that "it is possible to indoctrinate without knowing that you are
indoctrinating [sincere indoctrinators] and it is also possible to try to
indoctrinate but fail [for insincere indoctrinators]" (Wilson, in Snook(ed.),
1972b, 19). The former possibility can be viewed as the case of sincere
indoctrinators, whereas the latter possibility is the case of insincere
indoctrinators (but they may succeed). Cooper therefore claims that
White's and Snook's accounts of intention suffer from a failure to
distinguish clearly enough between what might be called the 'sincere' and
the 'insincere' indoctrinators (Cooper, 1973, 44).
Learning from Husserl's theory, I will claim that the intention of
indoctrination is more significant than the performance of indoctrination.
As McKenna points out, Husserl's theory of perception "has concentrated
on explaining the intrinsic intentionality of a perception, i.e. how, even if
its object is not actually present, a perception can be an experience of that
object" (McKenna, 1982, 98).
However, it seems to me that the difference in the argument on intention as
a criterion of indoctrination between Barrow & Woods, Cooper, and White
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lies in whether teachers' intentions are distinguishable. Similarly, for
Barrow and Woods, rwhat causes difficulty in ready acceptance of
intention as a necessary feature of indoctrination is the fact that it is not
always obviously present" (Barrow & Woods, 19822, 69). They claim that
we are faced here with a distinction between avowed intention (what the
indoctrinator says he is trying to do) and the real intention (what the
indoctrinator is in fact trying to do)... In the very nature of the case it is
impossible to get clear about real as opposed to avowed intention by asking
the teacher. (Barrow & Woods, 19822, 70)
From my viewpoint, intention should be involved in the consciousness of
the subject and the performance of the subject. For sincere indoctrinators,
their consciousness corresponds with their performance, while for
insincere indoctrinators, there is a gap between consciousness and
performance. This is a way to distinguish insincere indoctrinators from
sincere indoctrinators.
Further, intentional acts can be divided into two modes. As Michael H.
McCarthy points out, "intentional acts embody the basic distinction between
a subjective intending and an object intended" (McCarthy, 1990, 234). The
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subjective intending can be viewed as the experiential consciousness which
is the name for the subject's pre-reflexive, non-intentional awareness of
himself and his intentional acts, whereas the object intended heightens the
conscious presence to the subject (McCarthy, 1990, 234). In this sense,
teacher's intention should include intentional action [an insincere
indoctrinator] and non-intentional awareness of himself [a sincere
indoctrinator]. Anyway, indoctrination [performance] will help the
indoctrinator to become aware of his act of indoctrination, no matter
whether he was aware of his intention.
Similarly, Lonergan divides intention into two modes: 'the object to the
subject...; [and] the subject to himself' (Lonergan, 1967, 226). For
Lonergan, conscious occurrences [indoctrination which is made by
insincere indoctrinators] like pains, emotions, and intentional acts (subject
to himself) differ intrinsically from such nonconscious episodes
[indoctrination which is made by sincere indoctrinators] in a person's life
as the growth of hair, the circulation of the blood, and the normal
functioning of the nervous system (Lonergan, 1957, 320-8). The mode of
tobject to the subject' implies phenomenological consciousness, which is
object intended, in McCarthy's terms. In this sense, distinguishing
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insincere from sincere indoctrinators does not make much sense for
identifying indoctrination.
Moreover, avowed intention can be distinguished from real intention. Yet,
they are distinguishable neither merely by asking the teacher, nor merely
by observing their teaching. The avowed and real intentions can be
distinguished in part through examining the information which is collected
by asking the teacher and by observing practical teaching. However, the
real intention of a teacher must be grasped within the whole context of
teaching. The avowed and real intention can be distinguished through a
series of actions of verification, e.g., interview, observation, discussion
etc., within the whole context. Therefore, it should not be claimed that
intention is not a sufficient or necessary condition of indoctrination, just
because it is hard to measure.
Meanwhile, the stipulation for education is assumed to be rooted in the
nature of autonomy in this thesis. That is, if teachers' intention is directed
are intended neither at children's ability for autonomy, nor at children's
individual development of reason, then the action teachers take to reach this
aim will be viewed as indoctrination. One of the obvious cases has been
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shown in the dysfunction of education in Taiwan: where education is taken
as the tool for specific interests, e.g., political or economic interest. This is
a case where 'educational aim' is against the nature of education,
paradoxically, and such an instruction is then implicitly or explicitly aimed
at dominating children's thinking. The distinction between indoctrination
and education, in terms of intention, can be put into logical forms: a)
education is aimed at helping children to acquire beliefs x, y, z, which are
true; and b) indoctrination is aimed at making children believe x, y, z, no
matter whether they are true or false.
In this sense, indoctrination occurs not only because of teachers' intention
of indoctrination, but also because of the dominated intention involved in
the aim of the activity of 'teaching and learning'. In principle, a teacher's
intention of domination will lead to indoctrination, because with his
intention of indoctrination, irrational methods will be used to reach the aim
of his teaching. (Of course, there could be another case where a teacher's
'teaching' is aimed at indoctrinating but fails. But this is not the focus of
this thesis.) In this sense, intention is a necessary condition for
distinguishing indoctrination from education, because intention is tied to
aim, content and method.
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On the other hand, indoctrination will not occur when teachers themselves
intend to enlighten pupils rather than to indoctrinate them. In this
situation, teachers will not use any irrational method. Even though
teachers misuse irrational methods, the outcome of using irrational
methods will help the teacher to be aware of his misusing the methods,
which is not what he intends to.
More than that, indoctrination will not occur, because pupils are expected
to be or are 'treated' as autonomous. In other words, indoctrination will
not be produced if teachers do not intend to indoctrinate pupils, even
though non-rational or irrational methods are employed. That is because,
as discussed in the previous section, pupils are encouraged to reflect upon
what teachers taught and to argue for or against it. Therefore, intention of
domination is a sufficient condition for indoctrination.
In my view, whether it is indoctrination is one thing, and whether
indoctrination can be successfully implemented may be another. Ideally,
consequences should meet with the aim through teaching methods and
contents, besides, a teacher should intend to reach the aim with effect.
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Therefore, that indoctrination occurs due to the failure of teaching should
not be blamed on the failure of teaching, but on teachers' and children's
lack of the ability for autonomy. In other words, whether indoctrination
can be successfully carried out depends on whether teachers (sincere
indoctrinators) are capable of distinguishing education from indoctrination,
and then whether they can emancipate themselves from being
indoctrinators (both sincere and insincere indoctrinators); and whether
children can reflect upon what they have learned.
Instead of stressing teachers' duties, Weber stresses pupils'. He indicates
three major duties of students. They are:
1) to fulfil a given task in a workmanlike fashion;
2) definitely to recognise facts, even those which may be personally
uncomfortable, and to distinguish them from his own evaluations;
3) to subordinate himself to his task and to repress the impulse to exhibit his
personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily. (Weber, 1949, 5)
These students' duties remind us that there is no necessary relationship of
cause-effect between the process of indoctrinating and its product. Also, it
reminds us that teachers and pupils are 'human beings' rather than
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machines, who can think rather than be completely controlled. In this
sense, the tasks of seif-realisation, self-reflection and self-actualisation,
reveal the significance in avoiding one being an indoctrinator or
indoctrinated.
To summarise, the particular type of content is neither a sufficient nor a
necessary condition for indoctrination. Irrational method and the intention
of domination are not individually sufficient for indoctrination, but they
are jointly sufficient conditions of indoctrination. That is, irrational
method will be a sufficient condition for indoctrination, if it is used in the
whole process of schooling. On the other hand, while irrational method is
not a necessary condition of indoctrination, intention is a necessary
condition of indoctrination, if the intention of domination is in accordance
with the aim of domination. These criteria of indoctrination - the
particular type of content (which is viewed as tying with aim), irrational
method and the intention of domination will be illustrated as Table 6.1.
The result of schooling, education or indoctrination, can be distinguished
through examining the interaction between content, method and intention.
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Table 6.1 Indoctrination and its criteria
* 'I' means indoctrination, while 'E' means education.
'V means indoctrination occurs, while 'x' means indoctrination will not be produced.
'x/v' means indoctrination could produce which is concerned with other criteria.
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II. Autonomy as a fundamental criterion
The ability for autonomy will be the fundamental element in avoiding
being indoctrinators and indoctrinated. As stressed, the fundamental
distinction between education and indoctrination lies in whether children's
ability for autonomy is encouraged. In other words, whether children's
ability for autonomy is developed constitutes the fundamental criterion for
distinguishing education from indoctrination. Indoctrination limits the
room for pupils to form their own value systems. As Green claims,
"indoctrination aims simply at establishing certain beliefs so that they will
be held quite apart from their truth, their explanation, or their foundation
in evidence" (Green, in Snook (ed.), 1972b, 25). The authority of
knowledge and bureaucracy are involved in the activity of indoctrination.
Under such an authority and bureaucracy, children will be discouraged
from taking responsibility for themselves and from forming their own
value system.
Children's ability for reflection should be developed so that they will not
be indoctrinated. According to the characteristics of critical thinking,
pupils' ability for autonomy can be improved, if the development of their
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reason is encouraged, such as: they are encouraged to take responsibility
for their own problems through rational argumentation; their free will,
imagination, and ideas are not suppressed; their thinking and life styles are
not asked to be fixed on a specific mode.
One theme of the material - the extract(B) - implies that the Government of
K.M.T. should not be overthrown because of its role as the founder of the
State, like the position of parents in a family, for example. This theme also
illustrates that children are not taught to develop their capacities of
forming their own value systems through rational argumentation, within
such an uncoerced circumstance. In contrast, children are guided to base
their value judgment on a certain 'standpoint' by following an external
authority, instead of exercising their ability of reflection.
The keystone of indoctrination in the above case lies in how far children
can take responsibility for themselves, and whether their value systems are
formed through rational argumentation. For example, whether such
conclusions as, 'the revolutionary act of the seventy-two martyrs betrayed
Government'; and 'we (the pupils) should support the revolutionary action
of D.P.P.* at the present' can be discussed rationally without coercion. If
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such conclusions are not allowed to be made by children, or children are
unable to exercise rational argumentation to argue for or against value
judgments, before they accept them, then teaching comes closer to being
indoctrination. (Here, I do not mean that these conclusions are absolutely
correct. Rather, I emphasise the process of rational argumentation.) In
this sense, indoctrination occurs not because of the indoctrination of
content but because children lack the ability of autonomy.
Indoctrination occupies educational activities, whatever content and method
are used, when educational aim is carried by 'external' interests such as
political and economic interests, rather than by 'internal' interests such as
improving an individual's ability for reflection. Here, 'external' interest
refers to the aim or purpose, which is alienated from one's experiences; in
contrast, 'internal' interest is grounded in one's lifeworid.
* The Democratic Progress Party is an opposition political party which identifies the
mistakes of K.M.T. in the R.O.C., and some of them insist on overthrowing the
Government of K.M.T. (TAHR, 1989).
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Education with 'external' interest will be bound to link with the imposition
of 'content'. Then, schooling will merely take charge of the transmission
of knowledge rather than that of the integration of knowledge with
experiences. The educational content, method and intention are likely used
as instruments to correspond with such an external aim. mi this sense,
whether the rationality of education is distorted by instrumentall reason can
be used as a criterion for telling education from indoctrination.
Analogously, Flew distinguishes between education and indoctrination by
the development of reason:
the educator is waiting and hoping all the time for those whonn he is
educating to start thinking.., the indoctrinator, on the other hand, is waiting
for signs of trouble, and ready to intervene to suppress it when it appears,
however oblique and smooth his methods may be. (Flew, in Snook(ed.),
1972b, 69)
Flew's distinction education from indoctrination rests in whether thinking
ability is developed. Also, Barrow and Woods distinguish education from
indoctrination by rationality. This distinction is considered from the
viewpoint of morality. They point out that "indoctrination., in that it
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necessarily involves lack of respect for an individual's rationality, is
morally unacceptable and hence fails to rate as education" (Barrow &
Woods, 19822, 77). F. J. Sheed concludes that "any educator who proceeds
to shape human lives according to his own guess is exercising tyranny"
(Sheed, 1935, 10).	 In this sense, the self plays a significant role in
avoiding being indoctrinated.
That is, an indoctrinated person is different from a critical thinker in
lacking ability for seif-realisation and self-reflection. As Barrow & Woods
claim, "the most obvious hallmark of the indoctrinated person is that he has
a particular viewpoint and he will not seriously open his mind to the
possibility that that viewpoint might be mistaken" (Barrow & Woods,
19822, 68).
Green, like Snook, emphasises rational argumentation as the distinction
between education and indoctrination. He distinguishes education from
indoctrination by the fact that education includes giving reasons, evidence,
argument, etc., in order to approach the truth, while indoctrination is to
conditioning as beliefs are to habits (Green, in Snook(ed.), 1972b, 25).
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Integrating the function of the self and the characteristics of critical
thinking, I shall take Snook's examples to argue that autonomy is a more
fundamental criterion than criteria such as content, nithod or intention for
distinguishing education from indoctrination. The basic reason is, as
analysed in chapter five, that the ability of autonomy can free a person
from the control of ideology.
Snook divides the cases of indoctrination into three kinds: "cases which are
clearly indoctrination; cases which may seem like indoctrination, but which
are not since they are unavoidable*; and problematic cases" (Snook (ed.),
1972a, 152).
The first case has three sorts of situations, which are concerned with the
content of indoctrination:
* I, personally, disagree that unavoidable indoctrination is not indoctrination. In an
ideal educational activity, any indoctrination should be ruled out. In practice,
some situations cannot be avoided, but they are still indoctrination.
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a) teaching an ideology jf it were the only possible one with any claim to
rationality [referring to content and method];
b) teaching, jf they are certain, propositions the teacher knows are uncertain
[referring to content and the intention of teachers - teachers, insincere
indoctrinators, are aware of what they are doing]; and
c) teaching propositions which are false and known by the teacher to be false [referring to
content and the intention of teachers - teachers, insincere indoctrinators, are aware of
what they are doing] (Snook (ed.), 1972b,152).
In examining these cases, it is clear that teachers try very hard to attain
consciously the instructional purpose which they want to reach. They are
not concerned about pupils' aims, needs and abilities for reflection and
thinking. In other words, the teachers do not take children as autonomous
people, but an instrument for constituting parts of his purpose. That is not
teaching or education, but indoctrination.
Snook illustrates his second case of indoctrination with three examples.
They are:
a) teaching young children correct behaviour [teachers' or adults' intention
and value judgment];
b) teaching facts by rote [referring to methods]; and
c) influencing the child unconsciously in a certain direction [referring to
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method and intention in which ideology is involved] (Snook (ed.),
1972b, 152).
Snook argues that these cases are not indoctrination because of their
unavoidableness. Nevertheless, further issues can be raised, such as
whether the outcome of learning is satisfactory for the teacher, parents or
children themselves; who establish the criteria for so-called 'correct
behaviour' - teachers, parents or children themselves; and whether
irrational methods, e.g. learning by rote without understanding, are
appropriate for children to learn facts and to develop iJheir reason;
similarly, whether teachers or elders force children's thinking
unconsciously to develop in a certain direction; and whose direction is
taken as the guide for pupil's learning or acting - teachers', parents' or
children's own.
In shedding light on these questions, indoctrination is revealed when
children neither participate in establishing the criteria of correct
behaviour, nor express their willingness to learn by rote; when teachers
unconsciously influence pupils through forming children in a 'standard'
mode; and when pupils' thinking is limited to such a 'standard' mode. This
is one case of the domination of ideology. In this sense, teachers should not
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escape from being blamed for indoctrinating pupils.
In addition, Snook illustrates his third case of indoctrination with two
examples:
a) Inculcating beliefs believed by the teacher [the sincere indoctrinator] to be
certain, but which are substantially disputed; [referring to content]
b) Teaching any subject (e.g. Chemistry) without due concern for
understanding. [emphasising method] (Snook(ed.), 1972b, 158)
According to Snook, these are problematic cases, because such cases can be
claimed as indoctrination only if they are in company with certain
conditions. Case (a) "is a case of indoctrination provided the teacher
knows that the beliefs are substantially disputed" (Snook (ed.), 1972b, 159).
Case (b) "might be indoctrination if there were positive intent to make the
child incapable of further appraisal of the subject or if irrational methods
were so consistently used as to lead to a contempt for the evidence" (Snook
(ed.), 1972b, 159).
However, in all cases in Snook's writing, indoctrinators are people who
lack ability for autonomy. At the very least, they lack the ability for
352
self-reflection. Perhaps, this should be a focus of teacher education in
Taiwan. On the other hand, whether these cases are cases of indoctrination
depends also upon whether children can free themselves from the restraint
of beliefs; whether they are able to criticise the beliefs; whether they are
able to exercise rational argumentation; and whether they are capable of
taking responsibility for their value systems. This is the very task of
teaching critical thinking.
It can be seen from the discussions over Snook's examples that teachers'
and children's abilities for autonomy decide the possibility of
indoctrination. For example, if children are expected to build up their
ability for autonomy, then the subjects which are taught even 'without due
concern for understanding', in Snook's terms, cannot become the doctrine
of indoctrination.
In other words, if education is aimed at the ability for autonomy, education
will not be distorted into indoctrination, which can be marked by the
characteristics of dysfunction (hierarchical authority), dehumanisation (I-It
form) and depersonalisation (instrumental power). In contrast, education
may become indoctrination, when it connotes hierarchical authority, I-It
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form and instrumental power, "although it originally indicated a liberal
concept of implantation" (Snook, 1 972a, 11).
Now, the characteristics of indoctrination can be synthesised from the
phenomenological and hermeneutic points of view, in order to show its
distinction from education. The characteristics of indoctrination are:
a) indoctrination adheres to a relationship of hierarchy, in which dogmatic
authority is marked, and the doctrine cannot be questioned;
b) indoctrination shows the form of I-It: that is, the relationship between
the indoctrinator and the indoctrinated shows the form of I-It, in which
indoctrinator takes the indoctrinated as an instrument for attaining the
indoctrinator's aim; and relatively, children's interests and aim are
ignored; and
c) the relationship of the cause-effect of indoctrination can be established
only if children lack the ability of reflection: that is, indoctrination
cannot be implemented if children are encouraged to criticise rationally,
before accepting what the teacher teaches.
According to the characteristics of indoctrination synthesised above, ability
for autonomy helps children avoid being indoctrinated. As Crittenden
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explains, "enduring changes in thought or behaviour are not learnt unless
some conscious effort relating to the change is made by the subject"
(Crittenden, in Snook (ed.), 1972b, 134).
Also, autonomy avoids one being enslaved by indoctrination. Only when
"learners in formal educational institutions are asked to take control over
their learning" (Brookfield, 1987, 149), can education take place. "To take
control over one's learning" indicates the responsibility to the self of an
autonomous person. In contrast, indoctrination occurs when power within
education (knowledge or the authority of educators) is abused, because
under such a power, children will be prevented from being themselves.
Horkheimer reminds us the power of ideology, in terms of knowledge. He
claims that "men are no longer enslaved by the sword, but by the gigantic
apparatus which ultimately again forges the sword" (Horkheimer and
Adorno, Cumming (trans.), 1973, 233). It is the ability of autonomy to
emancipate human beings from the slavery of knowledge. Thus, children's
ability for autonomy should be developed in order to avoid themselves
from being indoctrinated.
Children's abilities for critical and creative thinking will be forfeited under
355
indoctrination. Under indoctrination, children are subject to damage by
subordination to authority; being tolerant of the irrational; and by reciting
doctrines, by which ideology is formed.
Shor invokes Freire's "banking systems" to explain the loss of abilities for
criticism and creation. Shor says,
the memorising form of study has been called by Freire the "banking
system" of education, in which professors make deposits of knowledge in
the empty accounts of their students' minds: "the role of the educator is not
to fill the educatee with knowledge, technical or otherwise". It is rather to
attempt to move towards a new way of thinking. (Freire, 1973, 125, 153;
Shor, 1980, 105)
Liberal educators, like Shor and Freire, try to emancipate children from
indoctrination. A liberal educator is viewed as a person who presents
knowledge through reasoning processes, and guides children to establish
their own self-concepts. Moore describes the teaching of a liberal
educator, which is an example of teaching critical thinking:
the liberal educator will encourage the student to reason to conclusions for
himself, even regarding such seemingly settled items as basic scientific
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principles and the multiplication table. He will try to help the student to
develop the habit of looking for the reasons for accepted conclusions. The
liberal teacher will encourage the critical attitude, the questioning stance, the
tendency to balance possibility against possibility, alternative against
alternative. He will so teach that his students will not only be not afraid but
even eager to subject to critical review what was taught them before they
were capable of being critical, including what he has himself sponsored or
endorsed. The liberal educator will teach as Hare puts it, with the
possibility in mind that he will some day discover that he is talking to an
educated man like himself - a man who may disagree with everything he has
said...(Moore, in Snook (ed.) ,1972b, 98)
Authentic education can then be characterised by an enlightening activity,
by which children are encouraged to seek their authenticity. Cooper claims
that "each has his individual essence; and to live in accord with it is to live
authentically" (Cooper, 1983, 8). Also, he argues that "unless the goal of
moral betterment involves the attempt to foster critical, self-conscious,
independent moral choice, it cannot figure in an education revolving
around the notion of authenticity" (Cooper, 1983, 91).
An authentic person, who is sincere to himself, can be taken as the
fundamental aim of education for autonomy. According to Cooper, an
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authentic person is the person who lives "in full awareness of the
possibilities of action, belief, and purpose that are in fact open to him, and
which anyone concerned with his existence as an issue must consider"
(Cooper, 1983, 19). Moreover, an authentic person should "make his
beliefs and values his own, and this must involve the attempt to see how he
has come by and retained the ones he has: for if he has simply taken them
on board, or begins to see them as having been thrust upon him, then they
cannot - yet, anyway - be his own" (Cooper, 1983, 87).
An authentic person is not only a rational autonomous person, but also a
romantically autonomous person who is keen on seif-actualisation, through
harmonising his rational and emotional aspects of life. In this sense, an
authentic person should be an autonomous person. This is probably the
reason why Peters and Dearden insist that "their [autonomous persons]
emphasis is on autonomy as well as on authenticity" (Dearden, 1973, 453;
Peters, 1977, 63).
A general form of education for autonomy will be encapsulated as follows:
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a) aim at ability for autonomy
Such an aim bears central characteristics such as, rational thinking,
democratic literacy, and the abilities for seif-realisation, self-reflection,
and seif-actualisation etc. The significance of the self is revealed from such
an aim.
Autonomy cannot be acquired merely from outside circumstances, but
from the internalisation of the self. That is, through seif-realisation,
self-reflection, and seif-actualisation, an autonomous person develops
himself. In this way, an autonomous person should be able to adjust
himself to new circumstances through the process of integration (or
equilibrium in Piaget's terms). Education then should be aimed at
developing rational individuals, who, as Hatcher indicates, are critical and
creative enough to respond to change and complexity, and are capable of
ultimately determining their own directions and values (Hatcher, 1979,
40-1).
b) rational argumentation within uncoerced circuin stances
Such an educational aim must be in company with a teaching and learning
process of rational argumentation. Rational argumentation cannot proceed,
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unless there is an uncoerced situation. In my view, teaching for autonomy
must be marked by knowledge without doctrines, enlightenment ithout
alienation, democracy without domination, communication without
distortion, and critical reflection without illusions. How to reach this aim
will be the task of teaching critical thinking, which will be discussed in the
next chapter.
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Chapter VII
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CRITICAL THINKING
FOR EDUCATION (II):
TEACHING CRITICAL THINKING
If teaching is an art, then teaching for critical thinking should also be an
art, because of the level of complexity of thinking which is involved. Here,
I am not intending to offer for teachers a syllabus for teaching critical
thinking. I shall clarify the concept of teaching critical thinking, and
establish its meta-principle, with 'meta' defined as knowledge about
knowledge (Nickerson, Perkins & Smith, 1985, 294).
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First of all, I shall deal with arguments about teaching for critical thinking,
in order to focus the issues which are involved in that teaching. The
arguments will be a) teaching critical thinking is compatible with
knowledge teaching; and b) the transferability of critical thinking
dispositions and abilities depends upon the structure of knowledge itself and
individual ability for categorisation. Habit-forming thinking will be
discussed where the transferability of critical thinking dispositions and
abilities is analysed. Second, curricular design for teaching critical
thinking will be analysed, in order to clarify the argument between
teaching of specific abilities and a cross-disciplinary approach in teaching
critical thinking.	 Direct teaching of specific abilities, and a
cross-disciplinary structure, which mixes some similar fields within a
subject for teaching critical thinking, will be discussed. Finally,
instructional principles for teaching critical thinking will be suggested as a
frame of reference for teachers.
I. Arguments about teaching for critical thinking
Arguments about teaching critical thinking still exist, although critical
thinking has become more important in education than before (Fisher,
1988, 12; Lipman, 1989, 2). As Ennis claims,
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there is much that we do not know about the capabilities for critical thinking
of students of various sorts at various levels. Teaching materials and tests
need to be developed and there is disagreement about what critical thinking
is and how it can be included in the curriculum. [For example], should
critical thinking be taught as a separate course or be included in the
instruction in an existing course, or both...? (Ennis, 1985, 28)
This thesis will not directly answer questions which Ennis raised, yet, the
questions raised by Ennis above will be involved in this chapter.
First of all, two arguments about teaching critical thinking will be dealt
with in this section, in order to reach a consensus on teaching critical
thinking. The first argument is relative to the argument about the nature
of teaching and that of teaching for critical thinking, while the second one
is relative to teaching method and the curriculum of teaching critical
thinking. These arguments can be shown in questions such as: can critical
thinking be taught; how is it taught; can it be better taught via teaching of
specific skills or in a cross-disciplinary way; can teaching critical thinking
develop the ability for critical thinking; and why does teaching critical
thinking avoid indoctrination, and how? In order to establish principles
for teaching critical thinking, the above questions need to be discussed, so
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that the notion of teaching for critical thinking can be stabilised.
A. Teaching critical thinking and knowledge teaching
There is a tension between teaching critical thinking and knowledge
teaching through traditional ways of teaching. The tension between
teaching critical thinking and knowledge teaching results from different
understandings about the nature of education, e.g., the aim, teaching and
learning, especially such concepts as, skepticism, reflection, emancipation,
and reconstruction, which are grounded in the nature of autonomy.
Teaching for critical thinking should be compatible with knowledge
teaching. However, it would not be compatible with schooling, if teaching
is distorted as indoctrination. Given that teaching is taken as an activity by
which teachers give children all 'required' knowledge, and children are
asked to learn this knowledge, as well as to learn it by heart, then teaching
critical thinking will be incompatible with knowledge teaching in the
school. This sort of 'schooling' has been described in chapter one and
two. A general phenomenon of such schooling - cramming for an
examination, instead of forming individual value systems or constructing a
rationality for a good life - becomes a crucial goal of teaching and learning
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in Taiwan. This kind of teaching is defined in this thesis as the traditional
view of teaching and learning.
According to the nature of critical thinking, teaching for critical thinking is
aimed at providing children with more opportunities to learn how to think
and to think by themselves and in their own ways - an independent and
rational thinking. Teaching as such is defined as creative and critical
learning. While traditional teaching emphasises the amount of knowledge
children acquire from schooling, creative and critical learning, in contrast,
is aimed at developing children's ability for self-development. In this
sense, the ability for autonomy constitutes the key difference between
traditional teaching and creative and critical learning.
Further, in the traditional view, ideas about critical thinking such as
skepticism (inquiry), reflection, emancipation, reconstruction are
improper, because the role of the teacher, as a mature person with
professional knowledge, and the authority of schooling are devalued. In
addition, in traditional teaching, children are treated as immature people
who are capable of learning rather than thinking - learning from what they
have taught, rather than thinking by themselves and in their own ways.
They are claimed as being too young to think. Therefore, the way of their
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thinking should be cast in a mold rather than be enlightened in accordance
with their own ways. These propositions seem to be rational, yet the
rationality of traditional teaching is arguable and needs to be examined, so
that the concept of rational schooling can be clarified, and then the
consensus on teaching critical thinking may be reached.
Also, teaching for critical thinking would be incompatible with knowledge
teaching, if knowledge is misunderstood as unquestionable. Knowledge,
established on the basis of human life, should not be alien to human
experiences and lifeworid. Such knowledge must satisfy the instrumental
requirement of Wittgenstein. Therefore, it is changeable, and it changes
with the circumstances men face.
Wittgenstein, particularly in his text On Certainty (1969), rejects Cartesian
and Kantian epistemological principles of the a priori. Rather, he tries to
alter the place of the a priori principle within knowledge by language
games, which are already accepted by a community. Following these
games, what we say and do can be understood and justified. Wittgenstein
claims,
giving grounds...justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not
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certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of
seeing on our part; it is an acting, while lies at the bottom of the language
game. (Wittgenstein, 1969, 204)
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Wittgenstein does not completely alter the
Kantian idea of the a priori. Wittgenstein replaces Kant's 'Reason' by the
language game in the sense that "the language game into which one is born
is for each person the ultimate locus of epistemic authority. It is not based
on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there - like our
life" (Wittgenstein, 1969, 559, 73e). In other words, a difference between
his view and Kant's lies in the different concepts of the principle of reason
(Kant) or the language game (Wittgenstein) - whether the inherited concept
(reason or language games) can be justified, questioned or changed.
Wittgenstein, in contrast to Kant, holds that "a language game does change
with time" (Wittgenstein, 1969, 256, 34e).
Here, I am not intending to delve into the nature of knowledge or its
metaphysical existence. Rather, I focus on the concept of knowledge in
reality, because it is more significant for a critical thinker than the concept
of knowledge of the a priori. For critical thinkers, knowledge should be
questionable, and should be reflected upon, in order that knowledge will
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not be alienated from human life. In a word, knowledge as such may be
changed with time and space, i.e. with the change of circumstances of
human life. This knowledge, which is called knowledge in reality in this
thesis, is different from a priori knowledge.
In this sense, knowledge should not violate the development of human
reason. Knowledge learned from schooling should not be taken as an
unquestionable authority. It must be reflected upon, when it violates the
development of human reason or lifeworld.
That is, teaching critical thinking is compatible with knowledge teaching,
because knowledge is viewed as 'rational authority', in William Hare's
terms, and can be challenged in both two sorts of teaching. Hare claims
that "authority itself is not incompatible with open-mindedness, since
rational authority derives from knowledge and claims to knowledge can be
challenged" (Hare, 1985, 58).
Therefore, the argument that teaching critical thinking is compatible with
knowledge teaching must endorse the idea of teaching and learning as
thinking and experiencing. Teaching and 'learning as thinking' demand not
only teaching and learning knowledge, but also reflecting upon it.
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Confucius confirms this idea by saying that, "learning without thinking
cannot lead to profound understanding; on the other hand, thinking without
learning can go astray [Here, thinking without learning implies that
thinking takes place with a lack of background knowledge.]" (Analects, ch.
2).
Thinking and reflection help pupils to avoid being indoctrinated. Teaching
critical thinking carries the same goal as knowledge teaching, in terms of
avoiding being indoctrinated. I agree with William Hare's claims that no
matter whether valuable ideas can be picked up in textbooks or not,
"students can be encouraged, directly and indirectly, to reflect on the
values and beliefs they are acquiring, so that the danger of unthinking
commitment is minimised" (Hare, 1985, 58). This confirms the claim that
teaching and learning through thinking can avoid being indoctrinated.
According to the process of critical thinking, questioning about existing
values and beliefs is the first step towards further reflection and then to
emancipating children themselves from being indoctrinated or dominated.
Teaching for critical thinking is the same as knowledge teaching in helping
children to master their background knowledge. However, furnishing
children with adequate background knowledge is not a sufficient but a
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necessary task for teaching critical thinking and knowledge teaching.
According to the cognitive process of critical thinkers, adequate
background knowledge is the necessary constituent for human insights. In
other words, the expansion of human insight is influenced by background
knowledge. That is, background knowledge provides cognitive style with
the sources of cognition. According to the characteristics of critical
thinking, knowledge can be re-categorised into different cognitive styles by
a critical thinker, whereas it will be kept in one's brain without any change
by one who is not a critical thinker.
From the above discussion, the tension between teaching critical thinking
and knowledge teaching, arises from a distortion or a misunderstanding of
the concepts of a priori knowledge and knowledge in reality and of
teaching and learning. If the aim of knowledge teaching rests on the
enlightenment of human reason, rather than on indoctrination, then
teachers and knowledge will not be viewed as authorities. Knowledge
should not be unquestionable, but changeable. Also, learning will not be
taken as a process of giving and taking by memorising, but as the activity
of thinking and experiencing. Therefore, the tension between teaching
critical thinking and knowledge teaching would be overcome, if the
distortion or misunderstanding of the concept of teaching and learning is
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clarified.
According to the nature of critical thinking, the relationship between
learning, thinking, and knowledge must be dialectic. Knowledge is
absorbed into our brains by learning, and it will be reflected upon through
thinking. After learning and thinking, knowledge is expanded through
reconstruction. During the process of reconstruction, 'theoretical'
knowledge is transferred into 'practical' knowledge synthetically.
Theoretical knowledge is assumed to be constituted through abstract
thinking, e.g., imagination, meditation and so on, while practical
knowledge is acquired from experiencing things in life. Theoretical
knowledge can be learned from hearing and memorising, while practical
knowledge must be learned from doing, seeing, practising and so on.
It is in these two ways, i.e. the ways for learning theoretical and practical
knowledge, that children construct and accumulate their knowledge.
McLean in a report on 'moral education' points out that pupils develop
moral understanding and generalise moral principles by establishing,
explaining and enforcing rules; then they grow toward self-discipline
(ASCD, 1988, 25-27). This is a case in which students reconstruct
knowledge through connecting the knowledge learned from schooling with
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that of their lives.
In noting the processes of the acquisition of knowledge, education should
leave enough room for children to experience and think about their lives,
and to reconstruct their knowledge without any fear. That is the idea of
autonomy - let children be themselves instead of forming them as
miniature adults. This should be the fundamental principle for teaching
critical thinking and for knowledge teaching.
B. The transferability of critical thinking dispositions and
abilities
After the argument that teaching critical thinking is compatible with
knowledge teaching has been justified, whether critical thinking is
transferable, and how far it can be transferred will be argued. I will argue
that abilities can only be transferred where there is a similarity of structure
between two areas. This argument will be dealt with, because the nature of
transferability is relative to teaching critical thinking: how do we teach
critical thinking and what should be taught?
However, whether critical thinking dispositions and abilities are
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transferable is still arguable. For example, McPeck holds that critical
thinking can not - automatically - be transferred. For him, skills which can
be transferred, especially through training, cannot be critical thinking
skills. McPeck says,
there is... no reason to believe that a person who thinks critically in one area
will be able to do so in another. The transfer of training skills cannot be
assumed of critical thinking but must be established in each case by means
of empirical tests. (McPeck, 1981, 7)
Ennis holds a quite different view from McPeck on the relationship
between transferable skills and abilities and critical thinking dispositions
and abilities. I shall discuss Ennis' idea later on.
In my view, whether a critical thinker can transfer critical thinking
dispositions and abilities to another area depends upon two factors:
a) whether the critical thinker's understanding about the areas of
knowledge between which he wants to transfer abilities extends to a
sufficient degree to recognise the similarity among them. Without this
understanding, he can neither work out the similarity between these two
areas of knowledge, nor discover or create a common category for the
knowledge in different areas; and
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b) whether there exists initially similarity between these two areas of
knowledge.
Therefore, McPeck's argument that "there is no reason to believe that a
person who thinks critically in one area will be able to do so in another"
does not mean that there is no way for critical thinking ability or
dispositions to transfer. The reason McPeck offered for claiming that
critical thinking dispositions and abilities cannot be transferred seems too
weak to be sustained.
For Fisher, the abilities and skills of critical thinking are not only
transferable, but also teachable. When talking about teaching critical
thinking, he suggests that
[teachers] must teach students how to identify what is at issue, how to pick
out the question to be answered, how to evaluate and produce reasoning for
and against the point at issue, how to judge the strength of basic claims,
how to detect (fallacious) assumptions, not just in some specific domain,
but over many domains. (Fisher, 1990, 3)
All skills which are claimed as transferable skills in Fisher's statements are
involved in those abilities analysed in this thesis, such as, skepticism
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(inquiry), reflection (understanding), emancipation and reconstruction.
Nevertheless, the ability for critical thinking could be described differently
by using a different categorisation of its constituent abilities. What this
thesis offers is just an example, which is grounded in the development of
human life and illuminates the process of human life by seeing it as
problem-solving. Also, this categorisation will be used when the
transferability of critical thinking dispositions and abilities and the
principles for teaching critical thinking are discussed.
In a word, in principle, critical thinking dispositions and abilities should be
transferable. The issue will be : how far critical thinking abilities can be
transferable. Ennis points out the conditions for the transferability of
critical thinking dispositions and abilities:
simple transfer of critical thinking dispositions and abilities from one
domain to another domain is unlikely. However, transfer becomes likely if,
but only if, (1) there is sufficient practice in a variety of domains and (2)
there is instruction that focuses on transfer (Ennis, 1989, 5).
Ennis argues that the possibility of transferable skills lies in whether
transferable skills have been taught, and whether the idea of transfer itself
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has been made explicit. I agree that skills, including transferable skills,
could be acquired through practice and learning from instruction. Yet, I
disagree with Ennis that 'only if there is sufficient practice in a variety of
domains', then transferability is possible. This is also McPeck's criticism.
It can be agreed that once 'sufficient practice' becomes a habit, skills will
be automatically transferable among the areas, with which men are familiar
due to sufficient practice. In my view, this is one aspect of transfer, and it
is not limited to critical thinkers.
On the other hand, critical thinkers must be able to transfer critical
thinking disposition and ability, to a field with which they could be
unfamiliar altogether (so that there can have been no practice to prepare
the way). In this situation, critical thinking must use the ability of
imagination-with-reason to sort out the similarity between different fields
of knowledge. This reveals the difference between critical thinkers and
others who are not critical thinkers. In this sense, the foundation abilities
of a critical thinker are significant for transferability. Yet, it does mean
that transferable skills or ability must be learned from sufficient practice.
It can merely be claimed that sufficient practice may be helpful for transfer
in that background knowledge, including skills and ability, is accumulated,
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so that the range of understanding may be expanded.
However, in noting the different mode of critical thinking, critical thinkers
are expected to be able to transfer learned skills to the domain of the
unknown. It is in this way that human history has been brought forward
through the solution of human problems. In this sense, a critical thinker
should be capable of exercising effectively his foundation abilities to
resolve the problems he faces. The problems are not necessarily and
automatically similar to that of his experiences or his cognitive styles. This
is a place where a critical thinker must transfer his foundation abilities to
the unknown. On this account, Ennis' claims about the possibility of
transferable skills is here criticised as too narrow to cover the range of
transferability of critical thinking dispositions and abilities.
More than that, as mentioned, transferable skills acquired from sufficient
practice, as Ennis indicates, are habit-forming skills*. I wonder, as
McPeck did, if such a way of learning - learning and practising critical
thinking in a variety of domains between which abilities will be transferred
- should be the way to learn how to think critically. It seems to me that
* habit-forming skills: the phrase 'habit-forming skills' is used of skills the exercise at
which tends to become habitual.
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learning in such a way will narrow critical thinking to the aspect of skills.
Then critical thinking will be devalued to the level of instrument rather
than the level of the development of human reason.
Habit-forming thinking* will decrease the function of critical thinking,
when it simplifies and unifies the process of thinking. A person who
exercises habit-forming thinking is supposed to "employ certain
procedures, abide by certain goals, encode certain factors, manifest a
certain cognitive style, use certain strategies to control cognitive load, and
so on" (Nickerson, Perkins & Smith, eds, 1985, 54). In this way, the
flexibility of thinking may be reduced. That is because "skillful thinking
might be defined as the ability to apply knowledge effectively", as
Nickerson claims (Nickerson, Perkins & Smith (eds.), 1985, 48).
Chambers points out that it is in this way that "training is complex and
detailed and it will often shade off into education" (Chambers, 1983, 24).
* habit-forming thinking: in psychology, mastery skills generally require memory and
practice, by which one is accustomed to an action, and in the end, reflex connection is
formed. Thinking formed in this way is defined as habit-forming thinking in this thesis;
one becomes habitant to think in a particular way.
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Nonetheless, habit-forming thinking cannot be confused with critical
thinking skills. Habit-forming thinking may become a brain-training,
which is one kind of indoctrination, as on a behaviorist account. In
contrast, if habit-forming thinking functions simply as an activity of
cognition, then a person will not confine himself to such a thinking style,
but benefit from it in expanding his knowledge. Kruglanski points out that
a critical thinker should be able to have the 'freezing mechanism' come to a
halt at some points (Kruglanski, 1981, 281). Here the term 'freezing
mechanism' means that the model of thinking is simply operated habitually
like a machine. Kruglanski acknowledges the fact that critical thinking is a
crucial element in distinguishing 'freezing' from 'unfreezing' in the
mechanism (Kruglanski, 1981, 281). This implies that critical thinking can
unfreeze the mechanism, while habit-forming thinking merely functions as
a freezing mechanism.
On this account, whether habit-forming thinking will retard critical
thinking depends upon how individual capacity and motivation operate
habit-forming thinking (rather than upon habit-forming thinking itself). In
this sense, Ennis seems to emphasise the aspect of the object rather than the
subject, when he claims that "transfer becomes likely only through
sufficient practice" (Ennis, 1989, 5).
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Subjectivity is a core concept for critical thinking. As Ruggiero reminds
us "Socrates' direction, "know thyself," is one of the cornerstones of
Western philosophy and remains an imperative for the teaching of thinking
skills" (Ruggiero, 1988, 56). In noting this, teaching for critical thinking
should consider the element of subjectivity. It is through subjectivity that
habit-forming thinking will not become a freezing mechanism. Also, it is
through subjectivity that the dimensions of transferability becomes varied
through the different categorisations of knowledge.
Now, I will move my discussion of transferability of critical thinking from
the practical level to the metaphysical level. Metaphysically, the
transferability of critical thinking dispositions and abilities rests on two
elements: the structure of knowledge itself, and individual ability at
transfer. In other words, knowledge itself must contain in its structure the
possibility of transfer, otherwise, abilities cannot be transferred. On the
other hand, the possibility of transfer must be recognised by human beings,
since the transfer cannot happen by itself.
These two dimensions of transferability of knowledge - knowledge itself
and the ability for transfer - will be analysed so as to clarify the
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transferability of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. First, the point
that the transferability of abilities rests on the similarity within knowledge
itself will be discussed. Given that a critical thinker is assumed to be able
to exercise his foundation abilities effectively, and given that every critical
thinker possesses a similar ability for transfer, different results of
transferability might still occur. For example, given that both pupils A and
B exercise their skills and dispositions in 'playing the piano' very well, it
could happen to them that they transfer different aspects the same skills or
dispositions to varied fields. Say, pupil A transfers his to dance, while
pupil B transfer them to typing.
This difference results not only from individual intelligence and ability, but
also from the structure of knowledge itself. In other words, one can
transfer the skills or abilities of 'playing the piano' to that of 'typing' or
'dancing', because there is similarity between 'playing the piano' and
'dancing', and between 'playing the piano' and 'typing'. On the other hand,
the reason why pupil A transfers the skills or abilities of "playing the
piano" to 'dancing', while pupil B transfers them to 'typing' is that they
have recognised different similarities between the activities: pupil A sorts
out the similarity in terms of melodics, while pupil B sorts out the
similarity in terms of mechanics.
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Therefore, knowledge can only be transferred either where different fields
of knowledge share a similar structure with each other, or where a person
can put knowledge into the categories in accordance with his cognitive
styles. In this way, knowledge can be grasped by working out its
categories, and it will be expanded by creating a new category for
knowledge.
As Hirst claims, "knowledge is hierarchically structured in various levels"
(Hirst, in Dearden, 1972, 392). Knowledge can be grasped through varied
categories. For example, Kant categorises knowledge into experienced,
empirical and pure knowledge (Kant; Smith, (trans.). 1968, 43, 53), or
constitutive and regulative knowledge (Kant; Smith, (trans.). 1968,
517-554), while Habermas categorises it into empirical-analytical,
hermeneutic-historical and emancipatory-critical knowledge (Habermas;
Viertal (trans.), 1971). In addition, knowledge can be categorised into
absolute, phenomenal and essential knowledge (Tran, 1989, 266); content
and general pedagogical and curriculum knowledge (Grant, 1988, 41);
factual and value knowledge (Koch, 1969, 133); objective and subjective
knowledge (Goldman,1986, 3) and Hirst's forms of knowledge, etc. The
above varied categorisations show us that the categorisations of knowledge
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can be different. However, there must exist a commonality among varied
areas of knowledge within the same category.
Therefore, to categorise knowledge becomes a task of critical thinkers,
when their background knowledge will be integrated into knowledge in
reality. In order to reach this task, adequate background knowledge will
be necessary. The more background knowledge one has, the more
possibility one can establish or 'create' the category of knowledge. Then,
the more possibility that knowledge can be transferred. Here, 'background
knowledge' implies the ability a man has to understand the circumstances
around him. In this sense, background knowledge is then important for
transfer, because it is relative to the ability for understanding. Then, the
more understanding of knowledge, the more universal the category that can
be established. Here, the term 'universal category' means the ground of the
category of knowledge. If the category is universal, then the more
different fields of knowledge can be involved in it. Kant confirms the
value of universal category. He says,
the absolutely necessary is only intended to serve as a principle for
obtaining the greatest possible unity among appearances, as being their
ultimate ground... such a necessary original being were presupposed as an
ultimate ground. (Kant; Smith, (trans.), 1968, 516 - 7)
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Also, Grene confirms that "the more we pursue the universal
characteristics, the more we are forced to qualify them.., and a theoretical
attitude always aims at universality"(Grene, 1969, 280-1).
Kleinig takes the discipline of mathematics as an example to explain the
possible transferability of knowledge, in terms of the structure of
knowledge itself. He states that the abilities of mathematics are transferable
between arithmetic, calculus, Euclidean, Riemaunian geometry etc.
(Kleinig, 1982, 153). There must be somehow similarities between the
branches of mathematics - arithmetic, calculus, Euclidean and Riemaunian
geometry - so that the knowledge can be transferred from one to the other.
The similarities between them could be logical thinking, reasoning,
cognitive abilities and basic mathematical operations etc. This is a case
where there are similarities between different subjects of knowledge.
Yet, two situations could happen. First, not all students can transfer their
mathematical knowledge equally to arithmetic, calculus, Euclidean and
geometry etc, although there may exist similarities between these branches
themselves. Second, even though students have the same background
knowledge about mathematics, such background knowledge may be
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transferred to different domains, e.g. arithmetic, calculus or geometry etc.
That is, the transfer of knowledge is relative not only to knowledge itself,
in terms of its category, but also to the knower, in terms of the ability for
categorisation.
For example, given that students have learned the same knowledge about
mathematics, and given that there are similarities within mathematics
between arithmetic and geometry, then person A can transfer his
knowledge about mathematics to arithmetic, when he is learning arithmetic;
on the other hand, pupil B has the same background knowledge as pupil A
has, however, he cannot transfer his background knowledge about
mathematics to arithmetics, but to geometry. This example shows the
significance of the knower himself in the transferability of knowledge.
(There might be a psychological basis for this in one person having more
aptitude in manipulation of abstract numbers, another in visualisation of
shapes and areas.)
In other words, whether critical thinking in mathematics can be transferred
between different branches of the subject depends upon whether critical
thinkers can work out the similarity between the branches already know
and those that are unknown. On a par with the case, which I described,
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that the skills of 'playing the piano' can be transferred to 'dancing' or
'typing', the knower must be able to categorise knowledge into his
cognitive styles so that the transfer and understanding of knowledge
becomes possible.
In this sense, the transferability of knowledge is therefore limited to
individual capacity of categorisation. A critical thinker with adequate
background knowledge is assumed to be able to categorise the unknown
knowledge according to his cognitive styles' by seeking the similarities
between the known and the unknown. This is the function of
reconstruction, and it is in this way that critical thinkers expand their
knowledge through reconstructing the categories of knowledge.
Therefore, adequate background knowledge constitutes the possibility for
transfer. Thus, the range and possibility of transfer is marked by the
extent and variety of similarities in knowledge which one can work out.
Adequate background knowledge here means the ability for categorising
knowledge according to one's cognitive styles. In this sense, understanding
constitutes the possibility of categorisation. Understanding, according to
the characteristics of critical thinking, is the outcome of interaction
between skepticism (inquiry) and reflection. With understanding,
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comparison and synthesis become possible. Comparison and synthesis are
thought to be two processes of categorisation.
In addition to the ability for understanding, the ability for imagination is
needed for transfer, because imagination has a synthetic potential, as Szwed
claims, quoting from Kierkegaard's Sickness Unto Death,
inasmuch as the self is a synthesis of finitude and infinitude, is, potential, in
order to become itself it reflects itself in the medium of imagination, and
thereby the infinite possibility becomes manifest. (Szwed, in McLean,
(ed.), 1991, Ch. 3, p. 2)
McLean assumes imagination is an ability which makes the extension of
knowledge possible. Worgul's claims confirm this idea. He says,
in essence, then, the imagination is the point of human contact with the real.
Imagination continually calls the human to seek union with the experience of
difference. Cognitive theory or epistemology must .. .include imagination
as the crucial power which makes knowledge possible. (Worgul, in
McLean, 1991, Ch.VI, 13)
It is through imagination that critical thinkers bring the known and the
unknown together. Also, imagination enables a person to uncover the
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diverse ways of his mind, and therefore, knowledge of the known can be
linked with that of the unknown through imagination. This function leads
the knower to a new terrain of knowledge.
However, imagination may take the risk of making a mistaken judgment,
during the process of linking knowledge of the known with that of the
unknown. In this sense, knowledge which is acquired through imagination
needs to be reflected upon. Therefore, the abilities for reflection and
imagination are needed during the process of transfer. Imagination is
aimed at establishing the linkage between different domains of knowledge,
while reflection reduces the risk of imagination. That is the reason why
the ability of imagination-with-reason rather than imagination or reason
was used in the supernatural mode of critical thinking.
In general, in order to transfer foundation abilities to other domains of
knowledge, a critical thinker should be skilled at:
a) recognising through understanding similarities in domains of knowledge;
b) categorising different domains of knowledge in accordance with his
cognitive styles; and
c) adequately linking knowledge of the known with the unknown through
'imagination-with-reason', reflection and reconstruction. During this
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process, expansion of knowledge means an emancipation of human
reason.
In sum, these two arguments about teaching critical thinking are raised,
partly because of the misconception about teaching, e.g., taking knowledge
teaching as an activity of giving-taking rather than learning as thinking
(both arguments A and B); partly because of misunderstanding about the
nature of critical thinking abilities and critical thinkers (argument B).
Clarifying the nature of critical thinking and critical thinkers paves the way
for teaching critical thinking. This task was carried out through clarifying
two arguments: the tension between teaching for critical thinking and
knowledge teaching; and the transferability of critical thinking dispositions
and abilities, including the distinction between habit-forming thinking and
critical thinking.
The possibility for teaching critical thinking will be identified, so that its
instructional principles can be worked out. This task will be aimed at
establishing the relation between critical thinker's background knowledge
and the form of curricula.
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II. Foundation abilities and the curriculum
Different conceptions of teaching give rise to different instructional
principles. Similarly, divergent concepts of teaching critical thinking
result in different instructional principles. Therefore, in order to establish
a consensus on instructional principles for teaching critical thinking,
clarifying the concept of teaching critical thinking is needed. For example,
reaching a consensus on questions such as can critical thinking be taught;
and what is taught and how? These are also concerned with curricular
design for teaching critical thinking. This section will work out the
relationship between teaching critical thinking and its curricular design.
The critical thinker's background knowledge, consisting of critical thinking
dispositions and abilities will be considered, where curriculum is designed.
First, what critical thinking dispositions and abilities can be taught will be
identified. In my view, only the dispositions and abilities which constitute
the foundation abilities of a critical thinker can be taught. The idea is that
schooling can help children to be critical thinkers but nobody can make
anyone think critically, because a critical thinker is an autonomous person
rather than a person who is determined. In general, two forms of
approach, i.e. teaching of specific abilities and cross disciplinary practice,
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are involved. Therefore, how to arrange these two disciplines into
teaching critical thinking adequately in accordance with the direct goal of
teaching, in terms of foundation abilities will be discussed.
Background knowledge, which is constituted by one's foundation abilities,
is important for a person to plan his life. As Rawis claimed, "one can
choose his or her own life plan, which plan then determines what his or her
concept of the good is" (Rawis, 1972, 12). This implies not only that one
can "become what you are" (Cooper, 1983, 16), but also that one's plan
will determines one's value system. In other words, the value system is
formed by the individual's understanding of knowledge, while the value
system, however, will also affect cognition, which is grounded in one's
background knowledge.
The relation between background knowledge and the individual's value
system is similar to that of between a critical thinker's insight and his
cognitive style, as explained in chapter four. In this sense, background
knowledge may be built up through schooling, on the other hand, value
systems must be established by the individual. However, as claimed, the
more comprehensive background knowledge one has got, the wider the
frame of reference one can use. Swartz emphasises the importance of the
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frame of reference for critical thinking. He says, the frame of reference,
i.e. foundation abilities, "must be viewed as necessary underpinnings of any
good critical thinking" (Swartz, in Baron & Sternberg (eds.), 1990, 111).
The question then will be: what foundation abilities should critical thinkers
have?
The abilities for skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction
constitute the necessary not the sufficient conditions for critical thinkers.
With the abilities of skepticism (inquiry), reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction, a person can think critically. Also, it is with these abilities
that one's knowledge is expanded. However, these abilities must be
exercised by an autonomous person so that critical thinking can be
revealed. This is the reason why two persons who possess the same
abilities of skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction, in
terms of quantity and quality, may not both be critical thinkers, or they
may both think critically but in different areas of knowledge. This is,
partly because the ability of transferability or categorisation is varied, as
discussed in the previous section; partly because critical thinkers must be
autonomous people, so that they organise their cognitive styles in
accordance with the circumstances they face.
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The abilities of skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction can
be learned from schooling, while the ability for autonomy needs to be
learned from experiencing via seif-realisation, self-reflection and
seif-actualisation. The abilities for skepticism, reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction constitute the foundation abilities of critical thinking, while
the ability for autonomy manifests the significance of the subjectivity in the
development of human reason. In other words, the ability of autonomy
plays the drawing force of critical thinking, while the abilities of
skepticism, reflection, emancipation and reconstruction are the sources of
critical thinking. In this sense, the abilities of skepticism, reflection,
emancipation and reconstruction can be taught, while the ability for
autonomy relies on self-education on the basis of one's foundation abilities.
Therefore, the principles for teaching critical thinking suggested in this
chapter will be the pedagogical principles for teaching the foundation
abilities of critical thinkers, i.e. the abilities for skepticism, reflection,
emancipation and reconstruction. Then, how to design appropriate
curricula for teaching such foundation abilities will be discussed. In other
words, how to teach such foundation abilities, either through a specific
teaching or a cross curriculum, needs to be discussed.
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The curriculum designed for teaching critical thinking should be in
accordance with the direct goal of teaching. The direct goal of teaching
should be varied for different children in accordance with their individual
demand for learning, in terms of individual aim and ability. For example,
given that children have learned cognitive skills and problem-solving
methods for identifying central issues, making comparisons, determining
relevance, judging information, checking for consistency, recognising
assumptions and distinguishing false from accurate images, then a direct
goal for teaching critical thinking may be how to help children to integrate
such skills into their lives. For instance, how to use such skills for
recognising their ideologies. In contrast, if children have not learnt
problem-solving skills as such or other prerequisites, then the direct goal
for teaching critical thinking may be aimed at improving children's skills
for solving problems or other prerequisites, which are needed for children
to cope better with their lives.
In general, a cross curricular approach may be appropriate for offering
children more opportunities to connect dispositions and abilities, learned
from schooling, with their lives. On the other hand, a teaching of specific
abilities lays emphasis on the requirement of particular skills or abilities, in
order to furnish children with adequate foundation abilities of critical
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thinking. In other words, when specific cognitive skills and abilities are
taught, a teaching of such specific abilities may be appropriate; while a
cross curricular approach will be appropriate when the direct aim of
teaching lies in helping children to practise the skill of integration, to
experience their basic skills and abilities in their lives, and to establish their
own value systems with these basic skills and abilities. These basic
disposition, skills and abilities constitute the sources of cognition.
Two key ideas about teaching for critical thinking must be clarified, no
matter whether critical thinking is taught via teaching of specific abilities
or cross-disciplinary experience. First, the ultimate educational aim must
rest on the idea of educating a whole person. Although school-subject
knowledge is not necessarily identical to everyday knowledge,
school-subject knowledge should not be alienated children from their lives.
Second, teaching specific abilities and a cross-disciplinary recognition of
the abilities serve as dialectical curricula for teaching critical thinking.
Teaching of specific abilities and cross-curricular approach should be
constituted in a synthetic way for teaching critical thinking, by which
children combine school-subject knowledge with everyday knowledge. For
example, to acquire a specific skill, direct teaching may be appropriate to
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meet this demand. To learn an ability for integrating knowledge with life,
a cross-curricular approach may be the appropriate one. After learning
specific abilities through direct teaching of them, the use of the abilities in
a variety of domains needs to be followed up, so that children can integrate
specific skills either with other domains of knowledge, or with their lives.
This is the dialectical way of curricula design.
In this sense, any one of these curricula may be insufficient for teaching
critical thinking. For instance, logic skills first of all should be taught
directly, so that children can concentrate on learning the 'skills' of logic
thinking.	 After children have learned basic skills about logic,
cross-disciplinary experience, e.g., applied logic, should be provided, so
that children can integrate their knowledge about logic into their real lives.
And then, further specific teaching of advanced knowledge of logic, which
is grounded in children's basic ability of logic, will be needed again. In
this sense, a fixed curriculum for teaching critical thinking is inadequate
for matching this need.
In other words, the specific teaching and cross-disciplinary elements of the
curriculum need to be designed dialectically, so that schooling knowledge
will not be alienated from knowledge in reality. Within this idea, the
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principle for designing specific teaching or cross-disciplinary experience
for teaching critical thinking can be illustrated as follows:
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specific teaching ---> establishing background/1
teaching for
abilities	 knowledge about critical thinking
critical thinking
critical thinking (
	
dispositions &
cross-disciplinary -------> integrating school knowledge
experience	 wit/i knowledge in reality
figure 7.1 The type of curricula for teaching critical thinking
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According to the spirit of curricular design for teaching critical thinking as
such, teaching for critical thinking should not be expected to make one
critical, but it can help one to develop the ability for critical thinking
through individual experiencing. Education therefore can provide children
with means and knowledge to think and think critically, but children must
themselves engage in developing the ability for critical thinking. As a
Chinese motto says, 'education can only offer children fishing poles or
even fishing bait, yet children must fish by themselves'. This again reveals
the distinction between education and indoctrination by showing the
subjectivity of an autonomous person.
Next, the principles for teaching background knowledge of critical
thinking, i.e. the abilities for skepticism, reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction, will be worked out with reference to teachers.
III. Pedagogical principles
As Lipman (1988), Siegel (1988) and Weinstein (1991) claim, critical
thinking can be seen as a foundation and ideal for education (Weinstein,
1991, 95 & 97). If this is the case, then teaching for critical thinking
should become one of the important goals of education. How to help
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teachers to attain this goal will be the concern of this section.
Two fundamental principles for teaching critical thinking will be
mentioned, before the principles for teaching the abilities of skepticism
(inquiry), reflection, emancipation and reconstruction will be suggested.
First, a basic consensus on education is that a variety of teaching materials
or methods for varied groups are needed for teaching critical thinking,
because teaching must be in accordance with various groups of children's
abilities. As Ennis suggests, "different groups (boys and girls; social class
groups; high, medium, and low mental ability groups) need different
approaches" (Ennis, 1962, 109).
Second, a democratic principle is also a general principle for teaching
critical thinking. Under this principle, children are allowed to explore
alternatives, to consider stereotypes, conventional and controversial ideas.
In other words, teachers should let children be free to speak and to think in
their own ways. According to Habermas (1984), ideally, democratic
principles demand us not only to persuade but also to listen to and to have
concern for others. Also, democracy implies that everybody should be
taken as an autonomous person, and society should be constituted by these
people (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984).
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On the ground of these two general principles, the principles for teaching
critical thinking, in terms of the abilities for skepticism (inquiry),
reflection, emancipation and reconstruction will be worked out.
The first principle is the principle for teaching the ability of inquiry.
Inquiry is stimulated by sensitivity and curiosity. Sensitivity and curiosity
might be in accordance with personality. This is shown in Krippner's
research. He formulates four types of personality to show the varied
method of inquiry: sensing-thinking, sensing-feeling, intuition-feeling and
intuition-thinking (Krippner, 1983, 86-9). In other words, man makes
inquiry through senses, thinking, feeling and intuition. In this sense,
experiencing will play a crucial role for acquiring such abilities.
Irrational situations provide children with chances to question. Also, vague
circumstances, in which the value system is uncertain and needs to be
established, will stimulate children's curiosity to inquiry. By and large, a
predicament results in unsettled issues, and inquiry emerges from unsettled
issues. Where there is no challenge, no problem, no difficulty, there is no
inquiry, no creation, no innovation. A new paradigm for solving a new
problem is sought, when men are faced with an anomaly in which existing
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rules, methods and even knowledge are failing to meet new problems.
Weinstein suggests that inquiring ability must be taught through learning
by experiencing, and should not be fixed on a specific dimension of
thinking. Fixing our thinking on a specific dimension is a sort of
habit-forming thinking, which could prevent the development of critical
thinking. Weinstein explains that
inquiry, and its epistemological foundations, are contextually embedded in
discourse frames, and so must permit criticism and change in the light of
advances in the understanding of inquiry itself. What we will attempt here
is flexible enough to respond to new conceptions, while retaining a
sufficiently robust core so as to serve as a basis for a rational criterion and
progressive change. (Weinstein, 1992, 95-6)
Following Weinstein's suggestions, children should be encouraged to
develop their minds in many ways and to explore open-ended challenges, in
order to expand the range of their inquiry. Also, Sweers reminds us that
genuine Socratic questioning challenges children to think critically (Sweers,
1988, 20-2).
Within the situation in which inquiry has emerged, imagination functions as
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a connector between the known and the unknown. Imaginatioffi in this sense
is then significant for human beings towards a good life. This has been
highlighted by Worgul. He lists scholars' concerns about imagination:
Paul Ricoeur and David Tracy have highlighted imaginations operation in
hermeneutics. William Lynch has unfolded a christology and theological
anthropology explicitly grounded in imagination theory. Harvey Cox has
explored imagination in the interrelationships of religion and culture. Phil
Keane has rooted an ethics in imagination theory, Ray Hart has analysed the
relationship of imagination and revelation, and I [Worgul] have sketched the
place of imagination in ritual, sacraments and Eucharistic theology.
(Worgul, in McLean (ed.), 1991, ch.VI)
In this sense, developing the ability of inquiry should be in company with
developing the ability for imagination.
Second, the principle for teaching the ability of reflection will be
suggested. Reflection is the activity of the self. Self bears a variety of
capacities, e.g, self-discovery, self-governance, self-control,
self-monitoring, self-expression, self-development etc. In Toulmin's
summarisation, the usages of the term 'self reveals three functions:
a) self- and - self, treated as reflexive, auxiliary prefixes or postfixes in
everyday colloquial language [for example, self-esteem];
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b) self, treated as the name of a hypothetical entity, or intervening
explanatory variable, in speculative psychological theories [for instance,
transcendental self]; and
c) self, treated as a diagnostic term, in clinical psychotherapy and
comparable, non-medical modes of psychological description [for
example, ego]. (Toulmin, in Mischel, 1977, 291)
In addition, Frankfurt (1972) adds the freedom of will to the self
(Frankfurt, quoted by Lindley, 1986, 65). This stresses the reflective
function of the self. Reflection shows the self a function of examination,
when self faces a perplexing circumstance. Lindley takes falling in love as
an example to illuminate the significance of reflection. He describes,
you might have the thought I know it is crazy to tie myself down in this
way, but that is what I really want to do, because I am so much in love,
and it would be a betrayal of my love to be moved by calculations about the
future. (Lindley, 1986, 91)
After clarifying the relationship between the self and reflection, three
pedagogical principles for teaching the ability of reflection will be
suggested. First, every child's self should be taken as a whole agent: a
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child is assumed to be able to think by themselves. In other words,
children should not be taken as 'things' but human beings. In this sense,
teaching and learning should not be taken as a process of giving-taking, but
an activity of self through reflection.
In addition, Gates suggests that the development of self provides educators
with a conceptual framework for viewing the affective and cognitive
domains as they exist in the wholeness of the real world (Gates, 1982, 90,
93). It implies that children's lives include not only the cognitive aspect,
but also the aspect of affection. Therefore, children should learn how to
harmonise rationally their lives through ability of reflection. This is an
activity of learning by thinking. In other words, teaching for the ability of
reflection should emphasise the activity of thinking rather than the activity
of mechanism, e.g., memorisation.
As Passmore pointed out, education is an activity of learning by thinking,
whereas indoctrination is learning by taking. He states:
the fundamental difference between the educator and indoctrinator is that the
indoctrinator treats all rules as "inherent in the nature of things" - as not
even conceivably bad rules... The educator, on the contrary, welcomes
criticism, and is prepared to admit that he does not always know the
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answers to them. (Passmore, 1980, 180)
'Learning by thinking' is a learning with self-reflection, whereas 'learning
by taking' is merely a mechanic as learning without reflection. 'Learning
by thinking' prevents children from being indoctrinated, while 'learning by
taking' may be devalued teaching and learning at an instrumental level.
Children learn how to regulate themselves and how to harmonise the
relationship between the individual and society through reflection.
Therefore, communication provides an opportunity for children to exercise
self-reflection. During communication, children exercise their abilities of
inquiry and reflection,when their own ideologies are challenged and when
they challenge other's ideologies through rational and open argumentation.
Simultaneously, children should be encouraged to review their prejudices
or ideas through such discussions. 	 After experiencing rational
communication, in which inquiry and reflection are involved, children are
expected to learn skills and abilities for democratic discussion. They also
should experience and learn how to control anxiety, emotions or passions.
After that, children will be able to scrutinise prejudice, be sensitive to
uncritical or irrational pitfalls, before they make a judgment.
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Third, the principle for teaching the ability of emancipation will be
discussed. It seems to me that education should take the responsibility to
bring children forth from their heritage to a new value system.
Emancipation is this task.
Emancipation is the first step to create a new dimension of life. Human
progress implies such a rational emancipation from a heritage or tradition.
As McLean points out,
if life as an ongoing process is neither the useless repetition of a broken
record nor the random confusion of the proverbial "tale told by an idiot",
then it must have unity, continuity and cohesion, as well as novelty,
direction and meaning. This implies having a heritage or tradition but it
implies as well that it be possible to bring forth from that heritage things
both old and new. (McLean, 1986, 1)
In order to formulate instructional principles for emancipation, its nature
needs to be clarified. The etymological meaning of emancipation can be
shown in Lukes' analysis. He explains that
emancipation is a term which derives from the Latin emancipare, which in
turn derives from e + manus + capare meaning to set free a child or wife
from the patria potestas and later of course to set free from slavery, and
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hence generally from civil disabilities. (Lukes, 1985, 28)
In Lukes' case, emancipation implies a change of interpersonal
relationships, e.g., father - son (parents - children), husband - wife or
master - slave. This case shows that emancipation stems from reflection,
while reflection makes human enlightenment possible. The relationship of
dominator-dominated will be changed through emancipation, because a
liberal opportunity to escape from coercive constraints is opened up. Thus,
release from a dominant relationship can be taken as the cornerstone of
emancipation.
Enlightenment of reason will be possible through emancipation, because
authority is not only examined, but also transcended. For example, a slave
could turn his life in a new direction, and becomes a free person - at least
mentally - once he emancipates himself from the fetter of his master,
through reflecting upon the domination of the master.
In order to emancipate men themselves from the constraint of tradition,
imagination is needed to create new dimensions of thinking and cognition.
Therefore, providing children with enough room for developing their
ability for imagination is also vital for the development of the ability of
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emancipation.
However, imagination must be in company with reason so that imagination
will not become naive. Heidegger confirms the function of
imagination-with-reason in Kant and the Problem of Metqphysics by saying
that
by his radical interrogation, Kant brought the "possibility" of metaphysics
before the abyss. He saw the unknown, he had to draw back. Not only did
his imagination fill him with alarm, but in the meantime he had come more
and more under the influence of pure reason as such. (Heidegger, 1962,
173)
Imagination needs to be grounded in reflection to draw one's cognitive
style back and to see the unknown. This is the function of
imagination-with-reason. It is in this way that imagination extends critical
thinkers' perspectives of thinking, but without going too far to be rational.
With imagination, children could avoid sticking to concrete things.
Therefore, imagination-with-reason, as Kant and Heidegger claim,
empowers the ability of creation. It creates possibilities for expanding
knowledge, but brings children towards the road of rational emancipation.
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In noting the relationship between emancipation, reflection and
imagination, teaching the ability of emancipation therefore must be in
company with teaching the ability of self-reflection. In this way of
teaching, although children's imagination takes the risk of making a
mistake when it functions in creation or producing a new cognitive aspect,
self-reflection enables them to penetrate into the error of imagination.
This shows the integrated form of teaching critical thinking.
Therefore, circumstances such as: exploratory conditions for children's
curiosity and creativity; open-ended discussion settings for self-reflection;
and enough room for children's imagination, will open a road for children
towards emancipation.
In general, emancipation is aimed at creating a new aspect. In teaching,
Rebbeck suggests that free-writing is one of the creativity exercises
(Rebbeck, 1989, 26-28). This suggestion stresses the idea of not killing
children's curiosity, inquiry and imagination. That is, children should be
encouraged to learn rationally and heuristically, and to discover different
rationalities or alternatives via open-ended explorations. In this way, when
children are learning the ability of emancipation, their ability for reflection
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will be also developed.
On the other hand, emancipation is fundamentally grounded in autonomy,
while autonomy will be expanded through emancipation. As analysed in
chapter five, autonomy is in accordance with the possession of freedom,
and with the task of the self. Therefore, autonomy must be expanded
through emancipation, by which the possession of freedom is expanded. As
Bre'hier claims, "freedom is a creation of ourselves; to be free is to do, not
to become..." (Bre'hier, Baskin (trans.), 1969, 61).
Cooper enriches autonomy with "becoming what you are" (Cooper, 1983,
16). For Cooper, this sort of autonomy is 'authenticity'. In this sense,
'the' self plays a significant role in emancipation and autonomy. That is,
through self-reflection, emancipation is possible; through seif-actualisation,
autonomy is expanded. Self-reflection and seif-actualisation must be based
on self-realisation, otherwise, self-reflection and seif-actualisation will be
distorted.
In addition, encouraging children to say 'No" is an experience of
emancipation. Trying to say 'No' should be in company with the sense of
responsibility. In other words, emancipation is a task for children to take
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responsibility for their knowing and action. This condition is quite
significant for developing the ability for autonomy, especially for Chinese
children, because they are usually taught not to rebel and even not to
question anything. In Chinese society, children therefore lose themselves
in saying 'Yes', and then they may have trouble in saying 'No'; in
particular, to say 'No' to authority, e.g., teachers. Consequently, they will
be suffering from losing themselves, and also they may lack abilities for
emancipation.
In my view, except for the factor of culture, two reasons for being afraid
of saying 'No' may be that we have not acquired enough knowledge to
prove which is correct or right; and that we lack courage to cope with a
new fact which may cause much more inconvenience or tension than to act
as usual.
Two methods will be suggested in helping children to say 'No'. First,
education must provide children with sufficient background knowledge - as
much as educators can do, and as much as children can grasp - so that
children will have confidence in saying 'No'. Second, self-identity should
be strengthened, because self-identity offers the self the basic ability for
thinking and acting independently. With the strength of self-identity,
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courage will be encouraged. Passmore suggests that "imaginativeness is a
form of courage" (Passmore, 1980, 163). That is, developing the ability
for imagination will help to strengthen courage.
In practice, courage can be inspired by offering children "an opportunity
to think up explanations for themselves, for example, to try to think out
ways of testing proposed explanations, to criticise suggested explanations",
as Passmore suggests (Passmore, 1980, 48). Teachers should support
children's positive self-esteem to enforce their self-identity. Meanwhile,
teachers should trust children's ability for ruling themselves, then a child's
authentic self can speak out. In this way, children are encouraged to take
responsibility for themselves.
Finally, the principle for teaching the ability of reconstruction will be
worked out. Two functions of reconstruction - synthesis and continuation -
will be explained, before its pedagogical principles are suggested.
First, reconstruction is the synthetically dialectical process of critical
thinking. It completes the tasks of skepticism, reflection and emancipation.
The relationship between skepticism, reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction can also be shown from Confucius' claim:
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One can understand human events which happened around oneself, when
one is forty years old; when one is fifty, one can understand the way of the
Heaven; when one is sixty, one can immediately grasp what he heard; when
one is seventy, one can do anything that one wants to do, but without
misbehaviour. (Analects, Ch. 2)
According to Confucius, before forty years, one cannot understand human
events very well, it is the stage for skepticism. After forty years, with the
profound understanding, one can reflect upon human events but on the
criterion of the Heaven. When man is seventy, he can emancipate himself
from the constraints of human events and the Heaven. Therefore, he can
construct his own value system in his own way, because he has become an
autonomous person, whose thought and acts are automatically and naturally
in accordance with the Way of the Heaven.
Here, I do not intend to discuss the epistemological foundation of
Confucius' statements but, taking the statements as an example is helpful to
grasp the relation between skepticism, reflection, emancipation,
reconstruction, and autonomy. According to the above statements, "one
can do anything that one wants..." implies the ultimate, real concern of
emancipation, while "without misbehaviour" is the model of an autonomous
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person. Each age-stage is a result of reconstruction in life: each
reconstruction shows an improvement of a person, both his reason and his
acts. The whole process shows the tasks of reconstruction in life.
According to the above discussion, the process of reconstruction can be
illustrated as follows:
a) positive acceptance after skepticism, in firmly believing in conventional
rules and tending to be satisfied with them;
b) negative rejection through reflection: by facing a new condition with
new problems upon which the existing rule is reflected; and
c) synthesising positive with negative dimensions, by which two
possibilities may come to us through reconstruction - either a
completely new rule or a synthetical rule, by which the existing rule is
integrated into the new one.
In this process, reconstruction shows its dialectical characteristic. During
this process, after skepticism, a rule or paradigm may be accepted
positively. Then, this rule will be reflected upon, and it perhaps will be
rejected. Finally, a new rule will be reconstructed, either by modifying the
existing rule or by changing completely the existing rule.
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Also, reconstruction is a continuous task. During the process of
reconstruction, the ability of autonomy adjusts human value systems to be
accordance with a new circumstance, while emancipation pushes men to go
beyond the status quo and to venture into a new world with new
knowledge. In this way, a new paradigm, in the sense of Kuhn (1962), will
be constructed on or beyond the existing paradigm. However, the new
paradigm may give rise to a new problem. That is the reason why critical
thinkers should keep reflecting upon themselves, including their value
systems, continuously when they face new problems.
Giddens confirms the significance of the continuous task of reconstruction.
He says,
.there is no circumstance in which the conditions of action can become
wholly opaque to agents, since action is constituted via the accountability of
practices, actors are always knowledgeable about the structural framework
within which their conduct is carried on, because they draw upon that
framework in producing their action at the same time as they reconstitute it
through that action. (Giddens, 1979, 145)
According to the characteristics of reconstruction, i.e. dialectical synthesis
and continuation, two skills are needed for the task of reconstruction:
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problem-solving and communication skills. Actually, reconstruction can be
viewed as a result of problem-solving. Also, these two characteristics are
involved in the nature of communication, in terms of synthetical and
dialectical argumentation continuously. Therefore, teaching the ability for
reconstruction must at the least involve teaching the abilities for
problem-solving and communication.
Problem-solving skills are skills of how we deal with a problem and how
we arrive at a viable solution (D-Costa, 1986, 9-11). Such skills should be
able to connect human background knowledge with real life. As discussed,
critical thinkers can employ different problem-solving skills to deal with
varied problems.
According to Ayer, solving problems might include at least six steps:
a) identifying a problem;
b) gathering information concerning the problem;...
c) finding components of the problem;
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d) brainstorming* possible solutions to the selected problem;
e) finding solutions; and
f) justifying a solution and developing a course of action (Ayer, 1989,
1-14).
From the above steps, problem-solving skills can be broken into the
following abilities: responding to circumstances, setting goals, analysing
information, making decisions and evaluating results. In other words,
skills such as analysis, classification, judgment and evaluation should be
included and are needed in teaching for the skills of problem-solving.
Teaching for problem-solving skills is an art - flexible and various.
Bonstingel in his book Introduction To The Social Sciences designs a
teaching package for problem-solving skills both for teachers and students
(Bonstingel, 1991, 10-43). This package includes sixteen units: expressing
problems clearly; identifying central issues; making comparisons;
* brainstorming possible solutions to the selected problem shows that teaching must make
an adjustment both to the individual and a group. Brainstorming is usually used in a
group-teaching, however its principle can also be used by the individual. For instance,
the individual sorts out the solution from different viewpoints. Every individual can
categorise the solutions, which is also one of the steps of brainstorming.
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determining relevance; creating good questions; distinguishing facts,
opinions, and inference; checking consistency; recogni sing assumptions;
distinguishing false from accurate images; recognising propaganda, bias,
and ideologies; recognising cause and effect; predicting consequences;
identifying alternatives; demonstrating reasoned judgment and drawing and
testing conclusions. All these strategies provide teachers with references
for teaching problem-solving skills.
Two feasible methods for developing the ability for problem-solving will
be sorted out from the above discussions. First, a situation with tension, in
which children's knowledge, belief and value system are challenged, is
needed in order to inspire the motivation of inquiry. Meanwhile,
children's curiosity and exploration therefore will be stimulated by the
tension.
After learning how to cope with the tension from such a situation, children
will be encouraged to deal further with controversy and uncertainty in
their own life. During the processes of experiencing a tension and learning
how to cope with it, children will experience how to modify the versions of
their own value systems, and to sharpen their intuitive and creative
capacities for solving their own problems. These accumulate the abilities
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for reflection and emancipation.
The second pedagogical principle for teaching the ability of
problem-solving is that children need to be arranged into a new setting. in
which both their own value systems and others' will be challenged. This
provides children with the opportunity to reflect upon their existing value
system. In this new setting, children will be incorporated into an
open-ended discussion, which leaves enough room for children to question
the rationality of themselves and others', and also to exercise their
imagination in connecting their own experiences with others'.
In this setting, discussion should also be stressed, because, as in Clarke's
description, "discussion is a cycle of inquiry" (Clarke, 1988, 143), more
than that, discussion is also an operation of reason in concrete. During
discussion, children should be encouraged to clarify their values, to extend
their experiences, to empower their expressive capacities, to harmonise
interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships, and to strengthen their
sensitivity to internal or external pressures around them.
In addition to the ability of problem-solving, teaching communicative skills
constitutes the task of reconstruction. In my view and according to
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Haberrnas' theory of communicative action, good communication must be
grounded in rational argumentation (Habermas; McCarthy (trans.), 1984,
1987), in which reason and emotion are united through rhetoric techniques
and rational discourse. Rhetoric is taken neutrally as a medium of
communication in this thesis, while communication is aimed at expressing
individual ideas, understanding each other, and reaching a consensus.
Ability for communication should be developed, because communication is
such an important ability for critical thinkers to reconstruct a consensus in
democratic society. The major characteristics of communicative abilities
may be participation, respect, cooperation, understanding, rhetoric,
decentralising and open-mindedness and so on. Apart from these abilities,
a sense of humour is assumed to be positively helpful to easy a tension
during communication, either when a consensus has not yet been reached,
or when one's dignity is involved in an argument.
According to the above characteristics of communication, four principles
for teaching communicative skills will be suggested. First, children's
linguistic skills should be developed. Therefore, the abilities of speech,
debate, discussion, and telling stories are important for teaching critical
thinking. Second, teachers should provide children a warm, safe
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atmosphere for speaking, so that children can express themselves freely. In
this sense, a democratic situation is needed. Third, controversial or
uncertain circumstances are also helpful for children to practise the skills
of debate and discussion. Finally, folk and fairy tales can be used as
relevant materials for children to develop the nature of humanity and
imagination-with-reason. With these abilities, children will be able to
engage in rational argumentation effectively and fluently.
In addition to the above linguistic knowledge and skills, inner speech is
emphasised here, because it is significant for understanding and
self-reflection, during the communicative action. Also, understanding and
self-reflection constitute the foundation of emancipation and reconstruction
for critical thinkers, according to the nature of critical thinking. The
meaning of inner speech is shown in Richard, Platt & Weber's
explanations:
inner speech is a type of "speech" discussed by the Russian psychologist
Vygotsky who distinguished between external speech and inner speech.
External speech is spoken or written speech, and is expressed in words, and
sentences. Inner speech is speech for oneself. It takes place inside one's
own mind and often takes place in "pure word meanings" rather than in
words or sentences, according to Vygotsky. (Richards, Platt & Weber,
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1985, 142-3)
This definition also confirms the function of inner speech as a bridge
between thinking and language.
Streff points out four characteristics of inner speech in his paper at the
Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association in 1987: silence,
production of low levels of semantic elaboration, production of low levels
of syntactic elaboration, and egocentricity (Streff, 1987). Also, he points
out eight capacities of inner speech:
Teaching about inner speech facilitates 1) the learning of human
communication as process; 2) the development of decentralising, or the
ability to understand information objectively; 3) the development of
displacement, or the ability to transcend time and space via the word; 4) the
development of semantic elaboration; 5) the development of syntactic
elaboration; 6) the learning of contextuality; 7) the awareness of language
arts as an integrated discipline; and 8) the development of appreciation for
the human condition. (Streff, 1987)
Inner speech ability needs to be developed, because it may help us have
deep understanding by which the value system and ideology will be
penetrated. Such understanding also paves the road towards rational
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reconstruction.
To summarise, in practice, the abilities of critical thinking, i.e. skepticism,
reflection, emancipation, reconstruction and autonomy, cannot be
separated. This nature can be shown from the task of problem-solving.
When authority or constraint makes men uncomfortable, men begin to
question whether it is rational, if men are autonomous persons. After that,
with inquiry, the authority and constraint will be reflected upon, and men
may emancipate themselves from such authority and constraint.
Simultaneously, a new system will be reconstructed. In this process, the
authority or constraint is viewed as a problem in our life. Solving this
problem becomes the task of critical thinking. In this way, the process and
abilities of critical thinking cannot be completely separated.
Conclusion
The principles for teaching critical thinking rest in 'children thinking by
themselves' rather than 'teachers telling children what to learn'. The
abilities for critical thinking, skepticism (inquiry), reflection, emancipation
and reconstruction are categorised, according to the modes of critical
thinking in this thesis. The abilities of skepticism (inquiry), reflection,
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emancipation and reconstruction constitute the foundation abilities of
critical thinking. The range of autonomy is expanded through
seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation, therefore, the abilities
of critical thinking are necessary for autonomy. In this sense, autonomy
must be developed, and it must be developed through individual thinking
and experiencing.
In this chapter, two major arguments about teaching for critical thinking
were clarified. They are: teaching critical thinking is compatible with
knowledge teaching; and transferability of critical thinking is possible, but
it depends upon the structure of knowledge and individual ability for
working out the similarity of knowledge. After that, the relation between
the background knowledge of critical thinking and curricular design -
specific teaching and cross-disciplinary experience - was identified, before
the pedagogical principles were suggested.
Peters stresses the task of 'practice' in education by claiming that education
both in theory and practice should "[keep] closely in touch with practice"
(Peters, in Tibble, 1966, 55). Critical thinking is such a case. As
discussed, teaching for critical thinking is a process of teaching and
learning by thinking and experiencing. On this account, the detailed
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syllabus of teaching for it should not be provided. Instead, in accordance
with the nature of critical thinking, pedagogical principles for skepticism
(inquiry), reflection, emancipation and reconstruction are established as a
frame of reference for teaching.
By and large, pedagogical principles for developing the ability of
skepticism are to provide irrational or vague situations, in order to
stimulate children's sensitivity, curiosity. The pedagogical principles for
reflection lie in the functions of the self. The pedagogical principles for
emancipation emphasise the abilities of inquiry and imagination and the
dispositions of courage and taking responsibility. Finally, the pedagogical
principles for reconstruction include the abilities for problem-solving and
communication.
With instructional principles for teaching critical thinking as a frame of
reference, teachers will be expected to design an adequate syllabus for
children to meet children's specific needs. In this sense, there should be
no standard teaching model for teaching critical thinking. More
importantly, teachers themselves should be a model as critical thinkers for
children. Thus, sharing with each other their individual teaching
experiences will be helpful for teachers to improve their teaching abilities
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for teaching critical thinking. In this sense, seminars or research groups
on teaching critical thinking in the school should be encouraged.
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Conclusions
As stated, one purpose of this thesis was to provide a critical review of
cultural, social and educational framings in Taiwan. That is partly because
the colonial past has been an obstacle to Taiwanese autonomy, ever since
Taiwan was under the occupation of the Dutch - from 1624 to 1652 (Yang,
1987, 5 - 6); and partly because education in Taiwan is dominated by
Sunism, i.e. the Three Principles of the People, and Confucianism, as
described in the first two chapters. Thus, contemporary educational crises
in Taiwan, in terms of autonomy, were identified, and their cultural, social
and educational framings were reflected on. Following this purpose, this
thesis has identified the current educational problems of Taiwan and, where
education should go next.
A lack of autonomy was identified as the major crisis of primary school
education in Taiwan. Seeking the fundamental root of autonomy became
the focus of chapter III, IV and V. One of the commonalities of critical
thinking in its different modes is autonomy. In this sense, developing
critical thinking can also develop one's ability for autonomy. Autonomy
implies self-government with freedom for personal and social development
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in this thesis. The etymology of the term 'autonomy' - 'autos' means 'self,
while 'nomos' means 'rules' or 'law' (Dworkin, 1988, 12) - reveals also the
role of self played in life.
Therefore, another purpose of this thesis was to indicate the significance of
autonomy for life and education. Four dimensions which are concerned
with the nature of autonomy were discussed: a) four modes of critical
thinking; b) inner and external characteristics of critical thinking, including
its definition; c) the significance of autonomy for a good life; and d) the
distinction between indoctrination and education.
A central conclusion of this thesis was that it is incumbent to teach critical
thinking in order that the Taiwanese meet their demands for modemisation
via the ability for autonomy. The conclusions address the following
questions. What is the movement of Taiwan's modernity nowadays? what
are the obstacles in educational systems that curb Taiwan's movement
towards modernisation? what is the nature of critical thinking? why is
teaching critical thinking significant for Taiwan's modernity? and how is
critical thinking put into educational practice in Taiwan?
430
Taiwan's modernisation: its historical and current movements
From the middle of the 17th century until the middle of the 20th century
Taiwan was treated as an economy to be exploited by three periods of
occupation. The first period was that of the Dutch from 1624 to 1650
(Campbell, 1967; Gordon, 1970; Yang, 1987); the second period saw the
control of Taiwan by the Ching Dynasty from 1652 to 1895 (Carrington,
1977), a period which included a change of the Mainland Chinese Dynasty;
and the third period was occupation by Japan, from 1895 to 1945
(Grajdanzev, 1942; The Government General of Taiwan, 1912).
Economic progress had been made during these periods. The total income
of business, including products and trade, in Taiwan was at the time of the
occupation of the Dutch the second highest among the Asian countries
(Yang, 1987, 17; Grajdanzev, 1942, 154-159). Surplus agricultural
products increased from 1,356 piculs in 1866 to 99,050 piculs in 1883
(piculs = bs) (Hopkins, 1884, 6 - 7).
In contrast, the political thought and cultural identity were underdeveloped
compared with the economic development, because of military control,
administrative operations and educational indoctrination. The Dutch,
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instead of offering training for the Taiwanese, encouraged emigration
from the Mainland to Taiwan (Yang, 1987, 11); also, they Christianized the
native Taiwanese through religious dogma (Campbell, 1967, 308 - 310).
The Manchu Government prohibited Mainlanders from emigrating into
Taiwan for one hundred ninety years, from 1684 to 1874 (Yang, 1987, 42
- 56), lest the people in Taiwan connect with Mainlanders to rebel against
the Manchu Government. Following the system established by the Manchu
Government, the Japanese Government in Taiwan went further to control
not only politics, the economy and the freedom of thought, but also private
lives of the Taiwanese through the police and the identity card system
(Yang, 1987, 216 - 217; 222)
In general, education was never a major concern at that moment, under the
periods of occupation. Instead of Christianization the Dutch provided,
under the control of the Manchu Government only a few people were
educated to be the officials of the Government, and the Taiwanese were not
allowed to develop their own value system through the policy of
examination and employment (Yang, 1987, 99 -100) during the control of
Ching Dynasty. The Japanese Government in Taiwan did begin to build an
educational system, and education was developed rapidly in terms of
numbers of schools and students, which can be shown in table 8.1 (The
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Government General of Taiwan, 1946, 1211 - 1213). However,
Japanisation was the major educational aim for the Japanese Government to
provide the Taiwanese with education. Japanisation was aimed at making
the Taiwanese into Semi-Japanese, especially value systems. Therefore,
schools established for the Taiwanese were separate from those for the
Japanese (Tsurumi, 1977, 242 - 245), and the Taiwanese were allowed to
study only agriculture, economy and medicine. There was no way for the
Taiwanese to study politics or philosophy (Riggs, 1952, 137).
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Table 8.1 The development of education in 1918 and 1939
* Source: the Government General of Taiwan, The statistical Summary of Taiwan: since
1895, 1946, pp.1211-1213
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TABLE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
The mode of developing the economy instead of political thought and
cultural consciousness has been initiated in Taiwan since Taiwan was under
the control of the Dutch. Under such political domination, in particular, in
politics and education, cultural identity was weakened and the lack of
autonomy became rooted in Taiwanese society. Such a crisis still exists in
current society of Taiwan, although economic and political autonomies
have been claimed recently, since 1987. It is a case that the monopolisation
of political opinions and the ideology of stability* retard the speed of
political reform in Taiwan. (The KMT was the only political party in
Taiwan until 1986, and it is still the party of the Government to date. In
contrast, the DPP (Democratic Progress Party), the opposition political
party, was established in 1986, and it is still too weak to be a party useful
for checks and balances.)
Gradually, the political power and policies are, however, shifted in
* the ideology of stability: 'Growth with stability' must be distinguished from the
'ideology of stability'. 'Growth with stability' is a means for social and individual
development, whereas 'the ideology of stability' is a political strategy for dominating
by an elite. In this sense, individual or social development should not be constrained
under the policy of 'growth with stability', because 'growth with stability' must be
taken as simply a medium rather than an end for social, economic and political
developments.
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Taiwan. The subordination of economic growth to political interest was
criticised through the personal and press freedoms which were expanded
with the end of Martial Law. For example, a number of demonstrations
emerged, e.g. the chung-! Incident in 1976 and the Formosa Incident in
1979. The crucial appeal of these demonstrations is to claim Taiwanese
independence or self-determination (Gold, 1986, 94), even though the
economic performance has offered the KMT Government in Taiwan a
good political return (Li, 1988, 26 - 27).
This implies a demand for autonomy, it implies also the demands for
modernisation and liberalisation. Modernisation in this thesis includes
economic growth, political democracy and cultural development, and it
results from the reconstruction of rationality, in Habermas' terms
(Habermas, in Bernstein (ed.), 1985, 3 - 14). Liberalisation in this thesis
emphasises 'romantic autonomy' which is based on 'conscious freedom'
and, it is reached via self-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation,
as discussed in chapter five. In this sense, rational consensus on
liberalisation and modemisation is needed for the Taiwanese to overcome
the crisis of the weakness of self-identity and of the lack of ability for
autonomy.
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The curbs on Taiwan's movement towards modernisation: an
educational perspective
Taiwan is still on the way towards modernity in the economy, as well as in
politics and culture, thus, what the Taiwanese should do, first of all, is to
remove political and cultural obstacles to improve individual and social
developments. As stressed, it is incumbent on education to help people to
cope with them, however, education has been used economically and/or
politically since Taiwan was the colony of the Dutch. For example, in
order to reach the economic goal, the emphasis on technology becomes a
key dimension for developing Taiwan's education (Council for Economic
Planning and Development, 1991, 283 - 294). In addition, as analysed in
chapter one and two, the educational aim is affected by political interest,
which pushes education to be in accordance with economic policies through
cultural ideologies of Confucianism, collectivism or nationalism.
As Chan & Clark point out, "traditional Confucian culture has seemed
more important than social change in promoting entrepreneurship and
economic growth" (Chan & Clark, 1992, 97). Confucianism does
contribute to Taiwan's economic miracle by emphasising the instrumental
function of education, and by stressing the virtues such as patriotism,
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loyalty, filial piety, obedience and so on. Within these virtues, Taiwanese
personality traits such as industriousness, deferred gratification are formed
to contribute to the investment of physical capital. It is in this way that
political Sunism, i.e. the Three Principles of the People, and cultural
Confucianism have been added to the instrumental function of the economy
in Taiwan since 1945.
The dysfunction, dehumanisation and depersonalisation of education, in
terms of the lack of autonomy, then emerge from educational activities
such as educational aim, administration, textbooks, teaching objectives and
the types of learning and teaching. As a result, the Taiwanese develop
merely the virtues of Confucianism, e.g., patience and fortitude, but lack
authenticity and self-identity. Therefore, the Taiwanese are not courageous
enough to rebel against tradition, even though education has been
tremendously expanded since the 1950s (Council for Economic Planing and
Development, 1992, 277 - 292; The Ministry of Education, 1991, 1).
Under this situation, the ability of critical thinking reveals its significance
for the Taiwanese to unfetter themselves from political and traditional
curbs.
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The nature of critical thinking
The nature of critical thinking was investigated through the analyses of its
four modes and the reinterpretations of its noesis. The abilities of critical
thinking, worked out from its four modes, are skepticism (inquiry),
reflection (understanding), emancipation and reconstruction. Human
insights are constituted and expanded through operating these abilities
continuously. However, the noema with which critical thinking deals is so
different that different modes of critical thinking reveal not only their
commonalities but also their diversities.
The commonalities of critical thinking revealed through manifesting its
inner logic are: a) pivoting a common motive on autonomy; b)
interweaving genetic with dialectical development; c) enriching cognitive
styles from one dimensionality to multi-dimensionality; d) emancipating
men from alienation; and e) establishing rationality as its inner logic for a
good life. The diversities of critical thinking are shown from the fact that
critical thinking deals with contingencies rather than with universal
situations. In this sense, critical thinking is defined as a dialectical practice
of mind of an autonomous person to transcend his current life for the
better.
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By and large, the characteristics of critical thinking are divided into inner
and external characteristics - the external characteristic shows from the
expert knowledge one has; while the inner characteristic is displayed by an
autonomous person. The external characteristic of critical thinking can be
used to distinguish critical thinkers from others who lack critical thinking.
On the other hand, distinguishing better critical thinking from worse is
hard, because the criterion for human achievements should be varied to be
in accordance with the whole context of human activities. Such a criterion
had better be established through rational argumentations, and should not
be taken as permanent.
Teaching critical thinking is significant for Taiwan's
modernisation
Autonomy, as discussed in chapter five, showing the abilities of
seif-realisation, self-reflection and seif-actualisation, is a fundamental
condition for self-identity. According to the historical buirden of Taiwan,
analysed above, what is needed in Taiwan is more critical and rational
citizens.
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There are three reasons for the need for critical thinking to move towards
Taiwan's modernity. First, historically and phenomenologically, alienation
captures Taiwanese ability for autonomy, because of false-consciousness,
e.g., the belief that silence is the best policy, and of institutionalisation
during the periods of occupation. Therefore, the Taiwanese have to
emancipate themselves from such alienation so as to identify themselves as
autonomous people.
Second, the experiences of authoritarianism, acquired from political and
cultural dominations since the occupation of the Dutch, forced the
Taiwanese to develop the value system of survival which is taken as the
priority of life. Also, this system shaped not only the personality of
industriousness and discipline but also the personality of conservatism.
Therefore, the ability for imagination-with-reason needs to be developed
through enriching the cognitive style from one dimensionality to
multi-dimensionality, in order to transcend such personalities which were
formed by historical and cultural burdens.
Third, in order to keep abreast with the prospects for continued economic
growth, and go towards mature democracy and rational culture, the
Taiwanese should reconstruct the rationality of modernisation. It is
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incumbent on education to improve people's abilities for critical and
rational thinking, because education performs the functions of transmission
and expansion of culture, including knowledge and experiences.
According to the nature of critical thinking, life is a process of
problem-solving. The contemporary problematics in Taiwan: colonial
past, traditional burdens, individual and social developments at the basis of
instrumental reason, i.e. developing economy rather than political thought
or cultural consciousness retard the speed towards modernisation. This
explains the gap between the economic and political developments in
Taiwan.
Under the controls of political thought and cultural consciousness, the
Taiwanese are confused by questions such as, whether Sunism and
Confucianism need to be reflected upon; whether the party chairman
should be the real leader of the party-state; whether education is only the
concern of political parties; and whether Taiwan and the Mainland should
be merged into a New China. In a word, the Taiwanese are confused to
decide where they should go next. Critical thinking then again reveals its
significance for seeking self-identity.
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The argument that critical thinking is essential for autonomy, harmony and
reconstruction of a good life was justified in chapter five. The relationship
between person, culture, and society is understood reciprocally via critical
thinking. In other words, human beings develop themselves and build up
their culture on the ground of tradition but without suffering from it,
because of the intentionality for autonomy. Meanwhile, harmony, a
common good not only in Greek culture but also in Chinese culture,
provides an autonomous person with a criterion for happy and intelligent
life. In this sense, critical thinking is needed to facilitate individual and
social developments towards a better rationality in accordance with the
loop of critical thinking: inquiry ---> reflection ----> emancipation --->
reconstruction ---> inquiry -->...
According to Habermas, establishing a better rationality of a good life is an
aim of modernisation (Habermas, in Bernstein (ed.),1985). In this sense,
teaching for critical thinking is needed for Taiwan's modernisation in two
ways. One, the rationality for individual and social developments can be
located through critical thinking; the other, the current rationality of
development will be reflected upon continuously, so as to prevent
rationality becoming a negative ideology.
443
First, the ultimate concern of teaching critical thinking is assumed to be to
enlighten people to be themselves, i.e. to be authentic and autonomous
people. Therefore, teaching critical thinking will help people to question
authority which is irrational, to emancipate themselves from the negative
ideology, and to reconstruct a rational value system. This is what the
Taiwanese need to locate where they should go next.
Second, although education has contributed to human welfare, social
stability and economic prosperity in Taiwan, political thought has been
prevented from developing since Taiwan was under the control of the
Dutch. Therefore, teaching for critical thinking is important for the
Taiwanese to improve the ability for reflection. After that, the Taiwanese
are able to reflect upon the existing value systems, e.g., the instrumental
rationality, the belief in authority and cultural Confucianism.
To summarise, the abilities for skepticism, reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction are needed for the Taiwanese to cope with current problems
and to overcome political and cultural obstacles, and then to reach a
rational consensus for individual and social developments. Therefore,
teaching for critical thinking should be Taiwan's direct goal at this
moment.
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How to put teaching critical thinking into educational practice
In fact, teaching critical thinking has become an important concern in
education (Ennis, 1985; Fisher, 1988; Kuffis, 1988; Lipman, 1989). I
would like to repeat that in order to improve the ability for critical
thinking, teaching critical thinking should be indispensable. How to put
critical thinking into educational practice then will be an essential stage for
teaching critical thinking.
However, arguments about teaching critical thinking such as, whether
teaching critical thinking is compatible with the official aim of education
and teaching, still exist. Therefore, a number of concepts of education
such as the nature of education and knowledge were discussed in chapter
seven. The main conclusions about these arguments were a) critical
thinking can be taught, and what can be taught is its external
characteristics, by which critical thinking may be exercised through
individual experiencing; b) teaching for critical thinking is compatible with
teaching knowledge, if teaching knowledge is not taken as an activity of
giving-taking but of experiencing and thinking; c) possibilities for the
transferability of critical thinking from school knowledge to daily life
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depend upon individual background knowledge and upon individual ability
for categorising knowledge into cognitive styles.
According to the nature of critical thinking, teaching critical thinking
should show correspondence not only with common but also with diverse
contexts. Therefore, only instructional principles for teaching critical
thinking were provided in this thesis. This thesis suggested that the
practical activities of teaching critical thinking must be designed by
teachers and students themselves so as to be in accordance with individual
contexts.
In chapter seven three principles for teaching the abilities for
emancipation, reflection and reconstruction were suggested. The ability
for emancipation includes the skills of inquiry and imagination; the ability
for reflection includes the skills of understanding, communication and the
disposition of responsibility; and the ability for reconstruction includes the
skills of communication and problem-solving.
Teaching such skills and dispositions should be possible in Taiwan. First,
these skills and dispositions will be effective in enabling the Taiwanese to
create not only an economic miracle but also a political miracle in the near
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future, because intentionality for autonomy will inspire people to create
rather than to imitate; and to rationalise rather than to riot. Second, the
range of freedom has been expanded with the end of Martial Law after its
exercising in Taiwan for forty years. Terminating Martial Law implies
that the room for freedom of thought is expanded, therefore the hindrance,
in terms of cultural or political taboo, to the enlightenment of reason is
reduced. This provides the very time for the Taiwanese to establish their
autonomy. In addition, as Gold claims, "economic development, a higher
standard of living, nine years of compulsory education, and an influx of
foreign ideas and practices has created a more complex society in Taiwan"
(Gold, 1986, 94); therefore, dominating the Taiwanese through political
power has become more difficult than before. In such circumstances, the
struggle for autonomy will be easier than in previous eras when people
were suffering from the eagerness to survive.
Nevertheless, educational autonomy needs to be struggled for by teachers
themselves. Teachers must first enlighten themselves to be autonomous
people, then education could not be dominated economically and politically,
but would have its own end for individual, social and cultural
developments. In this sense, teachers' ability for self-education should be
improved. Yet, if teacher education is controlled by the Government, this
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will more or less constitute a difficulty for teachers' autonomy.
As discussed in chapter I, II, Ill and V. the difficulties for teaching critical
thinking in Taiwan emerge from the fact that the criteria for autonomy and
harmony become a negative ideology, in terms of instrumental reason
shown in political interest and the cultural myth. Accordingly, individual
development is confined to instrumental reason. In acknowledging this,
distinguishing education from indoctrination is useful for bringing out the
concept of autonomy, before teaching critical thinking is undertaken. This
was undertaken in chapter VI.
Education acquires a chance to reflect upon itself from such distinction.
Moreover, educational autonomy is drawn out through moving the
attention of education from the objective aspect, e.g., knowledge, to the
subjectivity, e.g., teachers and pupils themselves. In this way, the contents
of political and cultural dogmas and indoctrinating methods may be
prevented from functioning as indoctrination. Also, it is in this way that
the educational innovation will not be at odds with existing educational
systems or policies, because distinguishing education from indoctrination is
taken as an educational improvement, an improvement from the inside of
schooling rather than from external politics or institutions. In a word,
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schooling should be reflected upon continuously so that it will not become
indoctrination.	 Meanwhile, the consensus on the criterion for
distinguishing education from indoctrination must be reached by teachers,
parents and administrators. This criterion, as argued on the ground of the
nature of critical thinking in this thesis, is autonomy.
Next, instead of criticising political policies, schooling should emphasise
the expression of metacognitive processes and products. For example,
pupils should be able to show their metacognitive knowledge, in which
self-reflection, self-appraisement and individual experiences of cognition
will come up. This process helps the pupil himself not only to redefine his
cognitive styles, but also to share his cognitive knowledge and experience
with others. This is a communicative way to establish a rational value
system. In addition, in this way, pupils expand their views of knowledge
and thinking, because they learn not only declarative knowledge but also
procedural knowledge. More importantly, it is an educational process
rather than a political interest. Therefore, it is acceptable at the present in
Taiwan within cultural and political circumstances as such.
At the same time, 'learning by thinking and experiencing' was claimed as a
major principle for teaching critical thinking in chapter VII. In order to
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help children to cope better with their environment, teaching should
provide children with opportunities to experience and to think in their own
different ways, and should help children towards seif-realisation,
self-reflection and self-actualisation. This is the way towards autonomy.
Also, through the experiences of seif-realisation, self-reflection and
seif-actualisation, pupils' abilities for transfer and organisation may be
enriched. That is, school knowledge will connect with daily knowledge
through experiencing and thinking. In this sense, the ability for transfer
makes sense to autonomy.
As argued in chapter seven, the possibility for the transferability of
knowledge depends upon individual capacities for categorising knowledge
into cognitive styles and upon the nature of knowledge itself. Also, it was
argued that curricula for teaching critical thinking should be designed in a
dialectical way, therefore, any one of the discuplinary approach, i.e.
specific or cross disciplinary, is insufficient for teaching critical thinking.
That is, given that the direct goal of learning is aimed at integrating school
knowledge with daily knowledge, then a cross-disciplinary approach may
be appropriate. On the other hand, if the goal is aimed at enriching pupils'
background knowledge, the teaching of specific knowledge may meet such
a demand. In other words, learning must be viewed as a whole activity, so
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that these two forms of curricula should be integrated dialectically,
corresponding with pupils' individual needs and the circumstances of
teaching and learning. Through such curricula, learning by experience
provides pupils with opportunities to access underlying similarities and
differences among different fields of knowledge, and to integrate pupils'
cognitive styles and knowledge, especially during the processes of
problem-solving and rational argumentation. After such learning, pupils
are expected to apply their knowledge in diverse contexts. For teachers,
similarly, as Grant suggests, teaching critical thinking should be taken as a
process "that draws upon teachers' knowledge in communicating subject
matter to students" (Grant, 1988, 119).
Finally, improving teaching and learning by experience and thinking, as
suggested in this thesis requires changing the conditions of teaching and
learning such as the size of the class, the assessment, the instruction, with
especial emphasis on the treatment of individual learning, and teacher
education. In a word, reconstructing the consensus on schooling is needed.
In this vision, existing value systems, centralised educational
administration, the lack of ability for self-determination and the alienation
of teachers and pupils either from educational activities or from their lives
have prevented the teaching of critical thinking from showing a successful
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feedback, especially in Taiwan, because Taiwan's society is suffused with
the instrumental interest nowadays.
In spite of these difficulties, there is still room for enthusiasm. That is
partly because, fundamentally, teaching critical thinking is compatible with
current education; and partly because in the short term, as suggested above,
an evolutionary rather than revolutionary innovation of education is
expected. The very reason for change is that Taiwan's education at the
present is distorted in the ways of dysfunction, dehumanisation or
depersonalisation. Furthermore, there are at least two centres for research
on critical thinking - one in California, the other in New Jersey. These are
evidences to show the Government in Taiwan that the tide of education is
turning to teaching critical thinking, and also may persuade the
Government to go with the tide.
Education then in Taiwan at this moment is at a crucial juncture for
demanding reform. The Ministry of Education in Taiwan is keen on
offering projects on educational reforms, e.g., the establishment of the
Centre for National Educational Research, and educational projects on the
investigation of education in Social Sciences and Natural Sciences etc. In
this sense, this thesis may contribute not only to the short-term educational
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reform, in terms of schooling, but also to the long-term human
enlightenment of reason, in terms of the reflection, emancipation and
reconstruction of rationality for a good life. If this thesis can provide
people with an opportunity to reflect upon the dysfunction, dehumanisation
and depersonalisation of educational phenomena, to identify the authentic
self and to reconstruct a rational value system, then it will instil confidence
in the Taiwanese to move towards the 21st century.
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